The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation offers the following comments in reference to TSA's request for comment for "Intent To Request Approval From OMB of One New Public Collection of Information: Certification of Identity Form (TSA Form 415)."

1) TSA indicates that Form 415 will be updated so that "it is generally only available to travelers who certify that they: reside in or have been issued a driver's license or state identification card by a state that is compliant with the Real ID Act or a state that has been granted an extension by DHS; or have been issued another verifying identity document that TSA accepts." The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation believes there would be inequitable treatment among the residents of states that issue REAL ID compliant products and those states that do not. Even though an individual may reside in a state that issues REAL-ID compliant products, that state may have an opt-in process. As a result, the person may hold a non-compliant product from a compliant state and may be able to use the TSA form; however, a resident from a non-compliant state who holds a similar non-compliant product cannot use the TSA Form 415.

From a legal point of view, there does not appear to be any rational distinction between a resident of a state who has been issued a Real ID non-compliant product and a resident of a state that does not issue Real ID-compliant products at all. As such, TSA's proposal would appear to deny equal protection to similarly situated residents in different states. The department asks TSA to reconsider its policies and procedures related to TSA Form 415 to ensure equitable treatment.

Additionally, clarification is being sought regarding the statement that the form will be "...generally only available to travelers who certify that they: reside in or have been issued a driver's license or state identification card by a state that is compliant with the Real ID Act or a state that has been granted an extension by DHS; or have been issued another verifying identity document that TSA accepts..." The term "generally" seems to indicate that there would be some exceptions where the form would be used. Can TSA clarify when the form may be used by residents of non-compliant states who have not been issued another acceptable form of ID from the TSA list of acceptable identity documents?

2) The link contained at the end of the first paragraph under the heading "Information Collection Requirement" to access the list of acceptable verifying documents appears to be invalid. After clicking the link, the user is taken to a TSA webpage that indicates "Page Not Found." We believe "https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/resources/realid_factsheet.pdf" to be the correct link.

Please contact me if you have any questions.

Thanks,

Kara N. Templeton | Director
PA Department of Transportation | Bureau of Driver Licensing
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www.penndot.gov
December 9, 2016

United States Department of Homeland Security

Transportation Security Administration

[Docket No. DHS-2016-26958]

Intent To Request Approval From OMB of One New Public Collection of Information: Certification of Identity Form (TSA Form 415)

Keeping IDentities Safe (KIDS) submits the following comments in response to the Transportation Security Administration’s new Information Collection Request (ICR).

Background

Keeping IDentities Safe is a 501(c)(3), non-partisan, not for profit, crime prevention, educational charity based in Washington, D.C. Its central purpose is to raise awareness that weak state systems for issuing driver’s licenses and IDs increase the risk from terrorists and criminals who can fraudulently assume new identities to escape detection by law enforcement. Keeping IDentities Safe also educates and encourages parents to secure their children’s identities, as well as provides information on the risks under age persons incur when using a counterfeit or fraudulently obtained ID.

Keeping IDentities Safe supports continued enforcement and implementation the federal REAL ID Act rules, and enforcement of the act by the federal government. The REAL ID Act prohibits federal agencies from accepting driver’s licenses and state issued identification cards that do not meet certain standards. The REAL ID standards, published in 2008, reduce the risk of identity theft and fraud through the adoption of best practices.

Confirming the identity of travelers prior to boarding an aircraft is a vital component of aviation security. As the 9/11 Commission stated, “At many entry points to vulnerable facilities, including gates of boarding aircraft, sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they are and to check whether they are terrorists.” The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that the federal government set standards for driver’s licenses. 50 states, five territories, and the District of Columbia each issue driver’s licenses each under different authorities and processes, largely independent of each other. Prior to passage of the REAL ID Act, the federal government exercised minimal regulation regarding the issuance

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of driver's licenses, with the exception of regulations pertaining to HAZMAT and Commercial Driver’s Licenses and the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act. Subsequent REAL ID rules created metrics for the federal government to define the components and characteristics pertinent to the security of a state’s driver’s license and its reliability as a proof of identity. These metrics and the states’ certification of compliance reports provide a basis for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to determine whether or not it is acceptable for “official purposes.”

Keeping IDentities Safe endorses the Department’s efforts to enforce the REAL ID Act throughout the United States, and especially by the Transportation Security Agency’s (TSA) review of passenger credentials at airports. Currently, TSA treats every driver’s license as the same. There is no review of the physical security features nor the application and adjudication process employed by the states to issue driver’s licenses and identification cards.

REAL ID enforcement will be the first time TSA agents differentiate driver’s licenses to segregate non-compliant states from the majority of compliant states. This notice suggests that TSA anticipates an alternate process for airline travelers who present driver’s licenses as proof of identity that were issued by states non-compliant with REAL ID requirements.

Many questions remain regarding how REAL ID will be enforced at the airports. How will travelers be notified at the airports in advance of the scheduled January 2018 enforcement? What kind of signage will precede enforcement and subsequently be posted at airports? Have notices been sent to the airlines so they can notify passengers to bring alternate identification if they do not possess a REAL ID compliant driver’s license or ID? What kind of additional personnel will be needed to account for the number of travelers who present noncompliant identification at the airport?

TSA’s notice does provide some insight into one part of enforcement: what process would TSA use to confirm the identity of travelers who present driver’s licenses from noncompliant states. According to the notice, TSA plans on using knowledge based authentication based on commercial and government databases to confirm the identity of travelers.

Comments

Capture Documentation

If documentation is presented, TSA should capture the documentation presented via electronic scan. Should a crime be committed, the scan of the identification presented would provide value to an investigation.

Verifying the validity of noncompliant licenses

The REAL ID standards are intended to mitigate the risk that an individual will present fraudulent identification to assume or create a new identity. However, there is some identity management value that can be attached to a noncompliant license. Statutorily, it is only

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2 The REAL ID Act defines "official purposes" as presenting state driver’s licenses and identification cards for boarding commercially operated airline flights, entering federal buildings and nuclear power plants.
insufficient for "official purposes." TSA should use the noncompliant driver's license, in part, to verify the holder's identity. There are systems that allow for the verification of a limited data set, such as full name, date of birth, and most importantly, the document number of the driver's license.

Knowledge based authentication

The notice states that TSA uses knowledge based authentication to verify the identity of a traveler who cannot or will not present sufficient proof of identity at the screening checkpoint. According to DRAFT National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-63A Digital Authentication Guideline Enrollment and Identity Proofing, using knowledge based authentication as the only means of verifying an identity ranks as "adequate." Given the continued risk to aviation security and the growing availability of complete online identity packages via the Dark Web and Tor networks, we recommend that TSA utilize a multi-factor method of identity verification. According to the NIST standard, a "superior" level of identity verification includes the use of biometrics. Given that the traveler would be submitting only biographic information via a form, TSA should phase in the collection of physical data including a front facial image and fingerprints. If the passenger has been previously enrolled in a federal program, biometric technology can seek to confirm the identity of a traveler. It may also be used to compare that facial image and fingerprints against various watch lists to check for known or suspected terrorists as well as for outstanding warrants.

The knowledge based authentications completed by TSA's Identity Verification Call Center should be conducted consistent with the DRAFT NIST Special Publication 800-63A Digital Authentication Guideline Enrollment and Identity Proofing Requirements. Section 5.3.2. "Knowledge Based Verification Requirements" includes minimum standards for the use of knowledge based verification.

Contact:

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Comment: This proposed regulation should be withdrawn. The TSA has not made public the contents of the old or new proposed Form 415. The public has no meaningful ability to comment on the proposed collection of information without being able to view the proposed form.

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Country: 
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ZIP/Postal Code: 
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Submitter's Representative: 
Government Agency Type: 
Government Agency: 
Cover Page:
The REAL ID Act provides that "a Federal agency may not accept, for any official purpose, a driver's license or identification card issued by a State to any person unless the State is meeting the requirements of this section." Official purpose, as described in the description in this notice, includes boarding commercial aircraft. It is clear that the TSA is required to not accept identification documents that do not meet certain requirements. However, as is clear from the proposal, passengers are allowed to board aircraft without providing any documents at all. If they comply with the IVCC procedure, their identities are confirmed without providing documents. The proposed regulation's requirement that the IVCC procedure can only be used by passengers who have been issued (but do not possess) identity documents that comply with REAL ID does nothing to enhance security because, whether or not they have been issued a compliant identification card, their identity has been confirmed by the IVCC procedure and there is no question as to their identity. The fact that a REAL ID compliant document exists but is not present is not required by the act, does not enhance security, interferes with travelers' constitutional right of travel, discriminates against travelers based on their state of residence (if certain states, through no fault of the traveler, opt not to comply with the REAL ID Act), and discriminates against travelers based on a host of other protected factors (including race) since certain groups are less likely to have ever obtained identification documents even if they live in REAL ID states. While state compliance with the REAL ID Act is optional, this regulation appears to be designed to increase political pressure from the travelling public for states to comply with the act. The purpose of the TSA and this regulation should be to secure commercial aircraft. This regulation has provisions to accurately verify the identities of passengers without the need to coerce states to comply with an act that it is their right not to comply with.
COMMENTS OF THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER
to the
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Intent To Request Approval From OMB of One New Public Collection of Information: Certification of Identity Form (TSA Form 415)

[Docket No. 2016-26958]

January 9, 2017

By notice published November 8, 2016 the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") requested public comments regarding the agency's intent to request approval from the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") to collect information for a certification of identity form individuals who do not have a REAL ID that the DHS has deemed a "compliant" form of identification.\(^1\) Pursuant to this notice, the Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC") recommends that the TSA not pursue the proposed information collection. Several states still rightly oppose REAL ID precisely because of the massive cost and the privacy concerns arising from the excessive collection of personal information by the federal government. The TSA's proposal fails to address the underlying privacy objections to the REAL ID.

EPIC is a public interest research center in Washington, D.C. EPIC was established in

\(^1\) Intent To Request Approval From OMB of One New Public Collection of Information: Certification of identity Form (TSA Form 415), 81 Fed. Reg. 78,623 (Nov. 8, 2016).
1994 to focus public attention on emerging privacy and human rights related issues, and to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional values. EPIC has considerable expertise analyzing the privacy and security risks attendant to the design and implementation of REAL ID.

In 2007, EPIC filed comments on behalf of leading experts in privacy and technology in response to the draft regulations for REAL ID.² At the time, we stated, “REAL ID is fundamentally flawed because it creates a national identification system. It cannot be fixed no matter what the implementation regulations say. Therefore, the REAL ID Act must be repealed.”³ EPIC also highlighted the privacy and security risks of REAL ID as part of the “Spotlight on Surveillance” series.⁴ EPIC also testified before the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee and explained that the REAL ID draft regulations impermissibly create a national identification system, prohibited by the law that established the DHS, and threaten national security and individual privacy.⁵ In 2008, EPIC published a report detailing the significant costs of implementing REAL ID.⁶ EPIC explained that “[DHS] [] believes that it can sweep aside the fact that REAL ID is an unfunded mandate by allocating $360 million to the States for REAL ID implementation…However, the

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number still pales next to the agency’s ‘reduced’ estimate of $9.9 billion. Our concerns about the problems with REAL ID are widely shared by many other organizations.

We have attached to these comments both the 2007 and the 2008 Comments on REAL ID and ask they be included in the administrative record.

EPIC remains concerned that the REAL ID Act creates a national identification system, in violation of the DHS Act, and poses significant privacy risks to millions of individuals. Furthermore, TSA’s proposed collection of information will unduly burden millions of people in several states that have rightly chosen not to comply with the REAL ID Act.

I. History of Opposition to A National Identification System & REAL ID

National identification cards have long been used to suppress minorities, track dissidents, and extend state authority.

a. Historical Opposition to the Implementation of National Identification System

The United States has always opposed the creation of a national identification system. When the Social Security Number (“SSN”) was created in 1936, it was meant to be used only as an account number associated with the administration of the Social Security system. Though use of the SSN has expanded considerably, it is not a universal identifier and efforts to make it one have been consistently rejected. In 1971, the Social Security Administration task force on the Social Security Number declined to transform the number into an ID card. The Health,

9 See Appendix I and II.
10 See generally, EPIC, National ID Cards and the REAL ID Act, http://www.epic.org/privacy/id_cards/.
Education and Welfare Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems in 1973 again rejected the creation of a national identifier and advocated the establishment of significant safeguards to protect personal data. The committee said:

We recommend against the adoption of any nationwide, standard, personal identification format, with or without the SSN, that would enhance the likelihood of arbitrary or uncontrolled linkage of records about people, particularly between government or government-supported automated personal data systems. What is needed is a halt to the drift toward a standard universal identifier and prompt action to establish safeguards providing legal sanctions against abuses of automated personal data systems.¹⁴

The Federal Advisory Committee on False Identification also advised against the use of a national identifier in 1976.¹⁵ In 1977, the Privacy Protection Study Commission recommended against the adoption of a national ID system.¹⁶ In its report, Personal Privacy in an Information Society, the commission said that it:

sees a clear danger that a government record system, such as that maintained by the Social Security Administration or the Internal Revenue Service, will become a de facto central population register unless prevented by conscious policy decisions. Therefore [...] the Federal government should act positively to halt the incremental drift toward creation of a standard universal label and central population register until laws and policies regarding the use of records about individuals are developed and shown to be effective.¹⁷

In Congressional testimony in 1981, Attorney General William French Smith stated that the Reagan administration was “explicitly opposed to the creation of a national identity card.”¹⁸

The Clinton administration advocated a “Health Security Card” in 1993 and assured the public...
that the card, issued to every American, would have “full protection for privacy and confidentiality.” Still, the idea was rejected and the card never was created. In 1999, Congress repealed a controversial provision in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 that authorized the inclusion of SSNs on driver’s licenses.

h. State Opposition to the Implementation of REAL ID

The DHS has repeatedly stated that REAL ID is not mandatory, however, REAL ID is not a “voluntary” program. In 2007, EPIC noted that “States are under considerable pressure to implement REAL ID and citizens who fail to carry the new identity document will find it impossible to pursue many routine activities.” Furthermore, in issuing the final REAL ID rule DHS noted that it “believes that many States may find noncompliance an unattractive option” because the States would not be able to “maintain the conveniences enjoyed by their residents when using their State-issued driver’s licenses and non-driver identity cards for official purposes, particularly as it pertains to domestic air travel.” Additionally, shortly before the passage of the Act a DHS spokesman stated that “[noncompliance with REAL ID] will mean real consequences for their citizens... if their leadership chooses not to comply.”

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At this point in time, those concerns have become a reality for some states as they
currently face two options (1) comply with the REAL ID Act or (2) not comply and have their
citizens secure alternative forms of identification in order to get on a plane. 24 These two choices
only allow one to come to the conclusion that REAL ID is a mandatory program as those states
who do not comply with the DHS mandate will suffer consequences that are effectively penalties.

Following the enactment of the REAL ID Act, at least 20 states enacted legislation
opposing the REAL ID Act. 25 While some of those states, under considerable pressure from the
federal government, have modified earlier legislation, 26 many still maintain opposition to REAL
ID. 27 Part of the resistance to REAL ID from the states is because the costs of implementing
REAL ID were, and remain, unfunded by the federal government and place a large burden on the
states. However, in addition to concerns as to how states are to pay for implementing the Act,
states also have significant privacy concerns as does the general public.

II. Privacy Risks Inherent in the REAL ID Act

a. The Department of Homeland Security is not fulfilling their responsibility to
   protect privacy

The DHS stated ten years ago that it is constrained in its power to protect the privacy of
individuals and their data under the REAL ID Act. The agency claimed in the draft regulations
that, "The Act does not include statutory language authorizing DHS to prescribe privacy

24 Jad Mouawad, T.S.A. Moves Closer to Rejecting Some State Driver's Licenses for Travel, NEW YORK
some-state-drivers-licenses-for-travel.html.
25 EPIC 2008 Report Appendix 1; State Legislative Activity in Opposition to the Real ID, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Jan. 2014,
26 Garry Rayno, NH Senate Approves Bill Allowing Real ID Compliance, NEW HAMPSHIRE UNION
compliance; Jim Harper, Once Again, REAL ID Is A National ID, CATO INSTITUTE, May 25, 2016,
27 Edward D. Murphy, Without Change In State Law, Maine IDs Won't Get Mainers Aboard Airplanes in
want-extend-deadline-for-maine-compliance-with-federal-id-law/.
requirements for the state-controlled databases or data exchange necessary to implement the Act." 28 REAL ID creates a national identification system that affects 245 million license and cardholders nationwide, yet today the DHS has still failed to institute strong privacy safeguards in the system itself. 29 The agency has the obligation to protect the privacy of individuals affected by this system and must do more than the feeble attempts set out in the Act.

The Privacy Act of 1974 applies to the entire national identification system under guidelines set out by OMB and DHS. 30 The OMB guidelines explain that the Privacy Act "stipulates that systems of records operated under contract or, in some instances, State or local governments operating under Federal mandate 'by or on behalf of the agency . . . to accomplish an agency function' are subject to . . . the Act." 31 The guidelines also explain that "systems 'maintained' by an agency are not limited to those operated by agency personnel on agency premises but include certain systems operated pursuant to the terms of a contract to which the agency is a party." 32 The REAL ID system is operated under a Federal mandate to accomplish several agency functions, including immigration control.

Because the DHS has created this system, the agency must fully apply Privacy Act requirements of notice, access, correction, and judicially enforceable redress to the entire REAL ID national identification system. The REAL ID Act states that individuals should attempt to exercise their rights to notice, access, correction and redress through State DMVs, the Social

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30 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations, 6-12.
32 Id.
Security Administration, the Department of State, and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (a part of the Department of Homeland Security). 33

In enacting REAL ID, DHS has punted the issue of privacy to the States, but the agency needs to lead. Various questions remain, including important ones concerning redress. The right of redress must be judicially enforceable. The Privacy Act protections must be mandated in the REAL ID regulations in order for DHS to fulfill its obligations.

b. Privacy Risks of REAL ID

There are significant threats to individual privacy and security that would be created by unfettered access to REAL ID national identification system data. 34 Some of these problems are based on the design of the card, the information required to be stored on the cards, and the safeguards for the underlying databases.

Under REAL ID, a substantial amount of personal information must be included on the card. This includes a full legal name, digital photograph, and signature that can be read by common machine readable technology and the information included on the card is not required to be encrypted. Prior to enactment, the DHS Privacy Office supported encryption “because 2D bar code readers are extremely common, the data could be captured from the driver’s licenses and identification cards and accessed by unauthorized third parties by simply reading the 2D bar code on the credential” if the data is left unencrypted. 35 There are many examples of unauthorized users being able to download data from unencrypted machine-readable technology. 36 To protect privacy and improve security, this machine-readable technology must

33 REAL Final Rule at 5284-5284, supra note 20.
34 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 17-28, supra note 26.
36 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 21-23.
either include encryption or access must be limited in some other form. Without required encryption, REAL ID leaves 245 million individuals at risk for individual tracking.\textsuperscript{37}

DHS rejected encryption in the final rule because of “the complexities and costs of implementing an encryption infrastructure.”\textsuperscript{38} DHS is required to include security protections on the REAL ID card. Under the REAL ID Act, the card must include “Physical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for any fraudulent purpose.”\textsuperscript{39} The agency has this obligation and it should not abdicate this responsibility. If DHS does not seek to limit access to the data on the REAL ID card, then it is signaling that it is acceptable for third parties to download, access and store data for purposes beyond the three official purposes.

Rejecting encryption for the 2D barcode helps to push the REAL ID system into “widespread” use in everyday life, a goal that former DHS Secretary Chertoff and the DHS final rule itself expect and support. Such an expansion would harm both individual privacy and security and quickly turn the United States into a country where the REAL ID national identification card is involuntarily carried by everyone.

Furthermore, the amount of information contained on the REAL ID cards increases risks if the card is compromised. There are a number of “insider” and “outsider” threats to the massive identification database connecting 56 States and territories. Creating a national identification database containing personal data of 245 million State license and ID cardholders nationwide, one that would be accessible from a massive number of DMVs across the country, is an invitation for all criminals – whether identity thieves or terrorists – to break into just one of these entrance points to gather such data for misuse.

\textsuperscript{37} EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 17-18.
\textsuperscript{38} REAL Final Rule at 5292.
\textsuperscript{39} REAL ID Act at §202(b)(8).
Such a system would also be at risk of abuse from authorized users, such as DMV employees, who are bribed or threatened into changing the system data or issuing “authentic” national identification cards. It is appropriate to note here that, on the day that DHS released the final regulations for REAL ID, “A Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration employee [...] and four others were indicted [...] on charges that they made and sold fake State driver’s licenses and identification cards in exchange for money.”

Identity theft continues to be one of the leading concerns for consumers. The FTC found that in 2015, the last year for which information is currently available, the number of identity theft claims they received increased by more than 47% than identity theft incidents reported in 2014. Furthermore, identity theft has been one of the top consumer issues for the past fifteen years.

Large-scale data breaches have occurred in State DMVs across the country; if the databases are linked under REAL ID, these breaches will only grow in scale. The Oregon DMV lost half a million records in 2005. Also that year, in Georgia, a dishonest insider exposed 465,000 records. In 2011 a North Carolina DMV worker was charged with five counts of identity theft after she used DMV computers to obtain information to take out payday loans in other people’s names. In 2014, the California DMV suffered a data breach where credit card

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40 Five indicted in identity theft scheme, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 11, 2008.
42 Id.
43 Id.
45 Id.
information was compromised via their online payment system. In 2015, an Oregon man was able to download a list that contained a DMV list of identification numbers as well as federal income tax forms and was charged with 26 counts of aggravated identity theft. The list goes on, and the personal information of individuals will be endangered under the REAL ID national identification system.

Domestic violence survivors are particularly vulnerable to compromised data. Domestic violence survivors who flee their abusers, crossing into different States, would be exposed if their abuser breaches the security of any one of these 56 interconnected databases. "An abuser with an associate inside a State DMV, law enforcement, or other agency with access to the State records would be able to track a victim as the victim moves across the country." The danger of negligent and accidental disclosures is increased by REAL ID, as substantially more government employees will have access to all motor vehicle records nationwide. This sort of inadvertence will happen much more frequently in a post-REAL ID world as the access to driver’s license information is spread throughout the national identification system.

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49 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 50, supra note 26.
c. Increased Risks Associated with Hacking

In light of recent events there is even more reason to be concerned about the likelihood and effects of a data breach occurring of state DMV records. The federal government has been subject to a number of hacks in recent years which have been incredibly concerning to those affected by those hacks and the public at large. The lack of security features remain and show the risk of those states that chose to adopt the REAL ID requirements.

Recently, government data breaches have been numerous and severe and have raised concerns surrounding the safety of data in the United States. In the past three years, data breaches have affected the Office of Personnel Management, Internal Revenue Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the DHS. Overall, the number of government data breaches has exploded in the last decade, rising from 5,503 in 2006 to 67,168 in 2014.

These reports of hacking and data breaches are likely to be of further concern to state officials who are implementing, or are skeptical of, REAL ID in light of recent revelations of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The intelligence community currently has information showing that a foreign government was responsible for hacks of the Democratic National Committee as well as the hacking of John Podesta’s email. While the full nature and reasons behind the 2016...
US Presidential Election hacks are still being investigated and debated, the event should give pause to any state official that is considering fully complying with the REAL ID Act. It is clear that large databases of personal information are attractive targets for the purposes of identity theft, blackmail, or in some cases simply for the challenge of hacking into a government database.

III. Undue Burden on States Who Continue to Oppose REAL ID


As such, the TSA has stated that individuals with drivers licenses and identification cards from states the DHS deems “non-compliant” will need alternative forms of identification in order to board airplanes. Consequently, individuals in states that oppose REAL ID are far more likely to be inconvenienced at the airport under the proposed new form of information collection.

In addition to the eight states that opposed REAL ID, there are several other whose citizens may also be subjected to the agency’s data collection requirements. For example,
Montana has a law that prevents them from fully implementing the Act. Additionally, states like New York and Oregon have been granted extensions and may or may not be fully "compliant," according to the DHS, by 2018 which potentially puts them at risk as well of having to go through information collection practices when they go to the airport.

The proposed system creates a large problem for states that the DHS deems “non-compliant.” The TSA seeks to implement information collection practices that will burden millions of traveling individuals who hail from states that do not adhere to REAL ID requirements. Many of these individuals will likely be entirely unaware that their identification is not satisfactory and that they will be subject to TSA information collection until they arrive at the airport. These individuals will be burdened not because they do not have identification, but because they have identification that the TSA refuses to accept. Furthermore, the proposed information collection system penalizes these people for the choices of their state legislators and other state officials who have expressed several valid concerns surrounding REAL ID.

Individuals should not be punished when their state representatives have strong concerns about how REAL ID will impact their citizens to whom they are all accountable.

Given the stresses that a number of people face when traveling it is entirely misguided to have travelers who do have driver’s licenses or identification cards which, for years, have been acceptable documents to show to be able to board a plane. This is not an instance where individuals arrive at the airport with no proof of who they are, it is an instance of the DHS,

through TSA, attempting to force states to comply with their wishes and has nothing to do with airport security.

IV. Conclusion

The REAL ID Act still poses several concerns and challenges for states. It remains an unfunded federal mandate that exposes millions of individuals to threats of identity theft as well as having their information compromised and potentially exposed. Several states have chosen not to comply with the Act for reasons spanning from lack of federal funding, to opposition to a national identification system, and privacy concerns. The proposed information gathering of individual at airports essentially punishes citizens for actions that their state governments have taken to protect their privacy.

EPIC urges the TSA to abandon the proposed information collection for individuals who do not possess a state driver’s license that fails to comply with the DHS’s view of “compliance”: the United State has long opposed national identification system, the privacy risks of REAL ID are substantial, and the States were correct to opposed a federal identity system not in the best interests of their citizens.

Respectfully Submitted,

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Marc Rotenberg
EPIC President and Executive Director

/s/ Jeramie D. Scott
Jeramie D. Scott
EPIC National Security Counsel

/s/ Kim Miller
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EPIC Policy Fellow
APPENDIX I

Comments of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Experts in Privacy and Technology

Department of Homeland Security
Docket No. DHS 2006-0300
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Minimum Standards for Drivers Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes

May 2007
Department of Homeland Security
Docket No. DHS 2006-0030
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes

Comments of:

Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)

AND

[Experts in Privacy and Technology]

Steven Aftergood
Prof. Anita Allen
Prof. Ann Bartow
Prof. James Boyle
David Chaum
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Dr. Deborah Peel
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Prof. Anita Ramasastry
Bruce Schneier
Robert Ellis Smith
Prof. Daniel J. Solove
Prof. Frank M. Tuervheimer
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I. INTRODUCTION

By notice published on March 9, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") announced it seeks to establish "minimum standards for State-issued driver's licenses and identification cards that Federal agencies would accept for official purposes after May 11, 2008, in accordance with the REAL ID Act of 2005." Pursuant to this notice, the aforementioned group ("Coalition") submits these comments to request the Department of Homeland Security recommend to Congress that REAL ID is unworkable and must be repealed. The REAL ID Act creates an illegal de facto national identification system filled with threats to privacy, security and civil liberties that cannot be solved, no matter what the implementation plan set out by the regulations. And if REAL ID implementation does go forward, the protections of the Privacy Act of 1974 must be fully enforced for all uses of the data current and feature. Agencies should not be permitted to assert any exemptions and individuals must granted all rights, including the judicially enforceable right to access and correct their records and to ensure compliance with all of the requirements of the Privacy Act.

The problematic adoption of the law now under consideration is now well known. The REAL ID Act was appended to a bill providing tsunami relief and military appropriations, and passed with little debate and no hearings. It was passed in this manner

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even though Republican and Democratic lawmakers in the Senate urged Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist to allow hearings on the bill and to permit a separate vote on the measure. The senators said they believe REAL ID "places an unrealistic and unfunded burden on state governments and erodes Americans' civil liberties and privacy rights." The people could not speak during this rushed process. They are speaking now.

II. REAL ID CREATES A NATIONAL ID SYSTEM

Throughout the history of the United States, its people have rejected the idea of a national identification system as abhorrent to freedom and democracy. The REAL ID Act and the draft regulations to implement it create a de facto national identification system, and the Act must be repealed.

A. Americans Have Consistently Rejected a National ID System

When the Social Security Number (SSN) was created in 1936, it was meant to be used only as an account number associated with the administration of the Social Security system. Though use of the SSN has expanded considerably, it is not a universal identifier and efforts to make it one have been consistently rejected. In 1973, the Health, Education and Welfare Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems rejected the creation of a national identifier and advocated the establishment of significant safeguards to protect personal information. The committee said:


2 Id.


We recommend against the adoption of any nationwide, standard, personal identification format, with or without the SSN, that would enhance the likelihood of arbitrary or uncontrolled linkage of records about people, particularly between government or government-supported automated personal data systems. What is needed is a halt to the drift toward [a standard universal identifier] and prompt action to establish safeguards providing legal sanctions against abuses of automated personal data systems.

In 1977, the Carter Administration reiterated that the SSN was not to become an identifier. In Congressional testimony in 1981, Attorney General William French Smith stated that the Reagan Administration was “explicitly opposed to the creation of a national identity card.” When it created the Department of Homeland Security, Congress made clear in the enabling legislation that the agency could not create a national ID system. In September 2004, then-Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge reiterated, “[t]he legislation that created the Department of Homeland Security was very specific on the question of a national ID card. They said there will be no national ID card.” The citizens of the United States have consistently rejected the idea of a national identification system.

B. REAL ID Is Not Voluntary

Supporters of REAL ID point to the legislation, which says that State implementation is “voluntary.” However, States are under considerable pressure to implement REAL ID and citizens who fail to carry the new identity document will find it impossible to pursue many routine activities. The administration has also pursued a

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heavy-handed assault on those who have raised legitimate questions about the efficacy, cost, and impact of the $23 billion program. Critics of REAL ID have been labeled anti-security. In Congressional testimony, a high-ranking DHS official said, “Any state or territory that does not comply increases the risk for the rest of the Nation.” It is not anti-security to reject a national identification system that does not add to our security protections, but in fact makes us weaker as a nation. This system is also an unfunded mandate that imposes an enormous burden upon the states and the citizenry. The federal government has estimated that REAL ID will cost $23 billion, but it has allocated only $40 million for implementation and has told the states that they may divert homeland security grant funding already allocated to other security programs for REAL ID.

Design standardization means that anyone with a different license or ID card would be instantly recognized, and immediately suspected. The Department of Homeland Security already contemplates expanding the REAL ID card into “everyday transactions.” It will be easy for insurance firms, credit card companies, even video stores, to demand a REAL ID driver’s license or ID card in order to receive services. Significant delay, complication and possibly harassment or discrimination would fall upon those without a REAL ID card. In actuality, the “voluntary” card is the centerpiece of a mandatory national identification system that the federal government seeks to impose on the states and the citizens of the United States.

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12 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.845, supra note 1.
13 See Data Collection Expansion discussion, infra Section IX (DHS plans to expand uses of REAL ID).
C. Regulations Create a De Facto National ID System

The Department of Homeland Security draft regulations would (1) impose more difficult standards for acceptable identification documents that could limit the ability of individuals to get a state drivers license; (2) compel data verification procedures that the Federal government itself is not capable of following; (3) mandate minimum data elements required on the face of and in the machine readable zone of the card; (4) require changes to the design of licenses and identification cards (5) expand schedules and procedures for retention and distribution of identification documents and other personal data; and (6) dictate security standards for the card, state motor vehicle facilities, and the personal data and documents collected in state motor vehicle databases. These regulations create a de facto national identification system.

State licenses and identification cards must meet standards set out in the regulations to be accepted for Federal use. REAL ID cards will be necessary for: “accessing Federal facilities, boarding commercial aircraft, and entering nuclear power plants.” The Supreme Court has long recognized that citizens enjoy a constitutional right to travel. In Saenz v. Roe, the Court noted that the “constitutional right to travel from one State to another” is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.15 For that reason, any government initiative that conditions the ability to travel upon the surrender of privacy rights requires particular scrutiny. This is particularly relevant under the REAL ID regulations, as they affect 245 million license and cardholders nationwide. REAL ID could preclude citizens from entering Federal courthouses to exercise their right to due

14 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,823, supra note 1.
process, or from entering Federal agency buildings in order to receive their Social Security or veterans’ benefits.

DHS may compel card design standardization, “whether a uniform design/color should be implemented nationwide for non-REAL ID driver’s licenses and identification cards,” so that non-REAL ID cards will be easy to spot. This universal card design will lead to a national identification system, combined with the mandate under the proposed regulations imposing new requirements on state motor vehicle agencies so that the Federal government can link together their databases to distribute license and cardholders’ personal data, create a national identification system. DHS also has considered expanding the official uses for the REAL ID system, going so far as to estimate that one of the ancillary benefits of REAL ID implementation would be to reduce identity theft — a reduction DHS bases on “the extent that the rulemaking leads to incidental and required use of REAL ID documents in everyday transactions.” There are other ways in which DHS has contemplated expanding the uses of the REAL ID system so that the card becomes a national identifier — one card for each person throughout the country.

III. DHS HAS THE OBLIGATION TO PROTECT PRIVACY OF CITIZENS

The Department of Homeland Security states that it is constrained in its power to protect the privacy of individuals and their data under the REAL ID Act. The agency claims in the notice of proposed regulations that “The Act does not include statutory

16 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.841. supra note 1.
17 Id. at 10.825.
19 See Data Collection Expansion discussion, infra Section IX (DHS plans to expand uses of REAL ID).
language authorizing DHS to prescribe privacy requirements for the state-controlled
databases or data exchange necessary to implement the Act.”

We agree with Sen. Joseph Lieberman, who stated, “The concept that federal agencies need explicit
Congressional authorization to protect Americans’ privacy is just plain wrong. In fact,
our government is obligated to ensure that programs and regulations do not unduly
jeopardize an individual’s right to privacy.”

The draft regulations include little in terms of privacy safeguards:

In summary, DHS has proposed the following privacy protections in its
implementing regulations for the REAL ID Act: (1) The State-to-State data
exchanges and the State data query of Federal reference databases will be State
operated and governed; (2) as part of the State certification process, States will be
required to submit a comprehensive security plan, including information as to
how the State implements fair information principles; and (3) while
acknowledging the benefits of employing encryption of the personal information
stored on the identification cards, we invite comment on its feasibility and costs
and benefits to ensure that its costs do not outweigh the benefits to privacy.

DHS’s statement that it is constrained in its ability to set privacy protections for the
REAL ID system is a product of the agency’s mistaken belief that security and privacy
are separate. Security and privacy are intertwined; one cannot have a secure system if
privacy safeguards are not created, as well. DHS stated that it “believes that this language
[in the REAL ID Act] provides authority for it to define basic security program
requirements to ensure the integrity of the licenses and identification cards.” Because
DHS has the authority to define basic security requirements, it also has the authority to
set basic privacy safeguards for the REAL ID system.

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21 Joseph Lieberman, U.S. Senator, *Statement at a Hearing on Understanding the Realities of REAL ID: A
Review of Efforts to Secure Drivers’ Licenses and Identification Cards Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of
Gov’t Management, the Federal Workforce & the District of Columbia, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
22 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,826, *supra* note 1.
23 *Id.*
The draft regulations create a national identification system that affects 245 million license and cardholders nationwide, yet DHS is hesitant to ensure strong privacy safeguards in the system itself. DHS has the obligation to protect the privacy of citizens affected by this system and must do more than the feeble attempts set out in the draft regulations.

A. Privacy Act Applies Under OMB Guidelines

The Department of Homeland Security states that the Privacy Act of 1974 applies to only one part of the REAL ID system – the Problem Driver Pointer System. However, the Privacy Act of 1974 applies to the entire national identification system, under guidelines set out by the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") and the Department of Homeland Security itself.

The OMB guidelines explain that the Privacy Act "stipulates that systems of records operated under contract or, in some instances, State or local governments operating under Federal mandate 'by or on behalf of the agency . . . to accomplish an agency function' are subject to . . . the Act." The guidelines also explain that the Privacy Act "make[s] it clear that the systems 'maintained' by an agency are not limited to those operated by agency personnel on agency premises but include certain systems operated pursuant to the terms of a contract to which the agency is a party." The REAL ID system is operated under a Federal mandate to accomplish several agency functions, including immigration control.

25 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.826. supra note 1.
27 Id.
The REAL ID system is covered by the Privacy Act under the Department of Homeland Security's own policies. In a policy guidance memorandum from the agency’s Privacy Office, defines “DHS Information Systems” as “an Information System operated, controlled, or directed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This definition shall include information systems that other entities, including private sector organizations, operate on behalf of or for the benefit of the Department of Homeland Security.” The national system of interconnected State databases is “operate[d] on behalf of or for the benefit” of DHS. The Privacy Office also states:

As a matter of DHS policy, any personally identifiable information (PII) that is collected, used, maintained, and/or disseminated in connection with a mixed system by DHS shall be treated as a System of Records subject to the Privacy Act regardless of whether the information pertains to a U.S. citizen, Legal Permanent Resident, visitor, or alien.

It is clear that, under both DHS and OMG guidelines, the REAL ID national identification system is a system of records subject to the requirements and protections of the Privacy Act of 1974.

B. Requirements of Notice, Access, Correction and Judicially Enforceable Redress Must Be Mandated

If the Department of Homeland Security creates this system, the agency must fully apply Privacy Act requirements of notice, access, correction, and judicially enforceable redress to the entire REAL ID national identification system. Though the States are asked to include provisions for notice, access, correction and redress, this is not enough. The Privacy Act protections must be mandated in the REAL ID implementation regulations.

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29 Id. at 1.
When it enacted the Privacy Act in 1974, Congress sought to restrict the amount of personal data that Federal agencies could collect and required agencies to be transparent in their information practices. In 2004, the Supreme Court underscored the importance of the Privacy Act's restrictions upon agency use of personal data to protect privacy interests, noting that:

"[I]n order to protect the privacy of individuals identified in information systems maintained by Federal agencies, it is necessary . . . to regulate the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information by such agencies." Privacy Act of 1974, §2(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1896. The Act gives agencies detailed instructions for managing their records and provides for various sorts of civil relief to individuals aggrieved by failures on the Government's part to comply with the requirements.

The Privacy Act is intended "to promote accountability, responsibility, legislative oversight, and open government with respect to the use of computer technology in the personal information systems and data banks of the Federal Government[.]") It is also intended to guard the privacy interests of citizens and lawful permanent residents against government intrusion. Congress found that "the privacy of an individual is directly affected by the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal information by Federal agencies," and recognized that "the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United States." It thus sought to "provide certain protections for an individual against an invasion of personal privacy" by establishing a set of procedural and substantive rights.

We support the Department of Homeland Security's requirement that the States must include in their "comprehensive security plan" an outline of "how the State will

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34 Id.
protect the privacy of personal information collected, disseminated or stored in connection with the issuance of REAL ID licenses from unauthorized access, misuse, fraud, and identity theft" and that the State has followed the Fair Information Practices (these are practices, not principles, as listed in the draft regulations), which "call for openness, individual participation (access, correction, and redress), purpose specification, data minimization, use and disclosure limitation, data quality and integrity, security safeguards, and accountability and auditing." However, this is not enough. The agency must mandate minimum security and privacy safeguards, which the states should build upon, to protect individuals and their personal information. Also, there must be standards for the issue of redress. How will redress be adjudicated if one State includes erroneous information in an individual's file and passes that information on to another State? Will the individual have to petition both States separately for redress? Will neither State process the redress, because each believes it to be the responsibility of the other? The right of redress must be judicially enforceable.

The right of redress is internationally recognized. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data recognize that "the right of individuals to access and challenge personal data is generally regarded as perhaps the most important privacy protection safeguard." The rights of access and correction are central to what Congress sought to achieve through the Privacy Act:

35 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.826. supra note 1.

36 The OECD Privacy Guidelines of 1980 apply to "personal data, whether in the public or private sectors, which, because of the manner in which they are processed, or because of their nature or the context in which they are used, pose a danger to privacy and individual liberties." Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-Border Flow of Personal Data, OECD Doc. 58 final at Art. 3(a) (Sept. 23, 1980), reprinted in M. ROTENBERG ED., THE PRIVACY LAW
The committee believes that this provision is essential to achieve an important objective of the legislation: Ensuring that individuals know what Federal records are maintained about them and have the opportunity to correct those records. The provision should also encourage fulfillment of another important objective: maintaining government records about individuals with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to individuals in making determinations about them.37

The Privacy Act requirements that an individual be permitted access to personal information, that an individual be permitted to correct and amend personal information, and that an agency assure the reliability of personal information for its intended use must be applied to the entire REAL ID national identification system. Full application of the Privacy Act requirements to government record systems is the only way to ensure that data is accurate and complete, which is especially important in this context, where mistakes and misidentifications are costly.

IV. REAL ID CARDS MUST NOT DENOTE CITIZENSHIP STATUS

DHS is considering using the REAL ID card in the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative border security program. For the REAL ID card to be compliant under the program, it would need to include long-range RFID technology, discussed below, and “the State would have to ensure that the State-issued REAL ID driver’s license or identification card denoted citizenship.”38 It cannot be stressed strongly enough: REAL ID cards must not include citizenship status. If REAL ID cards were to signify citizenship, there would be intense scrutiny of and discrimination against individuals who chose not to carry the national identification card and those who “look foreign.”

38 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,842, supra note I.

SOURCEBOOK 2004 395 (EPIC 2005. The OECD Privacy Guidelines require, among other things, that there should be limitations on the collection of information; collection should be relevant to the purpose for which it is collected; there should be a policy of openness about the information’s existence, nature, collection, maintenance and use; and individuals should have rights to access, amend, complete, or erase information as appropriate. Id.

Comments of EPIC

REAL ID

Department of Homeland Security

Docket No. DHS 2006-0030
V. STANDARDS FOR ID DOCUMENTS WOULD BURDEN MANY INDIVIDUALS

Under the REAL ID Act, States are required to obtain and verify documents from applicants that establish “(1) The applicant’s identity, through a photo identity document, or a non-photo identity document that includes full legal name and date of birth if a photo identity document is not available; (2) Date of birth; (3) Proof of SSN or ineligibility for an SSN; (4) The applicant’s address of principal residence; and (5) Lawful status in the United States.” 39 Under the regulations, the only documents that could be accepted by the states to issue these new identity cards would be: (1) valid unexpired U.S. passport or the proposed passport card under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative; (2) certified copy of a birth certificate; (3) consular report of birth abroad; unexpired permanent resident card; unexpired employment authorization document; (4) unexpired foreign passport with valid U.S. visa affixed; (5) U.S. certificate of citizenship; U.S. certificate of naturalization; or (6) REAL ID driver’s license or identification card (issued in compliance with the final regulations). 40

The difficult standards for acceptable identification documents would limit the ability of some individuals to get a state driver’s license. There are questions as to whether some citizens could produce these documents, among them Native Americans, victims of natural disasters, domestic violence victims, the homeless, military personnel, or elderly individuals. 41 We applaud the Department of Homeland Security for attempting to resolve this problem by allowing the States to voluntarily create an exceptions process for extraordinary circumstances. However, though DHS set minimum standards for data

39 Id. at 10,827.
40 Id. at 10,827-28.
41 See Domestic Violence discussion, infra Section XI (how domestic violence victims will be harmed by the standards); see Data Verification discussion, infra Section VI (general problems with the standards).
collection, retention and documentation of the transaction, the agency did not set minimum standards for eligibility, length of process, or cost of process. DHS states that persons born before 1935 might not have been issued birth certificates, so they might be eligible for the exceptions process. Otherwise, there is nothing that explains to either States or individuals how they could prove eligibility, how long the process would take (days, weeks, months or even years), or if they could even afford the cost of the exceptions process.

VI. DATA VERIFICATION PROCEDURES ARE BASED ON FAULTY PREMISES

The data verification procedures mandated by the draft regulations are based on faulty premises: DHS relies on non-existing, unavailable or incomplete databases and the mistaken belief that DMV workers can or should be turned into Federal immigration officers. Each assumption creates more problems in the Department of Homeland Security’s attempt to create a fundamentally flawed national identification system.

A. DHS Relies on Verification Databases That Are Not Available

Under REAL ID, the states must verify applicant documents and data with the issuing agency. DHS states that, “If for individual States to verify information and documentation provided by applicants, each State must have electronic access to multiple databases and systems. Secure and timely access to trusted data sources is a prerequisite for effective verification of applicant data.” Yet, beyond the national identification system created by the State-to-State data exchange, two of four verification systems required are not available on a nationwide basis and third does not even exist.

42 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,834, supra note 1.
43 Id. at 10,822.
44 Id. at 10,833.
The database systems the States are required to verify applicant information against are: (1) Electronic Verification of Vital Events ("EVEV"), for birth certificate verification; (2) Social Security On-Line Verification ("SSOLV"), for Social Security Number verification; (3) Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements ("SAVE"), for immigrant status verification; and (4) a Department of State system to verify data from "U.S. Passports, Consular Reports of Birth, and Certifications of Report of Birth."45

The only system that is available for nationwide deployment is SSOLV, and a survey of States by the National Governors Association found that even this database would need substantial improvements to be able to handle the workload that would be needed under REAL ID.46 EVVE is currently in pilot phase and only five states are participating.47 Yet DHS bases its requirements on the assumption that EVVE will be ready for nationwide expansion by the implementation deadline May 2008.48 The executive director of the organization overseeing the database has announced that EVVE will not be ready by May 2008 and the system may not be ready by the extended implementation deadline of December 2009.49

DHS admits that only 20 states are using SAVE, and that the planned connection between SAVE and another database for foreign student status verification (Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, "SEVIS") may not be completed by the

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45 Id. at 10,830-35; Electronic Verification of Vital Events ("EVVE") is also called Electronic Verification of Vital Event Records ("EVVER") in some federal documents.
48 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,831. supra note 1.
49 Eleanor Stables, Multi-Billion Dollar Real ID Program May Be Stymied Due to $3 Million Shortfall, CQ, Mar. 15, 2007.
implementation deadline of May 2008.\textsuperscript{50} The State Department system to verify passports and some reports of births has not even been created, but DHS bases its mandates on the assumption that the system “is eventually developed.”\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{B. DMV Workers Cannot and Should Not Become Immigration Officials}

Under the regulations, State DMV employees would need to authenticate license and identification card applicants’ source documents, which means the employees would be required to physically inspect the documents and “verify[] that the source document presented under these regulations is genuine and has not been altered.”\textsuperscript{52} These source documents are: (1) valid unexpired U.S. passport or the proposed passport card under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative; (2) certified copy of a birth certificate; (3) consular report of birth abroad; unexpired permanent resident card; unexpired employment authorization document; (4) unexpired foreign passport with valid U.S. visa affixed; (5) U.S. certificate of citizenship; U.S. certificate of naturalization; or (6) REAL ID driver’s license or identification card (issued in compliance with the final regulations).\textsuperscript{53}

State DMV employees would be required to verify these documents, including Federal immigration documents, though they have no training to do so. DHS contemplates this problem and seeks to solve it by requiring that DMV employees handling source documents undergo 12 hours of “fraudulent document recognition” training.\textsuperscript{54} A review of the Social Security Administration found that staff had difficulty recognizing counterfeit documents, though it is their primary job to verify these

\textsuperscript{50} REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,833. \textit{supra} note 1.
\textsuperscript{51} Id. at 10,832.
\textsuperscript{52} Id. at 10,850.
\textsuperscript{53} Id. at 10,827-28.
\textsuperscript{54} Regulatory Evaluation at 122, \textit{supra} note 18.
documents before issuing SSN. For example, the Government Accountability Office review reported difficulty with detection of fraudulent birth certificates. In one case, a fake in-state birth certificate was detected, but "SSA staff acknowledged that if a counterfeit out-of-state birth certificate had been used, SSA would likely have issued the SSN because of staff unfamiliarity with the specific features of numerous state birth certificates." It is questionable how well State DMV employees would be able to spot fraudulent documents, especially documents as rarely seen as consular reports of birth abroad, with merely 12 hours of training when it is difficult for counterfeit documents to be spotted by federal employees whose primary job is verification of source documents. Also, if a State DMV employee determines that an applicant's source documents are fraudulent, where could the applicant turn? No redress procedure has been created.

VII. MINIMUM DATA ELEMENTS ON MRT MUST REMAIN MINIMUM

Under REAL ID, the following amount of information, at a minimum, must be on the REAL ID card: (1) full legal name; (2) date of birth; (3) gender; (4) driver's license or identification card number; (5) digital photograph of the person; (6) address of principal residence; (7) signature; (8) physical security features; (9) a common machine readable technology, with defined minimum data elements; and, (10) card issue and expiration date. The REAL ID card will include a 2D barcode as its machine readable technology. To protect privacy and improve security, this machine readable technology must either include encryption, which is recommended by the DHS Privacy Office, or access must be limited in some other form. Leaving the machine readable zone open would allow

56 See Privacy Act discussion, supra Section III.
57 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.8435, supra note 1.
unfettered third-party access to the data and leave 245 million license and cardholders nationwide at risk for individual tracking.

A. Access to Data Must Be Limited

Under the required changes to the design of State licenses and identification cards, DHS states the card must include “[p]hysical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for fraudulent purpose” and “common [machine-readable technology], with defined minimum data elements.”\(^58\) The Federal agency will require the use of a two-dimensional bar code, but will not require the use of encryption. Though Homeland Security lays out the privacy and security problems associated with creating an unencrypted machine readable zone on the license, it does not require encryption because there are concerns about “operational complexity.”\(^59\)

The Department of Homeland Security’s own Privacy Office has urged the use of encryption in REAL ID cards. In its Privacy Impact Assessment of the draft regulations, the Privacy Office supported encryption “because 2D bar code readers are extremely common, the data could be captured from the driver’s licenses and identification cards and accessed by unauthorized third parties by simply reading the 2D bar code on the credential” if the data is left unencrypted.\(^60\) DHS says that, “while cognizant of this problem, DHS believes that it would be outside its authority to address this issue within

\(^{58}\) *Id.* at 10,835.

\(^{59}\) *Id.* at 10,826.

As we have previously stated, DHS has the obligation to protect the privacy of individuals from whom they collect data, and the agency should not abdicate this responsibility. Imposing a requirement for the States to use unencrypted machine readable technology renders the cardholder unable to control who receives her data.

If, however, the agency determines that it will not use encryption because of concerns about the complexity of public key regulation, there is another approach that would better protect the privacy of individuals than unfettered access to the machine readable zone. We suggest that no personal data be placed on the machine readable zone. Instead, place a new identifier that is unused elsewhere (i.e., not the driver’s license number or Social Security Number). This unique identifier will “point” to the records in the national database. Access to the database can be controlled by password and encryption security, because it is easier to regulate public keys in this scenario. Also, the State should ensure that a new unique identifier is created each time the machine readable zone is renewed or reissued, in order to make the identifier less useful as an everyday ID number – people would not be forever linked to this identifier. This approach would improve data security and privacy.

It is possible to use a “pointer” system in the machine readable zone, because the REAL ID Act did not set out what minimum document requirements on the machine readable zone need to be. The Act reads, “(9) a common machine-readable technology, with defined minimum data elements.” Also, in the draft regulations, DHS requests comments on “[w]hether the data elements currently proposed for inclusion in the

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61 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,837, supra note 1.
62 See Privacy Act discussion, supra Section III (federal agencies have the obligation to protect the privacy rights of individuals from whom they collect information).
machine readable zone of the driver’s license or identification card should be reduced or expanded.”[^64] We recommend against putting any personal data on the machine readable zone and only placing this unique identifier. In this way, access to the data can be more tightly controlled.

DHS is required to include security protections on the REAL ID card. Under the REAL ID Act, the card must include “(8) Physical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for any fraudulent purpose.”[^65] If DHS does not seek to limit access to the data on the REAL ID card, then it is signaling that it is acceptable for third parties to download, access and store the data for purposes beyond the three official purposes set out in the draft regulations: “accessing Federal facilities, boarding commercial aircraft, and entering nuclear power plants.”[^66] Though DHS has contemplated expanding the uses for the REAL ID card, such an expansion would harm both individual privacy and security and quickly turn the United States into a country where the national identification card is involuntarily carried by everyone.

B. Unfettered Data Access Threatens Individual Privacy

If personal data is placed on the machine readable zone of the REAL ID card, then access to this data must be limited or individual privacy will be threatened. Unlimited access to this data will allow unauthorized third parties to download, access and store the personal data of any REAL ID cardholder.

The REAL ID Act mandates that the REAL ID card include “(8) Physical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for any fraudulent purpose.”[^67] We recommend against putting any personal data on the machine readable zone and only placing this unique identifier. In this way, access to the data can be more tightly controlled.

[^64]: REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,842, supra note 1.
[^66]: REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,823, supra note 1.
any fraudulent purpose.”67 Allowing universal access to personal data contained on the
REAL ID card would facilitate identity theft and security breaches. In the privacy impact
assessment of the draft regulations, the Department of Homeland Security Privacy Office
urges encryption for the REAL ID machine readable zone. It explains that unsecured
digital data raises the risk of “skimming,” where one “expos[es] the information stored on
the credential to unauthorized collection.”68 This risk is not theoretical, the Privacy Office
says, because “[r]eaders for the 2D bar code are readily available for purchase on the
Internet and at a very low cost, which permits unauthorized third parties to skim the
information for their own business needs or to sell to other third parties.”69 Such
skimming is often done without the individual’s knowledge or consent.

A recent case illustrates the security threat posed by open access to personal data
on a machine readable technology. Last month, New York prosecutors charged thirteen
people in a counterfeiting ring where restaurant servers on the East Coast (from
Connecticut to Florida) skimmed data from customers’ credit cards.70 “They used small
hand-held devices, about the size of a cigarette package that could be kept in a pocket, to
record information encoded in the magnetic strips of credit cards.”71 For a year and a half,
the illegally gathered data was used to create fake credit cards and buy merchandise that
the criminals resold.72 The financial data was easily accessed, downloaded and misused
by the criminals because anyone with a skimmer device was able to read the unprotected
machine readable zones.

68 Privacy Impact Assessment of Draft Regulations at 14.
70 Anemona Hartocollis, $3 Million Lost to Fraud Ring, Authorities Say, N.Y. Times, April 21, 2007.
71 Id.
72 Id.
Some States are already facing problems with unauthorized parties accessing license and ID card data. California, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Texas have laws restricting the skimming of such data. In November, the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission sent letters to bar, restaurant and retail organizations explaining that they must stop scanning and downloading their patrons' license data. Such actions violate the state Digital Driver License Act, as well as the state and federal Drivers Privacy Protection Acts, according to the commission. Yet at least one establishment expressed reluctance to stop downloading and storing their customers' personal data, even in the face of legal action from the State. Today, different States have different ID cards with a variety of data and security features. Imagine what would happen if 245 million cards nationwide had personal data in the exact same open access format.

When a person hands over her license or ID card today, the data is not routinely downloaded and stored. A grocery store clerk or club bouncer usually merely looks at the card, verifies age or address, and then hands the card back to the individual. No transaction is recorded. However, universal access to the machine readable zone of the REAL ID card would allow the data to be downloaded, stored and transferred without the knowledge or permission of the individual cardholder. A digital transaction would be recorded and a digital trail could be created.

For example, let's follow Douglas Osborne for one weekend in the near future, if the national identification system is created and the machine readable zone left open for universal access. On Friday night, Doug went to Eighteenth Street Lounge at 8 p.m. with

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73 Privacy Impact Assessment of Draft Regulations at 15.
74 Ian T. Shearn, License scanning is illegal, state says, Star-Ledger (NJ), Nov. 23, 2006.
75 Id.
76 Id.
four friends, where their REAL ID cards were scanned and their personal data accessed and stored. At 9:35 p.m., he went to Club Five with the same four friends, where their REAL ID cards were scanned and their personal data accessed and stored. On Saturday afternoon, Doug bought two six-packs of Harpoon beer at 12:27 p.m. at a Safeway in Capitol Hill, where Doug's REAL ID data was scanned and stored. On Saturday night, Doug and two friends took the 5:10 flight to Atlantic, where their cards were scanned and their information stored. At 11:37 p.m., Doug and his two friends checked into a hotel, where their ID cards were scanned and their data downloaded. On Sunday morning, one of Doug's friends buys cigarettes at a casino, and his REAL ID is scanned and his data stored at 11:04 a.m. The digital trail could continue indefinitely. Individuals could easily be tracked from location to location as they went about their daily lives. Add to the REAL ID trail the information that could be gleaned from individuals' credit card transactions, and you have complete consumer profiles for which many companies would pay dearly.

DHS must include in restrictions against the addition of data beyond that defined in the REAL ID Act. To allow additional data on the machine readable zone is to increase the likelihood of the REAL ID card becoming the default identification documents for everyday transactions; this would increase the incentive for third parties to gather and store individuals’ data, and substantially increase the card’s value to marketers and criminals. Expansion of the data collected, uses allowed, and users authorized would greatly increase both threats to the security and privacy of personal data.

77 "Because REAL IDs use a common MRT, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) considered requiring the use of machine readers on REAL IDs at airports. At this time TSA has rejected [the plan]" (emphasis added). Regulatory Evaluation at 58, supra note 18.

Comments of EPIC 23 Department of Homeland Security
REAL ID Docket No. DHS 2006-0030
C. Use of RFID Technology Increases Vulnerability of Data

DHS contemplates using the REAL ID system as part of its Federal border security program and requested comments on how States could incorporate long-range radio frequency identification ("RFID") technology into the REAL ID card so that it could be used as part of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. Many groups have urged against the use of RFID technology in identification documents. There are significant privacy and security risks associated with the use of RFID-enabled identification cards, particularly if individuals are not able to control the disclosure of identifying information. The Department of State recognized these security and privacy threats and changed its E-Passport proposal because of them; the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") has just abandoned a plan to include RFID chips in border identification documents because the pilot test was a failure; and both the Department of Homeland Security’s Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee and the Government Accountability Office recently cautioned against the use of RFID technology in identification documents.

Privacy and security risks associated with RFID-enabled identification cards include “skimming” and “eavesdropping.” Skimming occurs when an individual with an unauthorized RFID reader gathers information from an RFID chip without the cardholder’s knowledge. Eavesdropping occurs when an unauthorized individual intercepts data as it is read by an authorized RFID reader. In the absence of effective security techniques, RFID tags are remotely and secretly readable. Although the creation

of a small, easily portable RFID reader may be complex and expensive now, it will be easier as time passes. For example, the distance necessary to read RFID tags was initially thought to be a few inches. In the now-abandoned pilot test, the Department of Homeland Security said, “reliable reads can be received from a few inches to as much as 30 feet away from the reader.” Other tests also have shown that RFID tags can be read from 70 feet or more, posing a significant risk of unauthorized access.

Some attacks already have succeeded against so-called “strengthened” identification documents. In one case, a computer expert was able to clone the United Kingdom’s electronic passport by using a commercially available RFID reader (which cost less than $350) and software that took him less than a couple of days to write. In assessing the new RFID-enabled U.S. passports, one expert cloned the RFID tag and another used characteristics of the radio transmissions to identify individual chips, and those researchers spent only a few weeks attacking the RFID-enabled passports.

Another security risk of RFID-enabled identification cards is that of clandestine tracking. An unauthorized RFID reader could be constructed to mimic the authorized signal and then be used to secretly read the RFID tag embedded in the identification card. The Government Accountability Office has highlighted this security problem unique to wireless technology:

The widespread adoption of the technology can contribute to the increased occurrence of these privacy issues. As previously mentioned, tags can be read by any compatible reader. If readers and tags become ubiquitous, tagged items

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carried by an individual can be scanned unbeknownst to that individual. Further, the increased presence of readers can provide more opportunities for data to be collected and aggregated.\textsuperscript{83}

So long as the RFID tag or chip can be read by unauthorized individuals, the person carrying that tag can be distinguished from any other person carrying a different tag. Individuals, unlike commercial products with RFID tags, should have the right to control the disclosure of their identifying information.

The federal government should be fully aware by now of the problems raised by an insecure RFID scheme. In April 2005, EPIC, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and other groups submitted comments urging the State Department to abandon its E-Passport proposal, because it would have made personal data contained in hi-tech passports vulnerable to unauthorized access.\textsuperscript{84} After the Department of State received more than 2,400 comments on its notice for proposed rulemaking on RFID-enabled passports, many of which criticized its serious disregard of security and privacy safeguards, the agency said it would implement Basic Access Control in an attempt to prevent skimming and eavesdropping.\textsuperscript{85} The use of RFID-enabled identification documents, without including Basic Access Control and other safeguards, contravenes the Department of State’s incorporation of basic security features into new U.S. passports.\textsuperscript{86}

In 2005, DHS began testing RFID-enabled I-94 forms in its United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology ("US-VISIT") program to track the entry and

The RFID-enabled forms stored a unique identification number, which is linked to data files containing foreign visitors' personal data. EPIC warned that this flawed proposal would endanger personal privacy and security, citing the plan's lack of basic privacy and security safeguards. The Department of Homeland Security's Inspector General echoed EPIC's warnings in a July 2006 report. The Inspector General found "security vulnerabilities that could be exploited to gain unauthorized or undetected access to sensitive data" associated with people who carried the RFID-enabled I-94 forms. A report released by the Government Accountability Office in late January identified numerous performance and reliability issues in the 15-month test. The many problems with the RFID-enabled identification system led Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff to admit in Congressional testimony on February 9th that the pilot program had failed, stating "yes, we're abandoning it. That's not going to be a solution" for border security.

88 The data includes biographic information, such as name, date of birth, country of citizenship, passport number and country of issuance, complete U.S. destination address, and digital fingerprints. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Notice of Availability of Privacy Impact Assessment, 70 Fed. Reg. 39300, 39305 (July 7, 2005), available at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jun20051800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2005/05-13371.htm.
In Congressional testimony in March, a GAO official cautioned against the use of RFID technology to track individuals. "Once a particular individual is identified through an RFID tag, personally identifiable information can be retrieved from any number of sources and then aggregated to develop a profile of the individual. Both tracking and profiling can compromise an individual's privacy," the GAO said. The GAO reiterated the many problems with the failed US-VISIT RFID project and expressed concern that, despite this failure, DHS endorsed the use of RFID in the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative PASS Card.

In December, the Department of Homeland Security Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee adopted a report, "The Use of RFID for Identity Verification," which included recommendations concerning the use of RFID in identification documents. The committee outlined security and privacy threats associated with RFID similar to the ones discussed below, and it urged against RFID use unless the technology is the "least intrusive means to achieving departmental objectives." It is clear that the RFID technology outweigh its benefits and should not be used in identification documents.

VIII. Uniform License Design Would Cause Discrimination Against Non-REAL ID Cardholders

95 Id. at 2.
The Department of Homeland Security contemplates a universal design for compliant and non-compliant REAL ID cards. A universal design, especially for a card including citizenship status, would cause irreparable harm, as it would foster suspicion of those who do not wish to carry the REAL ID card. Uniform design for a national identification card would also create an enormous security risk.

A. Universal Design Would Foster Suspicion of Innocent Individuals

The agency is considering a uniform REAL ID card design, asking for comments on “[w]hether DHS should standardize the unique design or color required for non-REAL ID under the REAL ID Act for ease of nationwide recognition, and whether DHS should also implement a standardized design or color for REAL ID licenses.”

Mandating distinct designs or colors for both REAL ID and regular licenses and identification cards and requiring non-REAL ID driver’s licenses or ID cards to have explicit “invalid for federal purposes” designations turns this “voluntary” card into a mandatory national ID card. It would divide the country into two – people with the REAL ID card and those without – and anyone with a different license or ID card would be instantly suspicious. Significant delay, complication and possibly harassment or discrimination would fall upon those who choose not to carry a REAL ID card.

B. Official and Unofficial Purposes of REAL ID Must Not Be Increased

According to DHS, State driver’s licenses and identification cards must meet standards set out in the regulations to be accepted for Federal use under REAL ID. Such Federal purposes include entering Federal facilities, boarding commercial aircraft, entering nuclear power plants, and “any other purposes that the Secretary shall...”

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96 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,841-42, supra note 1.
97 Id. at 10,842.
determine,” but the limitation on use to the three enumerated purposes are “for the time being.”98 The Department of Homeland Security, via the draft regulations and Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, contemplates expanding the use of the national identification system.

In the draft regulations, the agency seeks comments on “how DHS could expand [the card’s official purposes] to other federal activities.”99 In a February speech, Secretary Chertoff said he envisioned the REAL ID licenses “do[ing] double-duty or triple-duty.”100 These national identification cards would “be used for a whole host of other purposes where you now have to carry different identification.”101 The agency also may use the REAL ID card in the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative program – if citizenship is denoted on the card and long-range RFID technology added.102

In the agency’s economic analysis of REAL ID implementation, reducing ID theft is listed as one of the potential ancillary benefits of the national identification system. However, the agency says that the potential benefit would depend on a vast expansion of REAL ID uses from the three official purposes required in the draft regulations; DHS suggests what is needed is “incidental and required use of REAL ID documents in everyday transactions.”103 DHS envisions that employers, social service agencies

98 Regulatory Evaluation at 30, supra note 18.
99 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,823, supra note 1.
101 Id.
102 See RFID Technology discussion, supra Section VII(c) (security and privacy risks inherent in RFID use), and Citizenship Designation discussion, supra Section IV (citizenship designation breeds discrimination).
103 Regulatory Evaluation at 130, supra note 18; see Identity Theft discussion, infra at Section X(c) (why REAL ID will not reduce identity theft).
(including Medicare, Medicaid and student financial aid), firearm sellers and licensors,
and election workers will all use this national identification system.\footnote{104}

The official and unofficial uses of REAL ID must not be broadened. Such
expansion would harm national security. As explained below, using a single card for
many identification purposes would be the same as using one key for every lock.

**IX. Expanded Data Collection and Retention Increases Security Risks**

Under REAL ID, the government would have easy access to an incredible amount
of personal data stored in one national database (or, according to the DHS description, 56
State and Territory databases, each of which can access all of the others).\footnote{105} DHS claims
that it is not expanding data collection and retention, but it is enlarging schedules and
procedures for retention and distribution of identification documents and other personal
data. This broad expansion of data collection and retention in a national database creates
significant threats to privacy and security.

The agency makes two claims about the expanded data retention under REAL ID
that we dispute: (1) “Most States already include this [extensive, personal] information in
a machine readable technology,” and (2) “neither the Real ID Act nor these proposed
regulations gives the Federal Government any greater access to information than it had
before.”\footnote{106} Each claim is false: DHS is mandating the increase of both the type of
documents that need to be retained and the length of data retention, and the agency will
give both State and Federal governments greater access to the personal data.

\footnote{104 See National Committee for Voting Integrity, http://votingintegrity.org/ and EPIC, Spotlight on
Surveillance, With Some Electronic Voting Systems, Not All Votes Count (Sept. 2006),
http://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0307 (why requiring any voter identification card is a
poll tax).}

\footnote{105 Section 202(d)(12); (d)(13).}

\footnote{106 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,824, supra note 1.}
With the REAL ID national identification system, DHS imposes new requirements on State motor vehicle agencies. Each of the 56 interconnected databases must contain all data fields printed on driver’s licenses and ID cards, and driver’s histories, including motor vehicle violations, suspensions, and points on licenses. The States are compelled to begin maintaining paper copies or digital images of important identity documents, such as birth certificates or naturalized citizenship papers, for seven to 10 years. This is a significant expansion of the personal data previously reviewed or stored by State motor vehicle agencies.

Currently these identification documents are kept in a variety of places – the Social Security system, the immigration system, local courthouses – and it takes considerable effort to gather them all together. Under REAL ID, all of these identification documents – concerning, among other things, births, marriages, deaths, immigration, social services – are consolidated into one national database, accessible to at least tens of thousands of government employees nationwide, which would give the Federal and State governments greater access than before.

Security expert Bruce Schneier, EPIC and others have explained that it decreases security to have one ID card for many purposes, as there will be a substantial amount of harm when the card is compromised. There is also the threat that REAL ID is ostensibly trying to protect against: forged identification cards. Investing so much trust into one card means that criminals will only have to forge one identification card. “No

107 Section 202(d)(12); (d)(13).
108 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.855, supra note 1.
matter how unforgeable we make it, it will be forged. We can raise the price of forgery, but we can’t make it impossible. Real IDs will be forged,” Schneier said.110 A national database full of identification documents, images and data would entice many kinds of criminals, including terrorists who seek to steal the identity of a “trusted” individual.

A national identification system would divide the United States into two groups: (1) “trusted good guys” who have the national ID card, and (2) “untrusted bad guys” who do not. But, Schneier has pointed out that there is a third category that appears – bad guys who fit the good guy profile. Upon the release of the draft regulations, Schneier said, “The REAL ID regulations do not solve problems of the national ID card, which will fail when used by someone intent on subverting that system. Evildoers will be able steal the identity – and profile – of an honest person, doing an end-run around the REAL ID system.”111 This national identification system inherently contains significant threats to individual privacy and national security.112

X. NATIONAL ID DATABASE WOULD INCREASE SECURITY VULNERABILITIES

In the best-case scenario, the creation of the REAL ID national identification system does nothing to improve our security protections. In the worst-case scenario, the REAL ID system will exponentially increase threats to our national security. DHS’s cryptic economic analysis is based upon incredible assumptions about possible future terrorist attacks that REAL ID would supposedly prevent. The economic analysis also ignores indirect costs. The REAL ID system would harm national security by increasing

112 See National Database discussion, supra Section X (how universal identification systems increase security threats).
risks of identity theft and fraud, and by diverting funds away from other security programs that have been proven effective.

A. Regulations Would Not Improve Our Security Protections

Quantitative risk assessments are characteristically limited by false or unverifiable assumptions, faulty modeling, and above all short-sighted local optimization that tends to ignore long-term implications and slippery-slope changes in the validity of the assumptions. The economic analysis in the Department of Homeland Security’s Regulatory Evaluation conducts such a quantitative risk assessment, and falls victims to these faulty assumptions. The Regulatory Evaluation states:

The primary benefit of REAL ID is to incrementally increase U.S. national security by reducing the vulnerability to criminal or terrorist activity of federal buildings, nuclear facilities, and aircraft. The chances of a terrorist attack on such targets being successful would generally increase if identity documents that grant access to them are in the possession of the attackers. This is demonstrated by the fact that several of the 9/11 hijackers had false driver’s licenses or fraudulently obtained driver’s licenses in their possession at the time of that attack.

The analysis goes on to say, “REAL ID is highly unlikely to impact the consequences of a successful attack, but it may impact, on the margin, the chance of a terrorist attack being attempted and succeeding.” So, DHS is attempting to determine the marginal chance that REAL ID will lessen the chance of success or discourage the attempt of a terrorist attack. Setting aside the assumption that a lack of REAL ID cards would make it more difficult to succeed in a terrorist attack upon the United States, we turn to the mathematical formula that DHS uses to calculate the REAL ID system’s presumed “primary benefit.”

114 Regulatory Evaluation at 126, supra note 18.
115 Id. at 127.
The annual risk that the U.S. faces with regard to a potential terrorist attack can be represented as the chance that an attack will successfully take place, multiplied by the consequences of that attack. This can be mathematically represented as $\Pi^K$, where $\Pi$ is the annual chance of a successful attack and $K$ is the consequences of an attack in monetary terms. Homeland security measures such as REAL ID impact either the chance or consequences of a successful attack, or both. REAL ID is highly unlikely to impact the consequences of a successful attack, but it may impact, on the margin, the chance of a terrorist attack being attempted and succeeding. Let $\Pi B$ be the chance prior to the introduction of REAL ID, and $\Pi A$ be the chance after REAL ID comes into effect. Then the security impact of REAL ID in the course of one year can be measured in dollar terms as ($\Pi B - \Pi A)^K$.

So, DHS takes the probability of a successful terrorist attack without the REAL ID national identification system in place ($\Pi B$) and subtracts the probability of a successful attack with REAL ID ($\Pi A$); then they take the resulting number and multiply it by the cost to the United States of a successful terrorist attack. Understandably, DHS goes onto explain that such an evaluation is very difficult and full of uncertainty.

Let the cost of the REAL ID regulation, which has been estimated, be C. Then for REAL ID to be fully justified on national security grounds alone, it must be the case that its benefit is at least as great as its costs. The annual risk-reduction benefit of Real ID is ($\Pi B - \Pi A)^K$, and the sum of this benefit over ten years must equal Real ID’s cost, C. If we can determine a dollar value for $K$, then we can measure the marginal impact that REAL ID must bring about on the probability of a successful terrorist attack on a federal target for it to be fully justified by its security benefit.

DHS is attempting to determine if ($\Pi B - \Pi A)^K$, which is the annual risk-reduction benefit of REAL ID, over 10 years, is at least equal to C, which is the cost of REAL ID, which DHS has set at – a discounted rate of – $17.2B. DHS goes on to explain that this formula is based on the assumption that another attack would affect us, in economic terms, the same as September 11, 2001. DHS estimates another attack would cost the United States either $63.9 billion (an estimate of the immediate impact incurred) or

\[116\] Id. at 127.
\[117\] Id.

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§374.7B (an estimate of the immediate and longer run impact). Other assumptions:

We assume that terrorist groups are seeking to inflict another attack with consequences on the order of magnitude of 9/11. We also assume that they are engaged in a campaign such that in every year during the 10-year period over which the costs and benefits of REAL ID are being evaluated, there is a positive and identical probability of being successfully attacked. Under this assumption, the expected present value of the consequences of the terrorist campaign against the U.S. homeland equals the sum of the expected values of consequences in each particular year over the 10-year period 2007-16:

\[ \Pi [2007^K2007 + (1-\delta)*\Pi 2008^K2008 + (1-\delta)^2*\Pi 2009^K2009 + .... + (1-\delta)^9*\Pi 2016^K2016, \]

where \( \delta \) is the discount rate and \( K \) is the monetary value of consequences in real 2006 dollars. Because we assume that \( \delta \) and \( K \) do not change from year to year, this can be re-written as:

\[ \Pi \times K + (1-\delta)*\Pi \times K + (1-\delta)^2*\Pi \times K + .... + (1-\delta)^9*\Pi \times K, \]

or

\[ D*\Pi \times K, \text{ where } D \text{ equals } \{1 + (1-\delta) + (1-\delta)^2 + .... + (1-\delta)^9\}. \]

This expression is the sum of the expected discounted annual consequences of a terrorist campaign against the U.S. homeland over a ten-year period. As noted earlier, Real ID is anticipated to bring about a reduction in the annual probability of a successful attack from \( \Pi B - \Pi A \), and the security benefit of Real ID over the ten-year period is therefore \( D*(\Pi B - \Pi A)*K. \)

The variable \( D \) represents the annual consequences of a terrorist campaign against the U.S. over a ten-year period. DHS multiplies \( D \) by \( [(\Pi B - \Pi A) \times K] \), which is the annual risk-reduction benefit of REAL ID. DHS then sets this equation equal to the direct cost of the REAL ID national ID system. By solving this equation, DHS hopes to find the marginal impact on security that the REAL ID system must have in order to break even. For "Real ID to break even with respect to cost and expected security
benefits, it must be the case that $D^*(B - A)^*K = C$, or $B - A = C/(D^*K)$. So, to break even, we need $D^*(B - A)^*K$ to be equal to $C$, meaning that how much REAL ID will save us in economic terms must be equal to the cost of the REAL ID system. Or, stated another way, it must be that $B - A$, probability of a successful terrorist attack without the REAL ID national identification system in place ($B$) minus the probability of a successful attack with REAL ID ($A$), is equal to $C$, cost of REAL ID system, divided by $D$, annual consequences of a terrorist campaign against the U.S. over a ten-year period, multiplied by $K$, cost to the United States of a successful terrorist attack.

Here is where it gets tricky. Assuming the cost of REAL ID to be $17.2B and the cost of a successful 9/11-type terrorist attack to be $374.7 billion long-term, the value of $C/D^*K$, in 2006 dollars, is 0.61%. Therefore, for “REAL ID to be fully justified by its primary security benefit, it must bring about a marginal reduction in the annual chance of a successful 9/11-type attack of 0.61%.” If DHS only estimates the immediate impact, and assumes the cost of REAL ID to be $17.2 billion and the cost of the attack to be $63.9 billion, then the value of $C/(D^*K)$ is 3.60%. “For REAL ID to be fully justified by its primary security benefit in immediate impacts alone, it must bring about a marginal reduction in the annual chance of a successful 9/11-type attack of 3.60%.”

After all of these head-scratching mathematical assumptions, there is no conclusion, because, as DHS explains, “[w]ithout further information on the absolute level of $B$ [the probability of a successful terrorist attack without the REAL ID national identification system in place], it is difficult to say whether 0.61% or 3.60% is a very large reduction in

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\[^{120}\] *Id.*, at 129.
\[^{121}\] *Id.*
\[^{122}\] *Id.*
the chance of successful attack, or a more moderate reduction." Therefore, it is unknown, even with all of these assumptions, whether REAL ID would even marginally reduce the possibility of a successful terrorist attack.

DHS acknowledges that certain assumptions are used in this analysis, such as assumptions for the variable K, the impact or the cost to the U.S. economy of a terrorist attack, which DHS assumes would be of the same magnitude as September 11, 2001. However, there is little discussion about the variable C, the cost of the REAL ID system. There are two ways in which the figures used by DHS are faulty: 1) they underestimate the direct costs and 2) they ignore the indirect costs. Such indirect costs include the impact upon civil liberties, increased risk of identity theft and fraud, and the diversion of funds from other, effective security programs. Both faulty assumptions make the variable C smaller, while DHS has assumed a very large number for K, so the cost of the REAL ID system would seem dwarfed in comparison to the cost of another terrorist attack, making REAL ID seem cost-effective even if it only has a marginal effect on the probability of another attack – an effect REAL ID would not have.

REAL ID does not add to our security protections, but in fact increases our security threats by diverting needed funds from other national security projects. The estimated cost of REAL ID implementation has spiraled. Before the Act’s passage in 2005, the Congressional Budget Office estimated its cost to be around $100 million. In September, the National Conference of State Legislatures released a report estimating the

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123 Id.
124 See Identity Theft discussion, infra at Section X(c) (REAL ID increases risks for identity theft).
cost to be $11 billion over the first five years. Now, the Department of Homeland Security has admitted that REAL ID will cost states and individuals from $17.2 billion to $23.1 billion over ten years. Congress has appropriated only $40 million for REAL ID implementation. The Department of Homeland Security now says that a state can use up to 20 percent of its Homeland Security Grant Program funding for REAL ID implementation, which total about $100 million for 2007. Implementation costs for the state of California alone would be about $500 million.

Diverting Homeland Security Grant Program money to REAL ID means that funding originally budgeted by the states for other homeland security projects, including training and equipment for rescue and first responder personnel. Even if the states received $100 million per year for 10 years, that would still amount to only $1.04 billion in Federal funds, a fraction of the $17.2 billion to $23.1 billion price tag. The rest of the cost would be borne by states and their residents.

B. Regulations Would Increase National Security Threats

In a recent analysis of the REAL ID Act, EPIC Executive Director Marc Rotenberg explained that "[s]ystems of identification remain central to many forms of security. But designing secure systems that do not introduce new risks is proving more difficult than many policymakers had imagined." The theory that the REAL ID Act

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126 Governors' Analysis, supra note 46.
127 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,845, supra note 1.
will prevent terrorism is predicated on the belief that only “outsiders” have an intent to harm the United States. This theory is fundamentally flawed.

Security expert Bruce Schneier has explained the theory of identification-based security. “In theory, if we know who you are, and if we have enough information about you, we can somehow predict whether you’re likely to be an evildoer,” Schneier said. This is impossible, because you cannot predict intent based on identification, he said. There are threats from both sides. Terrorist acts have been committed by U.S. citizens, “insiders.” Oklahoma City bombers Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were U.S. citizens. As was Unabomber Ted Kaczynski.

A recent case illustrates Schneier’s point. According to court documents, last month, two men entered restricted areas at an airport in Florida, bypassed security screeners and carried a duffel bag containing 14 guns and drugs onto a commercial plane. They avoided detection, because they are airline baggage handlers who used their uniforms and legally issued identification cards. Both men had passed Federal background checks before they were hired, according to a spokesman for Comair, the airline that employed the men. This questions the assumption that more and broader background checks, such as those suggested in the draft regulations, would prevent insider attacks. There are other problems with the background checks, which will be discussed below.

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11 Schneier Essay, supra note 110.
12 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 See Domestic Violence discussion, infra Section XI.
The baggage handlers were only investigated and caught after police received an anonymous tip. If the airport had identification-neutral security systems, such as requiring all fliers go through metal detectors, then the men could not have walked past them. But the identification-based security system failed because it allowed some fliers to skip screening because they are presumed to have no evil intent, and the men transported weapons and contraband aboard a commercial flight. Creating a national identification system would have just as devastating consequences, but on a larger scale, because many more people would be presumed “trusted” or “untrusted” based upon their decision to carry or not carry the REAL ID card.

C. Even If Assumptions Granted, REAL ID Would Not Substantially Affect Identity Theft Crimes

The draft regulations list reducing identity theft as one of the benefits of the REAL ID national identification system. However, the agency’s own economic analysis under its Regulatory Evaluation shows that, even if one grants DHS the economic assumptions it makes, overall identity theft crimes would only be reduced by 2.8 percent, at best.

First, it is important to note that the DHS Regulatory Evaluation does not list “Reduce Identity Theft” under any of the three categories of benefits — “monetized,” “annualized quantified, but unmonetized,” or “unquantifiable benefits” in the accounting statement for the draft regulations. Actually, the only benefit listed is under “unquantifiable benefits,” and that is the claim that REAL ID would “incrementally increase U.S. national security.”

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137 Jim Ellis, Feds: Bag Of Guns Smuggled Onto Plane.
138 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,837, 10,846, supra note 1.
139 Regulatory Evaluation at 5, supra note 18.
140 Id. at 7.
Second, the Regulatory Evaluation later lists “reducing identity theft” as a potential ancillary benefit. The economic analysis explains that:

REAL ID will only have the ability to impact those types of identity theft that require a drivers license for successful implementation, and only to the extent that the rulemaking leads to incidental and required use of REAL ID documents in everyday transactions, which is an impact that also depends critically on decisions made by State and local governments and the private sector.

The potential ancillary benefit depends on a vast expansion of REAL ID uses from the three official purposes required in the draft regulations. The economic analysis assumes that REAL ID would be used in “everyday transactions,” which would have a devastating affect on identity theft protections. Setting aside that flawed assumption and focusing upon the economic analysis, there is little benefit to be found. If all of the agency’s assumptions are agreed to, including the belief that REAL ID cards would be used in everyday transactions, the Department of Homeland Security still finds that REAL ID would reduce by 10 percent only the 28 percent of ID theft crimes that “are likely to require the presentation of an identity document like a drivers license.” Therefore, the REAL ID national identification system will reduce only 2.8 percent of all identity theft crimes, a savings of approximately $1.6 billion total for the 2007-2016 period. The Department of Homeland Security has estimated that REAL ID would cost $23.1 billion for that period. Basic economic analysis finds that one ought not spend $23.1 billion to create a national identification system that might reduce the cost of identity theft crimes by $1.6 billion.

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141 Id. at 126, 129-30.
142 Id. at 130.
143 See Identity Theft discussion, infra at Section X(c) (REAL ID increases risks of identity theft).
144 Regulatory Evaluation at 130, supra note 18.
145 Id.
D. Centralized Identification System Increases Risk of Identity Theft

The draft regulations create a national identification system with a national database, and this creates an enormous security risk. EPIC and others have explained that it decreases security to have a centralized system of identification, one ID card for many purposes, as there will be a substantial amount of harm when the card is compromised.146

The REAL ID Act mandates that States provide every other state with electronic access to information contained in their motor vehicle databases and each State database must contain all data fields printed on driver’s licenses and ID cards, and driver’s histories, including motor vehicle violations, suspensions, and points on licenses.147 Yet, DHS claims that a national database will not be created because the regulations “leave[] the decision of how to conduct the exchanges in the hands of the States.”148 This mandatory “State-to-State data exchange” creates one huge national database containing the personal information of 245 million license and ID cardholders – a database that can be accessed at DMVs across the country.

Using a national ID card would be as if you used one key to open your house, your car, your safe deposit box, your office, and more.149 “The problem is that security doesn’t come through identification; security comes through measures – airport screening, walls and door locks – that work without relying on identification”; therefore,

147 Section 202(d)(12); (d)(13).
148 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.825, supra note 1.
a centralized system of identification would not increase national security, security expert Bruce Schneier has said.\textsuperscript{150}

A large data breach affects the confidence and trust of the public. People will recoil from systems that create privacy and security risks for their personal data. We have seen countless data breaches that have left the personal data of tens of millions of Americans vulnerable to misuse. Recently, almost 46 million credit and debit card numbers were stolen by hackers who accessed the computer systems at the TJX Companies over a period of several years, making it the biggest breach of personal data ever reported.\textsuperscript{151} The computer system breaches began in July 2005 but weren’t discovered until December 2006 – the financial data of millions were exposed for 17 months.\textsuperscript{152} Last May, an information security breach by a Department of Veterans Affairs employee resulted in the theft from his Maryland home of unencrypted data affecting 26.5 million veterans, active-duty personnel, and their family members.\textsuperscript{153} The laptop and an external hard drive contained unencrypted information that included millions of Social Security numbers, disability ratings and other personal information.\textsuperscript{154} In February 2005, databroker Choicepoint sold the records of at least 145,000 Americans to a criminal ring engaged in identity theft.\textsuperscript{155} Also that year, Bank of America misplaced back-up tapes

\textsuperscript{152} Id. at 7.
\textsuperscript{153} See EPIC’s Page on the Veterans Affairs Data Theft, http://www.epic.org/privacy/vatheft/.
\textsuperscript{154} Statement, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, A Statement from the Department of Veterans Affairs (May 22, 2006).

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containing detailed financial information on 1.2 million employees in the Federal government, including many members of Congress.\textsuperscript{156}

A centralized identification system would be a tempting target for identity thieves. If a criminal breaks the system’s security, then the criminal would have access to the personal information of every single person in that database. If this one, centralized system is used across the nation, this would put hundreds of millions of people at risk for identity theft.

There is another significant security risk, besides that of attacks by unauthorized users, and that is of authorized users abusing their power.\textsuperscript{157} A 2005 scandal in Florida highlights risks associated with large database systems. A woman wrote to a newspaper criticizing a Florida sheriff as being too fat for police work and condemning his agency’s use of stun guns.\textsuperscript{158} Orange County Sheriff Kevin Beary ordered staffers to use state driver’s license records to find the home address of his critic.\textsuperscript{159} The sheriff sent her a letter at her home address, and she reported being surprised that he was able to track her down so easily.\textsuperscript{160} In a case in Maryland just last year, three people – including a Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration official – were indicted on charges of “conspiring to sell unlawfully produced MVA-issued Maryland identification cards.”\textsuperscript{161}

The consumer harm that results from the wrongful disclosure of personal information is very clear. For the seventh year in a row, identity theft is the No. 1 concern

\textsuperscript{157} See Domestic Violence discussion, infra Section XI (abusers use their authorized access to stalk victims).
\textsuperscript{158} Called fat, sheriff tracks down reader. Associated Press, Apr. 6, 2005.
\textsuperscript{159} Id.
\textsuperscript{160} Id.
\textsuperscript{161} Fake ID Cards, Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 2006, at B02.
of U.S. consumers, according to the Federal Trade Commission's annual report. Over 104 million data records of U.S. residents have been exposed due to security breaches since January 2005, according to a report from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. A centralized system of identification creates a “one-stop shop” for identity thieves. Centralizing authority over personal identity into one database and one card increases both the risk of identity theft as well as the scope of harm when it occurs. The confidence and trust of consumers will fall when such a breach occurs; people will withdraw because of privacy and security questions.

XI. REAL ID HARMS VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT

The REAL ID national identification system creates difficulties for many groups, and it has significant consequences for domestic violence and sexual assault victims. The residential address requirements endanger the ability of victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and other crimes to hide from their abusers. The background check provisions set out in the draft regulations do not fully protect these victims from their abusers. In fact, the REAL ID system would help abusers find and track their victims across the nation.

A. REAL ID Endangers Address Confidentiality

Currently, many States allow domestic violence victims and others to protect the confidentiality of their residential addresses. States have created formal Address Confidentiality Programs and states have also provided general measures of residential

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address privacy. The proposed regulations override these substantial protections, and the overrides must be removed from the final regulations. The government must not make it easier for abusers to find their victims.

State Address Confidentiality Programs are an important tool for protecting the safety of domestic violence and sexual assault victims. Currently 20 states have address confidentiality programs. Generally, under such programs, domestic violence or sexual assault victims register with the secretary of State or their attorney general. The victim is provided an address with that State office, which forwards the mail received there to the enrollee’s residential address. This State office address is used in official correspondence with the State, though businesses are not usually required to use it.

The REAL ID Act requires that driver’s licenses include a person’s “address of principal residence.” This requirement effectively destroys state address confidentiality programs. The recent Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act (“VAWA”) included a requirement for DHS to “consider and address” the needs of certain groups when the agency is “developing regulations or guidance with regard to identification documents, including driver’s licenses.” These groups include domestic violence and sexual assault victims who are entitled to be enrolled in State address confidentiality programs; whose addresses are entitled to be suppressed via court order or State or Federal law; or whose information is protected

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165 See, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, States With Address Confidentiality Programs for Domestic Violence Survivors, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/dvsurvive.htm (listing 19 states, not including Maryland but including Illinois which is unfunded); See also, Maryland Safe At Home Address Confidentiality Program, http://www.sos.state.md.us/ACP/Information.htm.
from disclosure according to Section 384 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 1996.\textsuperscript{168}

In the draft regulations, DHS has not followed the VAWA requirement; instead, the agency has significantly reduced the protections afforded by these programs. The proposed regulations require that addresses of principal residence be placed on the face of the REAL ID card and include some exemptions from this requirement, such as one for those enrolled in Federal Witness Security Programs.\textsuperscript{169} The regulations also exempt those who are enrolled in State address confidentiality programs.\textsuperscript{170} This is not the same as creating an exemption for those who are “entitled to be enrolled in the programs, as stated under the Violence Against Women Act.” In its discussion of the proposed rule, DHS does propose to include an exemption for those who are “entitled to be enrolled” in state address confidentiality programs.\textsuperscript{171} DHS must include this exemption in the final regulations. It cannot be that, as currently stated under the draft regulations, only those actually enrolled in State Address Confidentiality Programs would be exempted from the requirement to display their residential addresses on the face of the REAL ID card. Many domestic violence and sexual assault victims who are entitled to enroll in State Address Confidentiality Programs are not actually enrolled, for a variety of personal, safety and logistical reasons. They should not be punished for not actually enrolling in the program.

In order to adequately “consider and address” the needs of those who are “entitled to be enrolled” in a State confidentiality program, DHS must permit States to allow those who are entitled to be, but are not in address confidentiality programs to be exempted


\textsuperscript{169} REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10854, supra note 1.

\textsuperscript{170} Id. at 10854.

\textsuperscript{171} Id. at 10836.
from the address of principal residence requirement. DHS should allow individuals to affirm that they fear victimization and would benefit from address confidentiality. It would be problematic to burden State motor vehicle agencies with the determination of who is entitled to be enrolled in an address confidentiality program. States could rely on the affirmation, rather than making a determination of the merits of an individual’s need for confidentiality. This would close the gap between those domestic violence and sexual assault victims who are “entitled to be enrolled” and those who are actually enrolled in State Address Confidentiality Programs.

Also, though the proposed rule exempts from the residential address requirement those whose addresses are “entitled to be suppressed under State or Federal law or suppressed by a court order,” this statement should be clarified to include States that generally allow individuals to display on licenses and ID cards an address other than their principal place of residence.172 Several States generally allow non-residential addresses to be on driver’s licenses. Currently, at least seven States permit an address other than a residential address to be listed on licenses or ID cards (California,173 Florida,174 Montana,175 New Mexico,176 Oklahoma,177 Wyoming,178 and Virginia179). For example, under Virginia’s law, an applicant may choose to list a post office box, business or residential address.180 The applicant is still required to provide their residential address.

172 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10854, supra note 1.
180 Id.
Domestic violence survivors, other crime victims, or those generally interested in protecting their privacy avail themselves of these State laws to keep their addresses confidential. These laws are the only way that survivors can protect themselves in States that do not have formal address confidentiality programs – four of those listed do not (Montana, New Mexico, Virginia and Wyoming). These general address privacy laws are also the only way that those who fear victimization, but who do not formally qualify for State Address Confidentiality programs, can protect themselves.

Without this exemption allowing States to permit any individual to protect her privacy by listing a non-residential address, the victims of domestic violence and sexual abuse will also face the embarrassment of disclosing that they are victims anytime that their identification is shown. There are few exceptions from the residential address requirement, and anyone holding a REAL ID card without the residential address listed would immediately be placed into one of these few categories.

B. National Database Threatens Security of Victims of Abuse Crimes

The draft regulations require that States provide electronic access to their motor vehicle database information to all other States. Survivors who flee their abusers, crossing into different states, will be exposed if their abuser breaches the security of any one of these interconnected databases. An abuser with an associate inside a State DMV, law enforcement, or other agency with access to the State records would be able to track a victim as the victim moves across the country.

181 Id.
182 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,856, supra note 1.
The danger of negligent and accidental disclosures is increased by REAL ID, as substantially more government employees will have access to all motor vehicle records nationwide. One example of accidental disclosure occurred in Wisconsin earlier this year -- a police officer disclosed a victim’s address, found in a DMV record to a stalker; the officer did not know that the victim had a restraining order against this.\textsuperscript{183} This sort of inadvertence would happen much more frequently in a post-REAL ID world, as access to personal information is spread throughout the national identification system. Intentional breaches by outsiders or authorized insiders abusing their power would also have a wider scope. Past abuses exemplify what can be expected in a nationwide scale. For example, in Arizona, a police officer admitted to accessing motor vehicle records to find personal information on women he was romantically interested in, as well as co-workers.\textsuperscript{184} If REAL ID is implemented, abusers and insiders would have access to records throughout the country and would be able to track their victims no matter where they flee.

\textbf{C. Proposed Background Check Procedures Do Not Fully Protect Victims of Abuse Crimes}

DHS proposes that certain government employees be subject to criminal history background checks, with certain offenses disqualifying employees from specific jobs related to the REAL ID national identification system.\textsuperscript{185} Covered employees would be limited to those who could affect the recording of information, the manufacture of REAL ID cards, or the information displayed on a card.\textsuperscript{186} Employees who can access the record information without the ability to edit it are not subject to the background check.

\textsuperscript{183} Kevin Murphy, \textit{Officer’s Actions will Cost 25,000}, GAZETTE\textsc{Xtra}, Feb. 15, 2007, available at http://www.gazetteextra.com/mezera021507.asp.
\textsuperscript{184} Michael Kiefer, \textit{Officer Admits to Tampering; Databases Used to Check on Women}, ARIZONA\textsc{Republic}, April 6, 2006, at B3.
\textsuperscript{185} REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,855, supra note 1.
\textsuperscript{186} Id. at 10,856.
requirement. This massive loophole greatly increases the security and privacy risks of domestic violence and sexual abuse victims, as significant damage can be done by unauthorized data disclosure. In order to safeguard against these threats, the broad category of those who have access to records should be shrunk, rather than increasing the category of those who are covered by the background check requirement.

The suitability criteria of the background check do not match the threat of stalkers and abusers. DHS proposes to use the permanent and interim disqualifying criteria in the Transportation Security Administration’s background checks for maritime and land transportation security at 49 C.F.R. 1572.103. The offenses include espionage, sedition, treason, making bomb threats, and crimes involving transportation security incidents. Some of the offenses, such as fraud and misrepresentation -- including identity fraud -- are relevant to the risks of improper disclosure and access to the records. However, crimes such as stalking, surveillance, harassment and domestic abuse are not in this list. These crimes must be added to the list of disqualifying offenses, so that the REAL ID system does not create a loophole permitting abusers access to a national database that would allow them to track their victims no matter where the victims moved.

D. REAL ID Increases the Power Abusers Have Over Their Victims

REAL ID’s stringent document requirements will place more power in the hands of abusers. Fleeing domestic violence or sexual abuse can be a sudden and dramatic step. Victims’ advocates often counsel their clients to prepare “safety plans,” which include

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\[187\] Id. at 10,856.
\[188\] 49 C.F.R. 1572.103(a).
\[189\] Id. at 1572.103(b)(2)(iii).
gathering key documents such as passports, visas, and birth certificates. The proposed regulations limit the types of documents that can be used to prove identity, which create problems for many groups, including abuse victims. The draft regulations permit exceptions for those who do not have the required documents “for reasons beyond their control.” The exception requires that the records “visibly indicate” that alternative documentation was accepted and that a “full explanation” of the reason be included in the record. Thus victims will face the embarrassment of having intimate details of the abuse they have suffered included in a national database accessible to thousands of government employees across the nation. The “for reasons beyond their control” exception must specifically include abuse victims, so that they may not be punished for leaving their abusers. The visible indication and “full explanation” included in the records should be limited to the statement that alternative documents were accepted “for reasons of personal safety,” so that victims need not expose the history of their abuse to anyone who could view their DMV records.

Another problem is that this “for reasons beyond their control” exception does not apply to those who must demonstrate lawful immigration status. Under the draft regulations, the demonstration of lawful status would require documents that an abuser would likely have control over. Abusers of immigrants who are able to control their victims immigration documents will be able to control the victim’s ability to obtain a

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190 E.g., Oakland County Coordinating Council Against Domestic Violence, Domestic Violence Handbook - Personalized Safety Plan, at http://www.domesticviolence.org/plan.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2007) (“Items to take, if possible... Birth Certificates... Social security cards... Passports, green cards, work permits”).
191 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,852, supra note 1; see Data Verification discussion, supra Section VI (general problems with the standards).
192 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,852, supra note 1.
193 Id.
194 Id.
REAL ID card or license. The "for reasons beyond their control" exception must be extended to those victims who must prove lawful immigration status, so that the abusers cannot use these documents to trap their victims into staying in abusive situations. The exception permitting those who do not have access to documents to use alternative documentation should be extended to the proof of lawful immigration status. Here, also, the visible indication and "full explanation" included in the victims’ DMV records should be limited to the statement that alternative documents were accepted "for reasons of personal safety," so that victims need not expose the history of their abuse to anyone and everyone who could view their DMV records.

XII. Metasystem of Identification Is Better Choice

Once personal data has fallen into the hands of an identity thief, the potential for its misuse is proportionate to the extent that the information can be used for illegitimate authentication. We have already explained why a universal identifier will not improve security. Rather than promoting the use of universal identifiers, EPIC advocates the distribution of identity or an identity metasystem in which authentication is confined to specific contexts in order to limit the scope for potential misuse. The danger of a single identifier is that the harm will be magnified when it is compromised.

A system of distributed identification reduces the risks associated with security breaches and the misuse of personal information. For example, a banking PIN number, in conjunction with a bank card, provides a better authentication system because it is not coupled with a single, immutable consumer identity. If a bank card and PIN combination is compromised, a new bank card and PIN number can be issued and the old combination cancelled, limiting the damage done by the compromised data. Drawbacks of such
structures, including the possibility for the existence of multiple cards, are currently being addressed by the creation of an identity metasystem in which multiple identities can be loosely coupled within a single secure system.¹⁹⁵

Distributing identity in this way allows for different profiles to be used in different authenticating contexts. New profiles can be created as required within a single identity metasystem. Misuse is therefore limited to the context of the information breached, whether it is a single bank account, online merchant, or medical records.

Possibilities for data misuse can also be limited at the data collection stage. EPIC has previously called attention to the need for Web sites to stop storing customer credit card information.¹⁹⁶ Amassing large databases of credit card numbers creates an attractive target for potential identity thieves. Creating a national ID card under REAL ID also creates an attractive target for potential identity thieves – imagine having access to digital copies of “breeder” documents, such as certified birth certificates and SSN cards.

First and foremost, the best response is not to create a centralized identification system such as the one realized under REAL ID. Another simple response to identity theft is to require a PIN to be used in conjunction with all identification cards. A third response is to forbid third-party collection or storage of data from identification cards. An identity metasystem would further reduce the value of such aggregated database targets, because authenticators would be separate and distinct from all personally identifiable information.

Finally, technological measures can be used to improve the reliability of authentication while respecting consumer privacy. International research efforts are

currently underway to create authentication systems that preserve anonymity, and include the development of new privacy enhancing technologies for use in such schemes. These privacy enhancing technologies allow for the separation of authentication and identification and are being deployed in response to security vulnerabilities. Such technologies may plug in to identity metasystems, such as Microsoft’s CardSpace. While the default settings of CardSpace do not currently meet recognized standards for privacy preservation, this model should be studied in detail.

XIII. IMPLEMENTATION JUST NOT POSSIBLE UNDER CURRENT TIMELINE

Two years after Congress rushed through passage of the REAL ID Act, the Department of Homeland Security announced on March 1 proposed regulations to create the REAL ID national identification system. The draft regulations were released about 14 months before the May 2008 implementation deadline. After enormous criticism from the public and the States, DHS extended the deadline, but not by much.

Comments on the draft regulations are due by May 8. DHS says it will review the public comments and take them into consideration for the final regulations, the release of which is expected in August or September. In the draft regulations, DHS says it

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200 DHS Testimony at REAL ID Hearing, supra note 11.
“strongly encourages States to submit certification packages by October 1, 2007,” and sets a drop-dead date of February 10, 2008, for states to file these certification packages, which detail States’ plans to fulfill the obligations detailed in the final regulations.\footnote{REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,824, supra note 1.} These certification packages include a “comprehensive security plan for [each State’s] DMV offices and driver’s license storage and production facilities, databases, and systems utilized for collecting, disseminating or storing information used in the issuance of REAL ID licenses.”\footnote{Id. at 10,825.} This comprehensive security plan must also include “how the State will protect the privacy of the data collected, used, and maintained in connection with REAL ID, including all the source documents.”\footnote{Id. at 10,825.} The certification packages must also include an exceptions process for people who cannot fulfill the requirements necessary to receive a REAL ID card.\footnote{Id. at 10,822.}

The two-year delay in releasing draft regulations and the short timeline for the States to create “certification packages” detailing how they will comply with the final regulations makes it virtually impossible for the States to create useful implementation plans that take privacy and security questions into consideration. This fast-track scheduling makes it appear dubious that DHS will take comments submitted by the public into account when creating the final regulations for REAL ID implementation, though the agency is required to under law.

**XIV. REAL ID MUST BE REPEALED**

REAL ID is fundamentally flawed because it creates a national identification system. It cannot be fixed no matter what the implementation regulations say. Therefore,
the REAL ID Act must be repealed. Federal legislation has been introduced to repeal the
REAL ID Act.\textsuperscript{205} Arkansas, Maine, Idaho, Montana, and Washington State all have
passed legislation rejecting the REAL ID Act, and more than 20 other states are debating
similar legislation.\textsuperscript{206}

The Department of Homeland Security protests that it must implement the REAL
ID Act, but Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff has worked with members of
Congress in the past on problems with implementing the REAL ID Act.\textsuperscript{207} He can
continue to work with members of Congress to reject this national identification scheme.

XV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Coalition urges the Department of Homeland
Security to recommend to Congress that REAL ID is unworkable and must be repealed.
The REAL ID Act creates an illegal \textit{de facto} national identification system filled with
threats to privacy, security and civil liberties and undermines well-established principles
of law found in the Privacy Act. Assuming that REAL ID is repealed, any subsequent
legislation should be subjected to extensive review that explicitly addresses all of the
issues raised in this document.

Respectfully submitted,

\textbf{ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER}

\textsuperscript{205} See EPIC's page on National ID Cards and the REAL ID Act page,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/id_cards/ (information about federal and state legislation concerning REAL
ID).

\textsuperscript{206} Id.

\textsuperscript{207} At the press conference announcing the release of the draft regulations for REAL ID implementation,
Secretary Chertoff said, "And, I want to say in particular that in formulating the proposal that we're
announcing today we were delighted to work closely with governors and members of Congress," Michael
Chertoff, Sec'y, Dept of Homeland Sec., Remarks at a Press Conference on REAL ID (Mar. 1, 2007),
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REAL ID IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW: FEW BENEFITS, STAGGERING COSTS

ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S NATIONAL ID PROGRAM

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ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER

MAY 2008
About EPIC

The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a public interest research center in Washington, D.C. EPIC was established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional values.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Throughout its history, the United States has rejected the idea of a national identification system. Yet, the Department of Homeland Security continues to push forward a system of identification that has been widely opposed. The REAL ID Act mandates that State driver's licenses and ID cards follow federal technical standards and verification procedures issued by Homeland Security. REAL ID also enables tracking, surveillance, and profiling of the American public.

May 11, 2008 was the statutory deadline for implementation of the REAL ID system, but not one State is in compliance with the federal law creating a national identification system. In fact, 19 States have passed resolutions or laws rejecting the national ID program. The Department of Homeland Security has faced so many obstacles that the agency now plans an implementation deadline of 2017 -- nine years later than the 2008 statutory deadline.

Homeland Security claims that it is making strides in implementing the national ID program. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff encourages the use of the REAL ID system for a wide variety of purposes unrelated to the law that authorized the system. In an opinion column written by Secretary Chertoff after the publication of the final rule in January, he said, "embracing REAL ID" would mean it would be used to "cash a check, hire a baby sitter, board a plane or engage in countless other activities." None of these uses for the REAL ID have a legal basis. Each one creates a new risk for Americans who are already confronting the staggering problem of identity theft.

Last year, EPIC submitted detailed comments to the DHS on the draft proposal for REAL ID. With the assistance of many experts, we attempted to address the enormous challenge in the project proposal. In the following report, EPIC details the many problems with the final plan to implement this vast national identification system. The REAL ID system remains filled with threats to privacy, security and civil liberties that have not been resolved.

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I. INTRODUCTION: HISTORY OF NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION

National identification cards have long been advocated as a means to enhance national security; unmask potential criminals, chiefly terrorists; and guard against illegal immigration.¹ The cards are used in many countries including Belgium, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and South Africa.² Currently, the United States and the United Kingdom continue to debate the merits of adopting national ID cards. The types of card, their functions, and privacy safeguards vary widely.

EPIC and Privacy International’s Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey of Privacy Laws and Developments, explains the basics of the technology used in national ID cards:

In recent years technology has rapidly evolved to enable electronic record creation and the construction of large commercial and State databases. A national identifier contained in an ID card enables disparate information about a person that is stored in different databases to be easily linked and analyzed through data mining techniques. ID cards are also becoming “smarter” – the technology to build microprocessors the size of postage stamps and put them on wallet-sized cards has become more affordable. This technology enables multiple applications such as a credit card, library card, health care card, driver’s license and government benefit program information to be all stored on the same national ID along with a password or a biometric identifier.³

During the history of the national ID card debate in the United States, Americans have consistently rejected the creation of such a system. When the Social Security Number (“SSN”) was created in 1936, it was meant to be used only as an account number associated with the administration of the Social Security system.⁴ Though use of the SSN has expanded considerably, it is not a universal identifier and efforts to make it one have been consistently rejected. In 1971, the Social Security Administration task force on the Social Security Number⁵ declined to transform the number into an ID card.⁶ The Health, Education and Welfare Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems in 1973 again rejected the creation of a national identifier and advocated the establishment of significant safeguards to protect personal data. The committee said:

We recommend against the adoption of any nationwide, standard, personal identification format, with or without the SSN, that would enhance the likelihood of arbitrary or uncontrolled linkage of records about people, particularly between government or government-supported automated personal data systems. What is needed is a halt to the drift...
toward [a standard universal identifier] and prompt action to establish safeguards providing legal sanctions against abuses of automated personal data systems.7

The Federal Advisory Committee on False Identification also advised against the use of a national identifier in 1976.8 In 1977, the Privacy Protection Study Commission recommended against the adoption of a national ID system.9 In its report, Personal Privacy in an Information Society, the commission said that it:

sees a clear danger that a government record system, such as that maintained by the Social Security Administration or the Internal Revenue Service, will become a de facto central population register unless prevented by conscious policy decisions. Therefore [...] the Federal government should act positively to halt the incremental drift toward creation of a standard universal label and central population register until laws and policies regarding the use of records about individuals are developed and shown to be effective.10

In Congressional testimony in 1981, Attorney General William French Smith stated that the Reagan administration was "explicitly opposed to the creation of a national identity card."11 The Clinton administration advocated a "Health Security Card" in 1993 and assured the public that the card, issued to every American, would have "full protection for privacy and confidentiality."12 Still, the idea was rejected and the card never was created. In 1999, Congress repealed a controversial provision in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 that authorized the inclusion of SSNs on driver's licenses.13

In response to the tragic events of September 11, 2001, there has been renewed interest in the creation of national ID cards. Soon after the attacks, Larry Ellison, head of California-based software company Oracle Corporation, called for the development of a national identification system and offered to donate the technology to make this possible. He proposed ID cards with embedded digitized thumbprints and photographs of all legal residents in the U.S.14 There was much public debate about the issue, and Congressional hearings were held. Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich testified that he "would not institute a national ID card because you do get into civil liberties issues."15 Congress, in establishing the Department of Homeland Security, expressly prohibited the agency from developing National ID systems.16 The Act stated simply:

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the development of a national identification system or card.17
Nonetheless, the Department of Homeland Security continues to push forward with the REAL ID plan, as well as other proposals for identification and tracking.  

II. THE CREATION OF THE REAL ID SYSTEM

In May 2005, the REAL ID Act was appended to a bill providing tsunami relief and military appropriations and passed with little debate and no hearings. It was passed in this manner even though Republican and Democratic lawmakers in the Senate urged Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist to allow hearings on the bill and to permit a separate vote on the measure. The senators said they believe “Legislating in such a complex area without the benefit of hearings and expert testimony is a dubious exercise and one that subverts the Senate’s deliberative process.” Even though Congress was unable to debate the matter, civil liberties organizations began a public dialogue shortly after passage of the REAL ID Act.

When the agency released the draft regulations in March 2007, it received more than 21,000 public comments. EPIC joined 24 experts in privacy and technology in submitting comments that detailed significant privacy and security problems in the draft regulations. EPIC also encouraged public participation in the rulemaking process through a project organized by the Privacy Coalition, and in collaboration with over 60 organizations and more than 200 Internet bloggers.

On January 11, 2008, about two and a half years after the passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff released the final rule to implement the national identification system created under the Act. The proposal has drawn sharp criticism from State governments, members of Congress, civil liberties advocates, and security experts.

In response to the public comments to the draft regulations, the Department of Homeland Security scaled back some of the requirements, reduced the cost, and extended the deadline for State compliance in the final rule for the REAL ID system. However, Secretary Chertoff continues to encourage the use of the REAL ID system for a wide variety of purposes unrelated to the law that authorized the system, including employment eligibility verification. He also indicates that the agency would not prevent the use of the card by private parties for non-government purposes. Also, as part of the cost-saving effort, Homeland Security decided not to encrypt the data that will be stored on the card.
Though the Department of Homeland Security made some modification and attempted to solve several problems described in the public comments, the changes are not enough. REAL ID remains unworkable and should be repealed. The Department of Homeland Security is attempting to create an illegal de facto national identification system filled with threats to privacy, security and civil liberties that cannot be solved, no matter what the implementation plan set out by the regulations.

Even if REAL ID implementation were to go forward, the final regulations include poor privacy and security safeguards for the sensitive personal data of cardholders. The changes made in response to public comments about the proposed draft regulations are marginal, at best. For such a system to have the minimum protections necessary, the requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974 must be fully enforced for all uses of the data, current and future. Agencies should not be permitted to assert any exemptions, and individuals must be granted all rights, including the judicially enforceable right to access and correct their records and to ensure compliance with all Privacy Act requirements. Moreover, technical safeguards need to be incorporated into both the identity card and the databases systems. The DHS failed to establish adequate safeguards for privacy and security.

In our May 2007 comments to Department of Homeland Security concerning the draft REAL ID regulations, EPIC listed several privacy and security problems inherent in this national identification scheme. Below, we detail how the final regulations have changed the REAL ID system and whether our criticisms were answered.

A. REAL ID Is Still Not Voluntary

The Department of Homeland Security has repeatedly stated that REAL ID is not mandatory, therefore, it is not an unfunded mandate. However, in EPIC's May 2007 comments on the draft REAL ID regulations, we explained the reasons why REAL ID is not a "voluntary" program. "States are under considerable pressure to implement REAL ID and citizens who fail to carry the new identity document will find it impossible to pursue many routine activities." Also, "The administration has also pursued a heavy-handed assault on those who have raised legitimate questions about the efficacy, cost, and impact of the [REAL ID] program. [...] In Congressional testimony, a high-ranking DHS official said, 'Any State or territory that does not comply increases the risk for the rest of the Nation.' "

In the final rule, the Department of Homeland Security does nothing to change this initial assessment. In fact, the REAL ID initiative has practically invited proposals for expanded identification requirements in the United States. Though the agency limited the "official purposes" of REAL ID cards to the
statutorily mandated purposes ("boarding of Federally-regulated commercial aircrafts, entering of Federal facilities, and nuclear power plants"), the agency said it "will continue to consider additional ways in which a REAL ID license can or should be used." In its discussion of the final rule, DHS also said "widespread" acceptance of the REAL ID national identification system could lead to restrictions in "access to public subsidies and benefits programs" as well as restricting access to firearms or even elections. In his remarks announcing the final rule, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff said that "it is probably reasonably predictable that as these licenses become more widely distributed," then more groups will choose to use REAL ID cards; in fact, he said they would likely "flock" to the REAL ID national identification system.

The Department of Homeland Security continues its assault against States that contemplate rejection of the REAL ID national identification system. In the discussion of the final rule, the agency said it "believes that many States may find noncompliance an unattractive option" because the States would not be able to "maintain the conveniences enjoyed by their residents when using their State-issued driver's licenses and non-driver identity cards for official purposes, particularly as it pertains to domestic air travel."

"That will mean real consequences for their citizens starting in May if their leadership chooses not to comply," Department of Homeland Security spokeswoman Laura Keehner said in January. "That includes getting on an airplane or entering a federal building, so they will need to get passports." (emphasis added). This is a significant monetary penalty, as U.S. passports currently cost $85 to $100. DHS itself admits that only "25% of the population already holds a valid passport."

EPIC's assessment concerning the "voluntary" nature of the REAL ID national identification system remain unchanged from May. The Department of Homeland Security's declared support for and expectation of "widespread" use of the REAL ID systems, and the agency's continued pressure on the States and penalties for noncompliance prove the involuntariness of the national identification program.

B. Standards for ID Documents Remain Burdensome for Many

Under the REAL ID Act, States are required to obtain and verify documents from applicants that establish "(A) A photo identity document, except that a non-photo identity document is acceptable if it includes both the person's full legal name and date of birth. (B) Documentation showing the person's date of birth. (C) Proof of the person's social security account number or verification that the person is not eligible for a social security account number. (D) Documentation showing the person's name and address of principal residence" and "Evidence of lawful status." Though DHS has made minimal
changes to the standards for identity documents that REAL ID applicants must provide, the agency has not solved the problems EPIC detailed in the May 2007 comments.

Under the final regulations, the only documents that could be accepted by the States to issue these new identity cards would be: (1) valid unexpired U.S. passport; (2) certified copy of a birth certificate; (3) consular report of birth abroad; (4) unexpired permanent resident card; (5) unexpired employment authorization document; (6) unexpired foreign passport with valid U.S. visa affixed and “the approved I-94 form documenting the applicant’s most recent admittance into the United States”; (7) U.S. certificate of naturalization; (8) U.S. certificate of citizenship; or (9) REAL ID driver’s license or identification card issued in compliance with the final regulations. Notably, in the final regulations, the agency “has added a provision that would allow DHS to change the list of documents acceptable to establish identity following publication of a notice in the Federal Register.” Therefore, the Department of Homeland Security could make the identification document requirements even more burdensome at a later date.

These documents are virtually unchanged from those listed in the draft regulations, and such difficult standards for acceptable identification documents would limit the ability of some individuals to get a State driver’s license. As we explained in May 2007, “There are questions as to whether some citizens could produce these documents, among them Native Americans, victims of natural disasters, domestic violence victims, the homeless, military personnel, or elderly individuals.” We noted that the Department of Homeland Security attempted to resolve this problem by allowing the States to voluntarily create an exceptions process for extraordinary circumstances, but “though DHS set minimum standards for data collection, retention and documentation of the transaction, the agency did not set minimum standards for eligibility, length of process, or cost of process.”

The document requirements create specific problems for domestic violence victims. Under the draft regulations, the demonstration of lawful status would require documents that an abuser would likely have control over. Abusers of immigrants who are able to control their victims’ immigration documents will be able to control the victim’s ability to obtain a REAL ID card or license. EPIC urged the Department of Homeland Security to extend exceptions to those victims who must prove lawful immigration status, so that the abusers cannot use these documents to trap their victims into staying in abusive situations. We also recommended that the exception permitting those who do not have access to documents to use alternative documentation should be extended to the proof of lawful immigration status.
The REAL ID final rule is a little more sensitive to the problems of immigrant victims of domestic abuse. In the final rule, there is no requirement that records visibly indicate alternative documentation or that “full explanations” be attached when the exceptions process is invoked. The Department of Homeland Security also indicates that simple explanations such as “for reasons of public safety” or other “generic expressions” may be used. The exceptions process is also extended to allow determination of lawful status in the case of U.S. citizenship, but not other status. However, the Department of Homeland Security leaves unaddressed the problem of immigrant women whose abusers destroy, steal or otherwise control their documents.

Also problematic is that, in the final rule, DHS explicitly removed the only substantive guidance it detailed on the exceptions process. In the draft regulations, DHS stated that persons born before 1935 might not have been issued birth certificates, so they might be eligible for the exceptions process. But in the final rule, DHS removes this eligibility exemption. In the final regulations, there is nothing that explains to either States or individuals how REAL ID applicants could prove eligibility (other than that the “process may not be used by non-citizens to establish lawful status in the United States”), how long the process would take (days, weeks, months or even years), or if applicants could even afford the cost of the exceptions process, which would be above and beyond the already-high cost of the REAL ID card.

C. REAL ID’s Data Verification Procedures Still Based on Faulty Premises

In EPIC’s May 2007 comments, we detailed specific problems with the draft regulations’ data verification procedures, including, 1) DHS relies on verification databases that are not available, 2) of the databases that are available, some are not widely available, 3) of the databases that are available, government and independent analyses have proven (and the Department of Homeland Security itself has admitted) that there the information in these databases are incomplete or full of errors), and 4) State DMV employees are unable and should not be forced to become federal immigration officials. The final regulations promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security do not adequately address these problems.

Beyond the national identification system created by the State-to-State data exchange, two of four verification systems required are not fully deployed nationwide and third does not even exist. The database systems the States are required to verify applicant information against are: (1) Electronic Verification of Vital Events (“EVVE”), for birth certificate verification; (2) Social Security On-Line Verification (“SSOLV”), for Social Security Number verification; (3) Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (“SAVE”), for immigrant status verification; and (4) an as-yet uncreated Department of State system “to verify
passports, U.S. visas, and other information held by the Department of State," such as Consular Reports of Birth, and Certifications of Report of Birth.60

When the draft regulations were released, the only system that was available for nationwide deployment is SSOLV, and a survey of States by the National Governors Association found that even this database would need substantial improvements to be able to handle the workload that would be needed under REAL ID.61 SSOLV depends on data gathered in a system whose mistakes are well-known, the Numerical Identification File ("NUMIDENT").62 The Social Security Administration’s Inspector General estimated that about 17.8 million records in the NUMIDENT have discrepancies with name, date of birth or death, or citizenship status.63 About 13 million of these incorrect records belong to U.S. citizens.64

Federal reviews have found such data "seriously flawed in content and accuracy."65 In an October opinion granting a temporary restraining order enjoining the Department of Homeland Security from implementing a new "no-match" employment eligibility verification proposal, the federal judge noted "the government recognizes, the no-match letters are based on SSA records that include numerous errors."66 In the final rule, Department of Homeland Security admits there are accuracy and reliability problems in SSOLV said that it, AAMVA, and the States are working with SSA to attempt to solve these problems.67

In the final regulations, DHS revealed "that only 20 States are using SAVE, and that the planned connection between SAVE and another database for foreign student status verification (Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, "SEVIS") may not be completed by the implementation deadline of May 2008."68 Now, Department of Homeland Security claims "a majority" of States are enrolled in SAVE, but that it is still "working to modify the system" so that States can use it to implement the REAL ID national identification system.69 The agency also says that the planned connection between SAVE and SEVIS has not been completed.70

EVVE is currently in pilot phase and only 11 States are participating, an increase of six more than the five States that were participating in May 2007.71 In the final regulations, the Department of Homeland Security based its requirements on the assumption that EVVE would be ready for nationwide expansion by the implementation deadline of May 11, 2008.72 Now, DHS admits, "the EVVE system is not ready for full implementation. The final rule provides for additional time for States to implement EVVE or another system that provides for the verification of birth records."73 DHS burdens the States by requiring that the States either use a system that the agency admits is not ready
for full deployment or the States themselves must create such a complex and costly system.

In the draft regulations, DHS required that the States use a State Department system to verify passports and some reports of births that was not yet created. The agency based this mandate on the assumption that the system “is eventually developed.” In the final rule, DHS admits the system still does not exist and says it is working “to provide a capability to verify passports, U.S. visas, and other information held by the Department of State.”

DHS states in the final rule that “States cannot and will not be required to use systems that are not fully operational and available for use,” yet the agency then details mandates for the States to use systems that are not fully operational and available for use. It is clear that the agency has not solved the significant problems with its verification databases and has ensured that even States that wish to implement REAL ID will confront substantial obstacles and may not be able to do so.

There is a further problem with the revised verification procedures: the Department of Homeland Security anticipates that State DMV employees will become Federal immigration officials. The Department of Homeland Security has not adequately addressed these problems in its final rule for the implementation of the REAL ID national identification system.

Under the final rule, State DMV employees would still be required to verify REAL ID national identification card applicants’ source documents. DHS defined “verification” as “two interrelated procedures: (1) inspection to see if the document is genuine and has not been altered, and (2) checking to see that the identity data on the document is valid.”

Under the final regulations, the source documents that would be accepted by the States to issue these new identity cards would be: (1) valid unexpired U.S. passport; (2) certified copy of a birth certificate; (3) consular report of birth abroad; (4) unexpired permanent resident card; (5) unexpired employment authorization document; (6) unexpired foreign passport with valid U.S. visa affixed and “the approved I-94 form documenting the applicant’s most recent admittance into the United States”; (7) U.S. certificate of naturalization; (8) U.S. certificate of citizenship; or (9) REAL ID driver’s license or identification card issued in compliance with the final regulations. As we noted above, in the final regulations, the agency “has added a provision that would allow DHS to change the list of documents acceptable to establish identity following publication of a notice in the Federal Register.” Therefore, the document verification requirements could become even more burdensome for State DMV employees.
State DMV employees would be required to verify these source documents, including Federal immigration documents, though this is a complex and confusing area of law. In the draft regulations, DHS sought to solve this problem by requiring that DMV employees handling source documents undergo 12 hours of "fraudulent document recognition" training.\textsuperscript{81} The final rule mandates "Fraudulent document recognition training for all covered employees handling source documents or engaged in the issuance of driver’s licenses and identification cards."\textsuperscript{82}

A Government Accountability Office review of the Social Security Administration found that staff had difficulty recognizing counterfeit documents, though it is their primary job to verify these documents before issuing Social Security numbers.\textsuperscript{83} For example, the Government Accountability Office reported difficulty with detection of fraudulent birth certificates. In one case, a fake in-State birth certificate was detected, but "SSA staff acknowledged that if a counterfeit out-of-State birth certificate had been used, SSA would likely have issued the SSN because of staff unfamiliarity with the specific features of numerous State birth certificates."\textsuperscript{84}

We reiterate what we said in our May 2007 comments, "It is questionable how well State DMV employees would be able to spot fraudulent documents, especially documents as rarely seen as consular reports of birth abroad [...] when it is difficult for counterfeit documents to be spotted by federal employees whose primary job is verification of source documents."\textsuperscript{85} It still remains unclear would happen if a State DMV employee determines that an applicant’s source documents are fraudulent: What recourse would the applicant have to prove her documents are real? In the final regulations, the Department of Homeland Security again has punted its Privacy Act obligations, including appropriate redress procedures.

III. HOMELAND SECURITY HAS ABDICATED ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY

The Department of Homeland Security has stated that it is constrained in its power to protect the privacy of individuals and their data under the REAL ID Act. The agency claimed in the draft regulations that, "The Act does not include statutory language authorizing DHS to prescribe privacy requirements for the state-controlled databases or data exchange necessary to implement the Act."\textsuperscript{86} We agree with Sen. Joseph Lieberman, who said, "The concept that federal agencies need explicit Congressional authorization to protect Americans' privacy is just plain wrong. In fact, our government is obligated to ensure that programs and regulations do not unduly jeopardize an individual's right to privacy."\textsuperscript{87}
The final regulations create a national identification system that affects 245 million license and cardholders nationwide, yet DHS is hesitant to ensure strong privacy safeguards in the system itself. The agency has the obligation to protect the privacy of individuals affected by this system and must do more than the feeble attempts set out in the draft regulations.

The Privacy Act of 1974 applies to the entire national identification system under guidelines set out by the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") and the Department of Homeland Security itself. The OMB guidelines explain that the Privacy Act "stipulates that systems of records operated under contract or, in some instances, State or local governments operating under Federal mandate 'by or on behalf of the agency . . . to accomplish an agency function' are subject to . . . the Act." The guidelines also explain that the Privacy Act "make[s] it clear that the systems 'maintained' by an agency are not limited to those operated by agency personnel on agency premises but include certain systems operated pursuant to the terms of a contract to which the agency is a party." The REAL ID system is operated under a Federal mandate to accomplish several agency functions, including immigration control.

The REAL ID system is covered by the Privacy Act under the Department of Homeland Security's own policies. In a policy guidance memorandum from the agency's Privacy Office, "DHS Information Systems" is defined as "an Information System operated, controlled, or directed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This definition shall include information systems that other entities, including private sector organizations, operate on behalf of or for the benefit of the Department of Homeland Security." The national system of interconnected State databases is "operate[d] on behalf of or for the benefit" of DHS. The Privacy Office also states:

As a matter of DHS policy, any personally identifiable information (PII) that is collected, used, maintained, and/or disseminated in connection with a mixed system by DHS shall be treated as a System of Records subject to the Privacy Act regardless of whether the information pertains to a U.S. citizen, Legal Permanent Resident, visitor, or alien.

If the Department of Homeland Security creates this system, the agency must fully apply Privacy Act requirements of notice, access, correction, and judicially enforceable redress to the entire REAL ID national identification system. The final regulations conclude that individuals should attempt to exercise their rights to notice, access, correction and redress through State DMVs, the Social Security Administration, the Department of State, and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (a part of the Department of Homeland Security).
Once again, the Department of Homeland Security has punted the issue of privacy to the States, but the agency needs to lead. Various questions remain, including important ones concerning redress. How will redress be adjudicated if one State includes erroneous information in an individual’s file and passes that information on to another State? Will the individual have to petition both States separately for redress? Will neither State process the redress, because each believes it to be the responsibility of the other? The right of redress must be judicially enforceable. The Privacy Act protections must be mandated in the REAL ID implementation regulations in order for the Department of Homeland Security to fulfill its obligations.

A. Unfettered Access to 2D Barcode Data Threatens Individual Privacy

There are significant threats to individual privacy and security that would be created by unfettered access to REAL ID national identification system data. Some of the problems are based on the design of the card and the safeguards for the underlying databases. Though the Department of Homeland Security has made some changes in the final rule, substantial problems remain.

Under REAL ID, the following data elements, at a minimum, must be on the REAL ID card: (1) full legal name; (2) date of birth; (3) gender; (4) driver’s license or identification card number; (5) digital photograph of the person; (6) address of principal residence; (7) signature; (8) physical security features; (9) a common machine readable technology, with defined minimum data elements; and, (10) card issuance and expiration dates. The REAL ID card will include a 2D barcode as its machine-readable technology, which will include elements 1 through 7 and 10, with these notations, “(b) Full legal name, unless the State permits an applicant to establish a name other than the name that appears on a source document, pursuant to Sec. 37.11(c)(2)”; “(f) Address as listed on the card pursuant to Sec. 37.17(f)”; “(h) Card design revision date, indicating the most recent change or modification to the visible format of the driver’s license or identification card”; “(i) Inventory control number of the physical document”; and, “(j) State or territory of issuance.”

We support the Department of Homeland Security in its rejection of radio frequency identification (RFID) technology as the machine-readable technology for the REAL ID national identification card. Multiple reports, including the recommendations of the Department’s own Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee, made clear that RFID should not be used for human identification. However, the Department’s decision to leave the 2D barcode unencrypted creates unnecessary security risks. In doing so, the Department of Homeland Security rejects the advice of independent privacy and security experts and the agency’s own Privacy Office. The DHS Privacy Office supported encryption because 2D bar code readers are extremely common, the data could be captured from the driver’s licenses and identification cards and accessed by unauthorized
third parties by simply reading the 2D bar code on the credential” if the data is left unencrypted.99

There are many examples of unauthorized users being able to download data from unencrypted machine-readable technology.100 One case involved New York prosecutors charging 13 people with harvesting data from unencrypted, machine-readable credit cards and clubs downloading all data contained on unencrypted State licenses.101 To protect privacy and improve security, this machine-readable technology must either include encryption or access must be limited in some other form. As we explained earlier, “Leaving the machine readable zone open would allow unfettered third-party access to the data and leave 245 million license and cardholders nationwide at risk for individual tracking.”102

The Department of Homeland Security rejected encryption in the final rule because of “the complexities and costs of implementing an encryption infrastructure.”103 We anticipated this and detailed a privacy-protective alternative to encryption, yet the agency did not take this path either. We said:

We suggest that no personal data be placed on the machine readable zone. Instead, place a new identifier that is unused elsewhere (i.e., not the driver’s license number or Social Security Number). This unique identifier will “point” to the records in the national database. Access to the database can be controlled by password and encryption security, because it is easier to regulate public keys in this scenario. Also, the State should ensure that a new unique identifier is created each time the machine readable zone is renewed or reissued, in order to make the identifier less useful as an everyday ID number – people would not be forever linked to this identifier. This approach would improve data security and privacy.104

Instead of accepting this simple, privacy-protective suggestion, the Department of Homeland Security chose to require that a great deal of personal data be stored on the 2D barcode.

DHS is required to include security protections on the REAL ID card. Under the REAL ID Act, the card must include “(8) Physical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for any fraudulent purpose.”105 The agency has this obligation and it should not abdicate this responsibility. If DHS does not seek to limit access to the data on the REAL ID card, then it is signaling that it is acceptable for third parties to download, access and store data for purposes beyond the three official purposes.

Rejecting encryption for the 2D barcode helps to push the REAL ID system into “widespread” use in everyday life, a goal that DHS Secretary
Chertoff and the DHS final rule itself expect and support. Such an expansion would harm both individual privacy and security and quickly turn the United States into a country where the REAL ID national identification card is involuntarily carried by everyone.

B. REAL ID Increases Both Insider and Outsider Threats

Under REAL ID, the government would have easy access to an incredible amount of personal data stored in one national database (or, according to the final regulation from Department of Homeland Security, 56 State and Territory databases, each of which can access all others through a “hub”-based network).

As it did in the draft regulations, in the final regulations DHS claims that it is not expanding data collection and retention, but it is enlarging schedules and procedures for retention and distribution of identification documents and other personal data. This broad expansion of data collection and retention in a national database creates significant threats to privacy and security.

The Department of Homeland Security justifies the expanded data collection on the misleading representations that 1) “most States” already gather, retain and distribute such extensive personal data and documents, and 2) the REAL ID national identification system does not give States or the Federal government greater access to sensitive personal data and documents than before. The REAL ID national identification system mandates increased data gathering, retention and distribution, as well as massively expanding the Federal and State access to this data. The personal data of 245 million State license and ID cardholders would be accessible from a massive number of DMVs across the country.

Consolidating identity through a single document increases risks when the document is compromised. It would be as if you used one key to open your house, your car, your safe deposit box, your office, and more. “Perversely – a harder-to-forge card makes subverting the system even more valuable. Good security doesn’t try to divine intentionality from identification, but instead provides for broad defenses regardless of identification,” such as airport screening, walls and door locks, security expert Bruce Schneier has said.

There are a number of “insider” and “outsider” threats to the massive identification database connecting 56 States and territories. Creating a national identification database containing personal data of 245 million State license and ID cardholders nationwide, one that would be accessible from a massive number of DMVs across the country, is an invitation for all criminals – whether identity thieves or terrorists – to break into just one of these entrance points to gather such data for misuse.
Such a system would also be at risk of abuse from authorized users, such as DMV employees, who are bribed or threatened into changing the system data or issuing "authentic" national identification cards. It is appropriate to note here that, on the day that DHS released the final regulations for REAL ID, "A Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration employee [...] and four others were indicted [...] on charges that they made and sold fake State driver's licenses and identification cards in exchange for money."\textsuperscript{110}

Identity theft is a large and growing problem. A Federal Trade Commission report estimated 8.3 million victims in 2005 (the last year for which numbers are available).\textsuperscript{111} Serious cases of identity theft cost victims $1,200 - $2,500.\textsuperscript{112} In 10 percent of new account frauds, victims incurred at least $3,000 in out-of-pocket expenses.\textsuperscript{113} Domestic violence survivors are particularly vulnerable because their economic situation may be more precarious than average, and they may have greater need for unsullied credit as they attempt to create independent economic lives.

Large-scale data breaches have occurred in State DMVs across the country; if the databases are linked under REAL ID, these breaches will only grow in scale. The Oregon DMV lost half a million records in 2005.\textsuperscript{114} Also that year, in Georgia, a dishonest insider exposed 465,000 records.\textsuperscript{115} In 2006, a computer with the personal data of 16,000 individuals was stolen from a North Carolina DMV.\textsuperscript{116} The list goes on, and the personal information of individuals will be endangered under the REAL ID national identification system.

Domestic violence survivors are particularly vulnerable. Domestic violence survivors who flee their abusers, crossing into different States, would be exposed if their abuser breaches the security of any one of these 56 interconnected databases. "An abuser with an associate inside a State DMV, law enforcement, or other agency with access to the State records would be able to track a victim as the victim moves across the country."\textsuperscript{117}

Intentional breaches by outsiders or authorized insiders abusing their power would also have a wider scope under the Department of Homeland Security’s REAL ID national identification system. Past abuses exemplify what can be expected in a nationwide scale. For example, in September, a former Department of Commerce agent was indicted and charged with using a federal database to stalk a former girlfriend and her family.\textsuperscript{118} While employed at the Commerce Department, the agent is alleged to have accessed the system at least 163 times during a 10-month period.\textsuperscript{119} In Arizona, a police officer admitted accessing motor vehicle records to find personal information on women he was romantically interested in, as well as co-workers.\textsuperscript{120}
The danger of negligent and accidental disclosures is increased by REAL ID, as substantially more government employees will have access to all motor vehicle records nationwide. One example of accidental disclosure occurred in Wisconsin in 2007 – a police officer disclosed a victim’s address, found in a DMV record to a stalker; the officer did not know that the victim had a restraining order against this man. This sort of inadvertence will happen much more frequently in a post-REAL ID world as the access to driver’s license information is spread throughout the national identification system.

C. Background Check Procedures Fail to Address Insider Threat Problems

The Department of Homeland Security requires certain government employees undergo criminal history background checks and list particular offenses that would disqualify an individual from specific jobs related to the REAL ID national identification system. In the draft regulations, DHS said employees who had to undergo these checks would be limited to those who could affect the recording of information, the manufacture of REAL ID cards, or the information displayed on a card. Employees who could access the record information without the ability to edit it are not subject to the background check requirement.

EPIC explained in our May 2007 comments, “This massive loophole greatly increases the security and privacy risks of domestic violence and sexual abuse victims, as significant damage can be done by unauthorized data disclosure.” We proposed that “the broad category of those who have access to records should be shrunk, rather than increasing the category of those who are covered by the background check requirement” in order to safeguard against these threats. However, the final rule did not use this proposal.

In the draft regulations, the suitability criteria of the background check did not match the threat of stalkers and abusers. DHS proposed using the permanent and interim disqualifying criteria in the Transportation Security Administration’s background checks for maritime and land transportation security at 49 C.F.R. 1572.103. The offenses include espionage, sedition, treason, making bomb threats, and crimes involving transportation security incidents. Some of the offenses, such as fraud and misrepresentation – including identity fraud – are relevant to the risks of improper disclosure and access to the records. However, crimes such as stalking, surveillance, harassment and domestic abuse are not in this list.

Recognizing the risk of improper access to the record system, EPIC recommended that, “these crimes must be added to the list of disqualifying offenses, so that the REAL ID system does not create a loophole permitting abusers access to a national database that would allow them to track their victims no matter where the victims moved.” The Department of Homeland Security
did not add these offenses, allowing even convicted abusers the opportunity to access to the massive national database created under REAL ID.\textsuperscript{130}

\textbf{D. Final Rule Includes Marginal Improvements for Address Confidentiality and Name History Problems}

Many States have created formal Address Confidentiality Programs and also provided general measures of residential address privacy, but these protections would be removed by the draft regulations.\textsuperscript{131} The final rule improves on some of the address confidentiality provisions of the proposed rule, but the subject of addresses in the national ID database is treated in contradictory manners in different parts of the final rule.

The REAL ID Act requires that driver's licenses include a person's "address of principle residence."\textsuperscript{132} This requirement effectively destroys State address confidentiality programs. The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act ("VAWA") included a requirement for DHS to "consider and address" the needs of certain groups when the agency is "developing regulations or guidance with regard to identification documents, including driver's licenses."\textsuperscript{133} These groups include domestic violence and sexual assault victims who are entitled to be enrolled in State address confidentiality programs; whose addresses are entitled to be suppressed via court order or State or Federal law; or whose information is protected from disclosure according to Section 384 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 1996.\textsuperscript{134}

In the final rule, the Department of Homeland Security includes more exemptions and extends them to the unencrypted machine-readable zone. Now exempt are individuals for whom State law, regulation, or DMV procedure permits display of an alternative address.\textsuperscript{135} This exemption includes States that generally permit a mailing address to be displayed on the card. Individuals who are enrolled in address confidentiality programs, who have their information suppressed by court orders (including administrative orders), and those who are also protected by Section 384 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 may also use an alternative address.\textsuperscript{136} The unencrypted machine-readable zone requires the "address as listed on the card pursuant to § 37.17(f)" which includes the alternative address provisions.\textsuperscript{137} Further, the final regulations require two documents that show "address of principle residence" but exempt street addresses pursuant to § 37.17(f), the section on that regulates address confidentiality.\textsuperscript{138}

The agency's comments to the final rule state, "true addresses must be captured and stored in a secure manner in the DMV database even if an alternate address appears on the face and MRZ portions of the driver's license or identification card."\textsuperscript{139} However, the actual regulation that describes the design
of the national identification database, § 37.33, does not appear to incorporate these requirements. Under § 37.33 the database must contain:

(1) All data fields printed on driver’s licenses and identification cards issued by the State, individual serial numbers of the card, and SSN;
(2) A record of the full legal name and recorded name established under Sec. 37.11(c)(2) as applicable, without truncation;
(3) All additional data fields included in the MRZ but not printed on the driver’s license or identification card; and
(4) Motor vehicle driver’s histories, including motor vehicle violations, suspensions, and points on driver’s licenses.140

The gathering, retention and distribution of addresses in the databases are unclear, as the Department of Homeland Security has made contradictory statements.

Though the treatment of name history is improved in the final rule, a significant problem remains. Name histories may be kept in motor vehicle databases and thus exposed to security breaches by insiders with access or outsiders who break into any one of the many DMVs across the country with access to the national database.

The final rule allows State law or regulation to permit the use of a name other than the one on the source documents.141 The State may itself determine what evidence is needed for it to accept the name if it differs from source documents.142 Further, the name difference from the source document must be recorded.143 The final regulations also permit the name on the face of the card and in the machine-readable zone to deviate from the name on source documents.144 These are all improvements over the draft regulations.

However, the final rule for implementation of the REAL ID system still contains a problematic name history provision. The DMV database is required to have “a record of the full legal name and recorded name established under §37.11(c)(2) as applicable, without truncation.”145 This record includes copies of source documents and any evidence of a name change.146 Such data gathering, retention and distribution would leave a trail for abusers to follow.

IV. REAL ID SYSTEM CREATES NEW NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS

The Department of Homeland Security continues to claim that the national identification system created under the REAL ID scheme will improve national security. When releasing the final rule in January, Secretary Chertoff said, “secure identification is an essential way of ensuring that people are who they say they are. And therefore this kind of identification gives us a tremendous
tool in preventing dangerous people from getting on airplanes or getting into federal buildings.” Yet there is a multitude of evidence that Secretary Chertoff is wrong – including evidence from the 9/11 Commission.

DHS’s national security rationale has always been confusing and has not changed since the draft regulations were released in March 2007. Our May 2007 comments included a detailed debunking of the Department of Homeland Security’s mystifying quantitative risk assessment. The agency claimed this assessment proved the need for, cost-effectiveness of, and security advantages of the REAL ID national identification system. Yet, DHS admitted at the time, “REAL ID is highly unlikely to impact the consequences of a successful attack, but it may impact, on the margin, the chance of a terrorist attack being attempted and succeeding.” DHS attempted to determine the marginal chance that REAL ID will lessen the chance of success or discourage the attempt of a terrorist attack, using a number of faulty assumptions.

In the final regulations, the Department of Homeland Security again attempts a national security rationale, stating:

Under this final rule, it will be significantly more difficult for an individual to use a false name or provide fraudulent documents to obtain an identification that can be used for purposes of boarding a commercial airplane. Therefore, the final rule makes it less likely that a terrorist could circumvent watch-list screening processes and security procedures (as upgraded or developed post-9/11) and board a commercial airplane.

However, in the final rule, the Department of Homeland Security includes an exception that completely undercuts the supposed security rationale for the creation of this national identification system. In the final rule, the Department of Homeland Security allows individuals to show their foreign passport in place of REAL ID card or other US-issued identification document. Criminals who do not wish to go through the cumbersome REAL ID process could merely go to any number of foreign countries and obtain (whether legally or illegally) a passport that would “prove” their identity as a “trusted” individual, one whose name is not on any watch lists.

All of the 9/11 hijackers could have boarded commercial flights or entered federal buildings under the REAL ID scheme because each hijacker had a foreign passport, according to the 9/11 Commission Report. In fact, “potential hijackers [were told] to acquire new ‘clean’ passports in their home countries before applying for a U.S. visa. This was to avoid raising suspicion about previous travel to countries where al Qaeda operated,” said the Commission. The 9/11 Commission in 2004 detailed the problem with the national security rationale that DHS continues to use in 2008.
Also, note that the Department of Homeland Security says in the final rule that it will be “significantly more difficult,” but not impossible, “for an individual to use a false name or provide fraudulent documents to obtain an identification.” This is the reason that any national identification system is fundamentally flawed: Individuals are told to “trust” the national ID card, but it is still possible to create a fake card, so one cannot rely on the national identification system to “prove” an individual is who she says. Contrary to the Department of Homeland Security’s claims, this system harms our national security by creating another “trusted” path for criminals to exploit.

V. States Oppose National ID System

Since the passage of the REAL ID Act in 2005, a number of States have passed legislation rejecting the national identification system. On January 18, Montana governor Brian Schweitzer wrote to the governors of 17 States asking them to join him in rejecting the REAL ID system. “Today, I am asking you to join with me in resisting the DHS coercion to comply with the provisions of REAL ID,” Gov. Schweitzer wrote. “I would like us to speak with one, unified voice and demand the Congress step in and fix this mess.”

Four states (Maine, Montana, New Hampshire and South Carolina) have expressly rejected the system and none asked for an extension. After much posturing, DHS gave extensions to all States, even though some said they would never implement REAL ID, because their legislatures have passed laws banning the national identification system.

In the final regulations released in January, the Department of Homeland Security set an extension request deadline of March 31, 2008. By that date, all 56 States and U.S. territories were required to ask the agency for an extension that would allow their licenses and ID cards to remain “valid for federal purposes” past May 11, 2008 through the first extension period, until December 31, 2009. For States that do ask for the initial extension, those States then have until October 11, 2009 to “file a request for an additional extension until no later than May 10, 2011, by submitting a Material Compliance Checklist demonstrating material compliance.”

The extensions were necessary because, even though May 11, 2008 is the statutory deadline for implementation of the REAL ID system, not one State is in compliance with the federal law creating a national identification system. In fact, 19 States have passed resolutions or laws rejecting the national ID program.

The Department of Homeland Security said it “made extensions available for states that needed additional time to come into compliance, or to complete
ongoing security measures,” implying that states that received extensions had agreed to implement the REAL ID national identification system. However, a number of states have said that these extensions do not constitute an agreement to implement this national ID scheme.

For example, California (one of the most populous states) sent a letter to the Department of Homeland Security on March 18, stating, “California’s request for an extension is not a commitment to implement REAL ID.” New Hampshire said, “because our Legislature voted overwhelmingly in 2007 to pass a bill that prohibits our state from implementing the REAL ID Act in New Hampshire, we cannot authorize implementation of the REAL ID regulations.”

There are also ongoing concerns about Homeland Security’s cost computation. In the final regulations, DHS claims to reduce the cost of implementation for the REAL ID national identification system to $9.9 billion, a significant drop from the draft regulations’ estimate of $23.1 billion. However, there are significant problems with the agency’s assumptions.

The agency assumes that only 75 percent of U.S. residents will not apply for a REAL ID national identification card. DHS states that the remaining 25 percent will either not enter federal buildings or board commercial flights, or the people will use $100 U.S. passports. The agency also ignores, among other things, the cost of creating the national identification database (or “hub” network) linking 56 States and territories.

The Department of Homeland Security also believes that it can sweep aside the fact that REAL ID is an unfunded mandate by allocating $360 million to the States for REAL ID implementation. The agency said it will offer, “$80 million in dedicated REAL ID grants and another $280 million in general funding as part of the Homeland Security Grant Program,” which funds security programs such as first responder services. However, the number still pales next to the agency’s “reduced” estimate of $9.9 billion.

Currently Congress is considering legislation to repeal REAL ID. Sen. Patrick Leahy, who co-sponsored legislation to replace REAL ID with the negotiated rulemaking process originally enacted in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act, criticized the final regulations. “The Bush administration’s REAL ID program will not only lead to long lines at every DMV across the country, it will impose a massive unfunded mandate on State governments while offering absolutely no federal privacy protections to our citizens,” Sen. Leahy said. “It is unfortunate that instead of addressing the fundamental problems this law poses for the States, the Administration appears content merely to prolong a contentious and unproductive battle to force the States to comply.”
VI. RECOMMENDATION: DECENTRALIZE IDENTIFICATION

The REAL ID national identification system would harm rather than protect privacy and security, and such a system would exacerbate the country’s growing identity theft problem. It decreases security to have a centralized system of identification, one ID card for many purposes, as there will be a substantial amount of harm when the card is compromised.170

A system of decentralized identification reduces the risks associated with security breaches and the misuse of personal information. Technological innovation can enable the development of context-dependent identifiers. A decentralized approach to identification is consistent with our commonsense understanding of identification. If you are banking, you should have a bank account number. If go to the library, you should have a library card number. If you rent videos from a store, you should have a video rental store card number. Utility bills, telephone bills, insurance, the list goes on. These context-dependent usernames and passwords enable authentication without the risk of a universal identification system. That way, if one number is compromised, all of the numbers are not spoiled and identity thieves cannot access all of your accounts. All of your accounts can become compartmentalized, enhancing their security.171

Internet companies are already moving to develop systems of multiple identification in part because of concerns that were identified in a consumer privacy case brought to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) in 2001. In that matter, EPIC and 12 organizations submitted a complaint to the FTC, detailing serious privacy implications of Microsoft Windows XP and Microsoft Passport.172 The complaint alleged that Microsoft “has engaged, and is engaging, in unfair and deceptive trade practices intended to profile, track, and monitor millions of Internet users,” and that the company’s collection and use of personal information violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.173

In August 2002, the FTC announced a settlement in its privacy enforcement action against Microsoft.174 The settlement required that Microsoft establish a comprehensive information security program for Passport, and prohibited any misrepresentation of its practices regarding information collection and usage.

Since the FTC settlement of the EPIC complaint against Passport, industry groups have moved toward decentralized identity systems that are more robust, provide more security, and are better for privacy. Microsoft has developed an approach to identity management that allowed for multiple forms of online identification, and other companies, including open source developers, followed a similar approach.175 There is a need to avoid single identifiers and to promote
multiple identification schemes, and that this approach is best not only for privacy but also for security.

The development of system for multiple identification, or "meta-identification" is widely favored by experts in the field. For example, Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, explains that the REAL ID Act does not add to the nation's security protections. Instead, Harper advocates a diverse identification system. "A diverse, competitive identification and credentialing industry would be far better, and far more protective of liberty, than the uniform government-monopolized identification system on the advance today." 177

VII. Conclusion

When Congress created the Department of Homeland Security, it made clear in the enabling legislation that the agency could not create a national ID system. 178 In September 2004, then-Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge reiterated, "[t]he legislation that created the Department of Homeland Security was very specific on the question of a national ID card. They said there will be no national ID card." 179

In an opinion column written by Secretary Chertoff after the publication of the final rule, he said, "embracing REAL ID" would mean it would be used to "cash a check, hire a baby sitter, board a plane or engage in countless other activities." 180 This is a description of a national identification system, which is illegal in the United States.

The final rule includes few protections for individual privacy and security in its massive national identification database. It harms national security by creating yet another "trusted" credential for criminals to exploit. The Department of Homeland Security has faced so many obstacles with the REAL ID system that the agency now plans an implementation deadline of 2017 - nine years later than the 2008 statutory deadline. 181 It is an unfunded mandate that would cost billions, with the burden ultimately being placed on the individual taxpayer.

Technical experts familiar with the challenges of privacy protection and identification presented the Department of Homeland Security with a variety of recommendations that would have minimized the risks of the REAL ID system. The DHS made some modifications, but left the essential system in place. As REAL ID currently stands, the costs are many and the benefits are few. Public opposition to implementation is understandable.
### Appendix I

#### STATE LEGISLATION AGAINST REAL ID ACT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Legislation Against REAL ID Act</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Dakota</strong>, SCR 7 (February 25, 2008)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tennessee</strong>, SJR 0248 (June 14, 2007)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>South Carolina</strong>, S 449 (June 5, 2007)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Nebraska</strong>, LR 28 (May 30, 2007)</td>
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<td><strong>Illinois</strong>, HJR 0027 (May 22, 2007)</td>
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<td><strong>Missouri</strong>, HCR 20 (May 17, 2007)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Nevada</strong>, AJR 6 (May 14, 2007)</td>
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*Date passed*  
Source: [http://epic.org/privacy/id-cards/](http://epic.org/privacy/id-cards/)
Appendix II

EPIC EXPERT COMMENTS ON DRAFT REAL ID REGULATIONS


Signatories (affiliations are for identification only)

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Frank M. Tuerkheimer, Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School
End Notes

1 See generally, EPIC, National ID Cards and the REAL ID Act, http://www.epic.org/privacy/id_cards/.
3 Id. at 23-24.
10 Id.
11 Robert B. Cullen, Administration Announcing Plan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 30, 1981.
17 Id.
21 Id.


27 See discussion in Section IX. Recent Developments: States Continue Rebellion Against National ID System.

28 Id.; Also, Press Release, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, Twelve Senators Urge Frist To Keep Real ID Act Off Supplemental Appropriations Bill Sweeping Proposal Needs Deliberate Consideration supra note 20.


32 Id.

33 Id.

34 Id.


36 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 3, supra note 24.

37 Id. at 4, quoting Richard C. Barth, Assistant Sec'y for Policy Dev., Dep't of Homeland Sec., Testimony at a Hearing on Understanding the Realities of REAL ID: A Review of Efforts to Secure Drivers' Licenses and Identification Cards Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Management, the Federal Workforce & the District of Columbia, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. (Mar. 26, 2007), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/Testimonybarth.pdf.


39 REAL Final Rule at 5288, supra note 26.

40 Id. at 5319. In March 2007, a Homeland Security official testified to Congress that "widespread acceptance" of REAL ID would affect employment and voting. See Richard C. Barth, supra note 37.

41 Chertoff Remarks on Final Rule, supra note 31.

42 REAL Final Rule at 5329, supra note 26.


44 Id.
REAL ID Implementation Review: Few Benefits, Staggering Costs

46 REAL Final Rule at 5322, supra note 26.
47 REAL ID Act at §§ 202(c)(1), 202(c)(2)(B), supra note 19.
48 REAL Final Rule at 5333, supra note 26.
49 Id. at 5277.
50 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 13, supra note 24.
51 Id. at 14.
52 Id. at 53-54.
53 REAL Final Rule at 5334, supra note 26.
54 Id. at 5298.
55 Id. at 5334.
56 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,822, supra note 23.
57 REAL Final Rule at 5315, supra note 26.
58 Id. at 5298.
59 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 14-17, supra note 24.
60 REAL Final Rule at 5296, 5334, supra note 26; Electronic Verification of Vital Events (“EVVE”) is also called Electronic Verification of Vital Event Records (“EVVER”) in some federal documents.
64 Id. at Appendix C-2.
67 REAL Final Rule at 5297, supra note 26.
68 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 15-16, supra note 24, citing REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,833, supra note 23.
69 REAL Final Rule at 5275-5276, supra note 26.
70 Id. at 5297.
71 "As of October 2007 [the most recent data available], the following vital records offices are online with EVVE: Arkansas, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota and Utah.” Nat’l Ass’n for Public Health Statistics & Info. Systems, Electronic Verification of Vital Events (EVVE), http://www.naphsis.org/index.asp?bid=1036.
72 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,831, supra note 23.
73 REAL Final Rule at 5297, supra note 26.
74 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,832, supra note 23.
75 REAL Final Rule at 5297, supra note 26.
76 Id.
77 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 16-17, supra note 24.
REAL ID Implementation Review: Few Benefits, Staggering Costs

78 REAL Final Rule at 5277, supra note 26.
79 REAL Final Rule at 5333, supra note 26.
80 Id. at 5277.
82 REAL Final Rule at 5338, supra note 26.
84 Id. at 19.
85 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 17, supra note 24.
86 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,825, supra note 23.
88 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 6-12, supra note 24.
90 Id.
92 Id. at 1.
93 REAL Final Rule at 5284-5284, supra note 26.
95 REAL ID Act at § 202(b), supra note 19.
96 REAL Final Rule at 5336, supra note 26.
98 Id. at 5292.
100 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 21-23, supra note 24.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 17-18.
103 REAL Final Rule at 5292, supra note 26.
104 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 19, supra note 24.
105 REAL ID Act at § 202(b)(8), supra note 19.
106 REAL Final Rule at 5275, 5291, supra note 26.
107 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 31-33, supra note 24.
REAL ID IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW: FEW BENEFITS, STAGGERING COSTS


110 Five indicted in identity theft scheme, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 11, 2008.


112 Id. at 5.

113 Id. at 6.


115 Id.

116 Id.

117 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 50, supra note 24.


119 Id.

120 Michael Kiefer, Officer Admits to Tampering; Databases Used to Check on Women, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, April 6, 2006, at 3B. More insider and outsider abuses are detailed in our May 2007 comments. EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 45, 50-51, supra note 24.

121 Kevin Murphy, Officer's Actions will Cost 25,000, GAZETTE EXTRA, Feb. 15, 2007, http://www.gazetteextra.com/mezera021507.asp.

122 REAL Final Rule at 5338, supra note 26.

123 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,856, supra note 23.

124 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 51, supra note 24.

125 Id.

126 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,856, supra note 23.

127 49 C.F.R. 1572.103(a).

128 Id. at 1572.103(b)(2)(iii).

129 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 52, supra note 24.

130 REAL Final Rule at 5338, supra note 26.


132 REAL ID Act at § 202(b)(6), supra note 19.


134 Id.

135 REAL Final Rule at 5335, supra note 26.

136 Id.

137 Id. at 5336.

138 Id. at 5333.

139 Id. at 5302.

140 REAL Final Rule at 5337, supra note 26.

141 Id. at 5300.

142 Id. at 5333.

143 Id.

144 Id. at 5335-36.

145 REAL Final Rule at 5337, supra note 26.

146 Id.

147 Chertoff Remarks on Final Rule, supra note 31.


149 Id.
REAL ID Implementation Review: Few Benefits, Staggering Costs

150 DHS’s Regulatory Evaluation of Draft REAL ID Regulations at 127, supra note 81.
151 REAL Final Rule at 5285, supra note 26.
152 Id. at 5333.
154 Id. at 236.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 236.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 REAL Final Rule at 5339, supra note 26.
162 Id.
163 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
171 Id.
173 Id. at 1.
174 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Microsoft Settles FTC Charges Alleging False Security and Privacy Promises (Aug. 2002) ("The proposed consent order prohibits any misrepresentation of information practices in connection with Passport and other similar services. It also requires Microsoft to
implement and maintain a comprehensive information security program. In addition, Microsoft must have its security program certified as meeting or exceeding the standards in the consent order by an independent professional every two years.


176 Jim Harper, Identity Crisis: How Identification is Overused and Misunderstood (Cato Institute 2006).

177 Id. at 5.


181 REAL Final Rule at 5333, supra note 26.
Before

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Washington, DC 20229

Intent To Request Approval From OMB of One New Public Collection of Information: Certification of Identity Form (TSA Form 415); TSA-2013-0001-0075, FR Doc. 2016-26958

COMMENTS OF THE IDENTITY PROJECT (IDP) AND THE CYBER PRIVACY PROJECT (CPP)

The Identity Project (IDP)

<http://www.PapersPlease.org>

Cyber Privacy Project (CPP)

<http://www.cyberprivacyproject.org>

January 9, 2017
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I. Introduction

II. About the commenters

III. This proposal implicates freedom of movement, a statutory, constitutional, and internationally recognized human right.

IV. The notice does not satisfy the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act for approval of a collection of information from members of the public.

   A. The TSA does not currently require travelers to provide ID documents to fly. Such a new requirement is outside the scope of OMB authority to approve a collection of information, and requires TSA rulemaking pursuant to the APA.

   B. TSA Form 415 and the associated verbal information collection are not new, and therefore cannot be approved by OMB as a “new” collection of information.

   C. Would-be commenters have been told that the comment deadline has passed, depriving them of the opportunity for comment required by the PRA.

   D. No documentation concerning this request is available at Reginfo.gov, depriving members of the public of meaningful notice or opportunity to comment.

V. The history of TSA Form 415 and the associated verbal collection of information from travelers by the TSA shows a failure to comply with the PRA, APA, or Privacy Act.

VI. The current use of Form 415 and the additional associated information collection violate the Paperwork Reduction Act.

VII. The TSA greatly underestimates, without adequate foundation, the burden of the proposed information collection.

VIII. The current and proposed verbal and written information collection from travelers violates the Privacy Act.

IX. Conclusion and recommendations

Comments on Certification of Identity Form
(TSA Form 415)
January 9, 2017
I. INTRODUCTION

The Identity Project (IDP) and the Cyber Privacy Project (CPP) submit these comments in response to the notice and request for comments, “Intent To Request Approval From OMB of One New Public Collection of Information: Certification of Identity Form (TSA Form 415)”, docket number TSA-2013-0001-0075, FR Doc. 2016-26958, published at 81 Federal Register 78624-78625 (November 8, 2016).

The notice fails to satisfy the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), and the Privacy Act. The notice miscategorizes the proposal, fails to provide adequate or accurate notice to the public, and includes materially false statements about the proposal and the history and status of TSA Form 415.

The notice attempts to use the PRA procedures for approval of a form to effect a sweeping, highly controversial, substantive change in the scope of authority over air travelers claimed and exercised by the TSA. Even if such a change were authorized by a valid statute, it would require a different procedure: notice-and-comment rulemaking by the TSA pursuant to the APA. The significance of these procedural violations is heightened because the proposal implicates the ability of individuals to exercise their right – pursuant to Federal statutes, the U.S. Constitution, and international human rights treaties – to travel by air by common carrier.

The proposal for approval of TSA Form 415 and of this information collection by OMB should be withdrawn. The TSA should cease and desist from its years-old and continuing unlawful use of Form 415, and the additional associated verbal information collection, without the required OMB approval. If this proposal is submitted to OMB, it should be rejected as procedurally, substantively, and legally deficient and unjustified, and as a violation of the
fundamental statutory, Constitutional, and human rights of air travelers. If the TSA believes such a proposal is warranted, it should propose it through APA notice-and-comment rulemaking.

II. ABOUT THE COMMENTERS

A. The Identity Project (PapersPlease.org)

The Identity Project (IDP), provides advice, assistance, publicity, and legal defense to those who find their rights infringed, or their legitimate activities curtailed, by demands for identification, and builds public awareness about the effects of ID requirements on fundamental rights. IDP is a program of the First Amendment Project, a nonprofit organization providing legal and educational resources dedicated to protecting and promoting First Amendment rights.

B. The Cyber Privacy Project

The Cyber Privacy Project (CPP) is a non-partisan organization focusing on governmental intrusions against Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights of privacy, particularly in government databanks and national identification schemes for voting, travel, and work, and on medical confidentiality and patient consent.

III. THIS PROPOSAL IMPLICATES FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, A STATUTORY, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHT.

Freedom of movement ("the right of the people... peaceably to assemble") is recognized by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The right of U.S. citizens to travel between states is among the “privileges and immunities” protected by Article IV of the U.S. Constitution, and is a “liberty” protected by the
due process requirements of the 5th and 14th Amendments. "The original conception of the travel right is explicitly stated in Article IV of the Articles of Confederation and remains in force in the parallel article of the U.S. Constitution. Travel embodies a broadly based personal, political, and economic right that encompasses all modes of transportation and movement."¹

The right to travel is also recognized in Article 12 (freedom of movement) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a treaty ratified by, and binding on, the U.S. In addition, Article 17 of the ICCPR recognizes a right to protection against "arbitrary or unlawful interference with ... privacy."

The TSA, along with all other executive agencies, has been ordered by the President to consider human rights treaties including the ICCPR in performing its functions including rulemaking: Executive Order 13107, "Implementation of Human Rights Treaties," directs all executive departments and agencies to "maintain a current awareness of United States international human rights obligations that are relevant to their functions and... perform such functions so as to respect and implement those obligations fully."

In addition to the general Constitutional right to travel, there is an explicit mode-specific Federal statutory right to travel by air. "The public right of freedom of transit through the navigable airspace" is guaranteed by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, codified at 49 USC § 40101, 40103. The same statute expressly requires that the Administrator of the TSA (exercising powers described in the statute as those of the Administrator of the FAA, but reassigned to the TSA as part of the creation of the TSA and the Department of Homeland Security), "shall consider" this right in carrying out agency functions, which include rulemaking.

It is essential to keep these rights in mind in assessing the proposed (and in fact, as discussed further below, longstanding and ongoing) information collection from travelers. To the extent that responding to this information collection (or providing responses that the TSA or its contractors deem acceptable) is made a condition of the exercise of the right to travel by common carrier, it is a condition on the exercise of a fundamental statutory, Constitutional, and international treaty right, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.2

IV. THE NOTICE DOES NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT FOR APPROVAL OF A COLLECTION OF INFORMATION FROM MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC.

Instead of providing actual notice of what the agency has done, is doing, and proposes to do, and how concerned members of the public can obtain more information, the notice concerning this proposed information collection published in the Federal Register contains materially false statements concerning the proposal and the agency's actions.

These material misstatements deprive the public of meaningful notice of what has actually happened and is happening, and of the opportunity to provide informed comment on the agency's past, present, and proposed future actions.

In addition, to the extent that – for whatever reason – those promulgating the notice genuinely believed these falsehoods, they were ignorant of essential and material elements of the administrative and factual record necessary for non-arbitrary agency decision-making.

2 This is merely a summary of some of the fundamental rights implicated by air travel by common carrier. As discussed further below, this proceeding is a request for approval of a form, not a proposal for regulations to require air travelers to present, possess, or be eligible to acquire acceptable government-issued ID credentials, or to identify themselves. We reserve the right to submit more detailed comments concerning the right to travel, the standard of review for conditions or restrictions on the exercise of this right, and the effect on this right of ID requirements for common carrier air travel if the TSA proposes rules to impose such a requirement.

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A materially false notice does not satisfy the notice requirements of the PRA. A decision by agency officials ignorant of these facts would be arbitrary and capricious.

In addition, each of the false statements in the notice discussed below constitutes a violation of the “Information Quality Act” (IQA), Section 515 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Public Law 106–554, and the guidelines for implementation of this statute promulgated by OMB and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

These comments constitute a “complaint[... regarding the accuracy of information disseminated by]” the TSA. In accordance with the IQA, we request that this complaint be included in reporting by the TSA and DHS to OMB of “the number and nature of complaints received by the agency regarding the accuracy of information disseminated by the agency.”

A. The TSA does not currently require travelers to provide ID documents to fly. Such a new requirement is outside the scope of OMB authority to approve a collection of information, and requires TSA rulemaking pursuant to the APA.

According to the notice in the Federal Register:

TSA requires individuals to provide an acceptable verifying identity document in order to proceed through security screening, enter the sterile area of the airport, or board a commercial aircraft.

In fact, the TSA does not require, and the law does not authorize the TSA to require, that would-be travelers provide any verifying identity documents. According to longstanding practice, people who do not provide any verifying identity document travel by air every day –

3 See OMB Agency Information Quality Guidelines, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/_inforeg_agency_info_quality_links>; DHS Information Quality Standards, <https://www.dhs.gov/information-quality-standards>; and TSA Information Quality Standards, <https://www.tsa.gov/information-quality-standards>. Since the TSA has not responded to informal requests for correction of the notice, petitions for correction of the inaccurate information in the notice are being prepared for submission to DHS.

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typically after being required to complete and sign TSA Form 415 and answer questions about what information is contained in the file about them obtained by the TSA from Accurint.4

The TSA’s current policy permitting people to fly without ID if they submit to more intrusive search was described as follows by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Gilmore v. Gonzales5, based on review of TSA documents submitted ex parte and under seal:

The identification policy requires airline passengers to present identification to airline personnel before boarding or be subjected to a search that is more exacting than the routine search that passengers who present identification encounter.6

The identification policy requires that airline passengers either present identification or be subjected to a more extensive search. The more extensive search is similar to searches that we have determined were reasonable and "consistent with a full recognition of appellant’s constitutional right to travel."7

As discussed in more detail in Parts V and VI of these comments below, the TSA has provided, in response to our Freedom of Information Act request, only incomplete and badly munged portions of its records of how many people fly without ID every day.

But the first interim response to this request, containing images of redacted excerpts from the TSA “IVCC [ID Verification Call Center] Daily Summary” for May 6, 2014, is instructive.8

On that date, 175 people were reported to the IVCC as having sought to proceed through TSA checkpoints without initially presenting ID that the checkpoint staff found acceptable.

4 See the more detailed discussion of these ongoing practices below in Part V of these comments.
5 435 F. 3d 1125 (9th Circuit 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 929 (2007). Plaintiff-Appellant Gilmore is the founder of the Identity Project, one of the organizations submitting these comments.
7 Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F. 3d 1125 at 1155.
8 This first interim response contained four images of “pages” of records pertaining to a single day, although we had requested all such records for all dates. We received this first interim response almost two years after submitting our FOIA request. Three and half years after we submitted this request, the TSA still has not completed its response. See request and all interim responses to date at <https://archive.org/details/TSOC-ID-Verification-Reports> and discussion of the status of this request in Note 22 below.

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Of these 175 people, only three were denied access. The other 172 – more than 98% of those who sought to fly with no ID or with unacceptable ID – were allowed to do so.

In light of this current TSA policy and these facts, what the notice should say is:

TSA is proposing to require individuals to have been issued a verifying identity document acceptable to the TSA, or reside in a state that the TSA has deemed compliant with the REAL-ID Act or that TSA has granted a discretionary extension of compliance with the REAL-ID Act, in order to proceed through security screening, enter the sterile area of the airport, or board a commercial aircraft.

When the substance of the proposal is stated accurately, the notice is fundamentally deficient. Approval for this change in requirements to travel (not a mere continuation of, or change in, an information collection) is being requested from the wrong agency, through the wrong procedure, and without an adequate basis.

A change in the requirements for air travel by common carrier – such as the proposed and entirely new requirement for each would-be traveler to provide the TSA with a verifying identity document or attest that they have been issued by some government agency with such a document or reside in a state that the DHS has deemed compliant with the REAL-ID Act or has granted an extension of compliance – could properly be initiated only through a Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) by the TSA in accordance with the procedural requirements of the APA.

If such an NPRM were promulgated for public comment, we and many others would object to the proposal. It exceeds the statutory authority of the TSA and is contrary to the statutory duty of the TSA to recognize the public right of transit by air, the Constitution, and U.S. obligations pursuant to international human rights treaties.

In addition, such a rule would not be related to any legitimate aviation security interest.

According to the notice:

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TSA is updating the identity verification process for travelers who arrive at an airport security checkpoint without an acceptable verifying identity document... so that it is generally only available to travelers who certify that they—

- Reside in or have been issued a driver’s license or state identification card by a state that is compliant with the REAL ID Act or a state that has been granted an extension by DHS; or

- Have been issued another verifying identity document that TSA accepts.

It’s important to understand just what the TSA is saying, and the import of the practice the notice describes. If the TSA were to promulgate such a rule, travelers would still be able to fly with no ID at all, just as they are today. This would still be true, as it is today, for individuals who have never been issued, or applied for, any government-issued ID. But it would only be permissible, under a rule such as the TSA is contemplating, for individuals without ID to fly if they reside in a state that issues ID acceptable to the TSA.

The essential idea is to discriminate between people who don’t have or apply for state-issued ID cards, on the basis of how their states of residence treat those who do apply.

Variations in the practices followed by states in issuing driver’s licenses and ID cards, or whether data about those driver’s licenses and ID cards is shared with other states, provide no legitimate basis for differential treatment, on the basis of state of residence, of those individuals who do not have state-issued ID. Whatever claims the TSA might make about security benefits of these ID issuance procedures or their use as a basis for discrimination between holders of ID cards issued by different states, the state of residence of an individual who does not present ID bears no rational relationship to whether that individual poses a threat to aviation safety.
To put it another way, there is no reason to think that a person who has not chosen to apply for state ID as a resident of compliant state X posed less of a threat to aviation security than an individual who has not chosen to apply for state ID as a resident of noncompliant state Y.

Why, given the lack of any rational relationship of state of residence to aviation security, would the TSA discriminate between people who have not been issued with state ID on the basis of their state of residence, or on the basis of how that state treats people who, unlike these individuals, apply for or are issued with state ID?

The only apparent explanation for this otherwise perverse-seeming practice is that the TSA's real purpose in making this change is to coerce states to comply with the REAL-ID Act by punishing residents of states whose governments don't comply.

This is both an impermissible purpose and an impermissible practice. The Federal government has no authority to order states to enact legislation on matters within the jurisdiction of the states. The TSA has no authority to discriminate between residents of different states on the basis of the choices made by their state governments on matters within state jurisdiction.

We reserve the right to raise these and all other objections if and when such an NPRM is promulgated.

But this PRA notice in the Federal Register is not an NPRM. OMB is not authorized to approve substantive changes – or, for that matter, to approve any changes – in TSA regulations.

The only plausible interpretation of the false statement in the notice is to mislead OMB and the public, evade the requirement for public notice and comment, and use the innocuous-seeming device of a request for approval of an information collection to affect a
fundamental and profoundly controversial change in substantive TSA requirements and the rights of travelers.

The TSA does not have the authority to rule by decree, or to create a regulatory fait accompli by making new statements about what it seeks to require. Valid rulemaking requires the promulgation of rules, in accordance with the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, Constitutional due process, and the procedural and substantive standards applicable pursuant to U.S.-ratified international human rights treaties.

If the TSA wants to "make it so" that each air traveler is required to provide an acceptable verifying identification document, or that air travel without ID be permitted only for residents of certain states specified by the DHS, the TSA must properly propose such a regulation, providing notice of what it proposes to require and of the basis for its claimed authority to require it.

Whether or not the TSA proceeds with such a rulemaking – which, to be clear, we don't think it should, and would oppose – OMB must reject this purported request for approval of an information collection as exceeding the scope of OMB authority, pursuant to the PRA, for approval of a collection of information.

B. **TSA Form 415 and the associated verbal information collection are not new, and therefore cannot be approved by OMB as a “new” collection of information.**

The notice describes TSA Form 415 and its use as "a new Information Collection Request (ICR) abstracted below that we will submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for approval in compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)."
But while TSA Form 415 has never been submitted to, nor approved by, OMB, neither the form, its use, nor the additional information collection associated with its use are "new". As chronicled in detail in Part V of these comments below, TSA Form 415 and its unnumbered predecessor form(s), and the associated verbal collection of information from travelers, have been in use since at least 2008.

Submission of a form or other proposed ICR to OMB for approval after it has been in use for more than eight years is not, by any plausible interpretation of the law, "in compliance with" the PRA, which requires OMB approval prior to the first use of a form or information collection.

The proposed submission to OMB should be described as a request for approval of an ICR that has been conducted unlawfully without OMB approval since at least 2008.

Given the extensive experience of the TSA and the public with this form and information collection, it would be arbitrary and capricious for OMB to approve it without review of its extensive track record. And proper notice and comment would include an invitation to members of the public to comment on their experiences with this form and information collection.

Without proper notice that this form and information collection have already been in use, potential commenters might think that they would have to speculate about its effects, and might not realize that there is an extensive agency record and body of public experience that could form the basis for better informed comments concerning the request for OMB approval.

In addition, potential commenters are likely to scrutinize the proposal more closely and critically if they know that the agency has been acting illegally for many years.
A new notice should be promulgated, properly describing this as a request for approval of an ICR that has been conducted unlawfully without OMB approval since at least 2008. A new opportunity for public comment should be provided following that notice.

C. Would-be commenters have been told that the comment deadline has passed, depriving them of the opportunity for comment required by the PRA.

The notice published in the *Federal Register* was posted "for comment" on Regulations.gov at <https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=TSA-2013-0001-0075>. But since the notice was first posted, that Web page has falsely described it as "Comment Period Closed", and has not included any comment submission button, link, or form.

We have been contacted by several members of the public who would have prepared and submitted comments, but did not do so, in reasonable reliance on Regulations.gov (which is read by far more people than the printed *Federal Register*) as an authoritative official source of information concerning notice and comment on proposed rules and agency actions.

We and other members of the public contacted the TSA staff person named in the notice, within days of the error appearing on Regulations.gov, to alert the agency that comments were not being accepted. The TSA has failed to have the false statement on Regulations.gov corrected.

TSA staff told us that, contrary to the plain language at the top of the page on Regulations.gov, comments were in fact open and would be accepted by email through January 9, 2017. But members of the public would have no reason to read further in the notice or attempt to submit comments by email once they read that the comment period had already closed.

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Members of the public are entitled to rely on Regulations.gov for authoritative information about official Federal agency notices and opportunities for comment. Most members of the public, including many who have contacted us, assumed after consulting Regulations.gov that they were too late to submit comments. Most members of the public would not bother to prepare or try to submit comments by email after being told, through the official Federal government Web portal used for such purposes, that the comment period had already expired.

When the official Federal portal for comments is closed to comments throughout the "comment" period, there is no meaningful opportunity to comment. A new notice and opportunity for comment must be provided before any valid agency action can be taken.

D. No documentation concerning this request is available at Reginfo.gov, depriving members of the public of meaningful notice or opportunity to comment.

The notice claims that, “The ICR [Information Collection Review] documentation is available at http://www.reginfo.gov.” This claim is false: No information concerning this information collection has yet been submitted to OMB, and no information whatsoever concerning it is available at http://www.reginfo.gov, on any publicly-accessible Federal website, or from the TSA, even if it is specifically requested. The TSA contact designated in the notice has confirmed to us that no information other than that which was published in the Federal Register notice is available to would-be commenters or other members of the public.

It is critical for both the eventual reviewers of this request at OMB and any subsequent court reviewing this administrative action to be aware that the public has not been given actual
notice of, and an opportunity to comment on, any of these documents. They will only be submitted to OMB or posted at http://www.reginfo.gov after the close of public comments.

Despite our requests and diligent attempts to obtain, review, and comment on the allegedly supporting documentation referred to in the notice, it has been withheld from us.

A new opportunity for public comment must be offered after this documentation is made available to the public and public notice of its availability has been promulgated.

V. THE HISTORY OF TSA FORM 415 AND THE ASSOCIATED VERBAL COLLECTION OF INFORMATION FROM TRAVELERS BY THE TSA SHOWS A FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PRA, APA, OR PRIVACY ACT.

In light of the false characterization of TSA Form 415 as "new" in the notice, and the notice that elides any discussion of the extensive experience of the TSA and the public with its use and with the additional associated information collection, we find ourselves obliged to supply a summary of the background facts that should have been included in the notice, and that need to be considered by OMB, commenters, and any subsequent reviewers.

The PRA requires approval by OMB and assignment of an OMB "control number" prior to the commencement of any systematic collection of information (whether by printed or electronic form or verbal questioning) from more than ten members of the public. The PRA also requires the inclusion of that OMB control number on the form itself, and requires other specified notices to each individual from whom information is to be collected.
The Privacy Act requires promulgation of a System Of Records Notice (SORN) describing what data is to be collected from what sources, and how it is to be used, and makes it a criminal offense to maintain a system of records about individuals without first doing so.

The APA requires public notice and an opportunity to comment on proposed regulations before they are finalized.

In 2008, when the TSA implemented the "procedures" involving the first version of Form 415, and the additional associated collection of information, the TSA did none of these things.

Rather than operate in accordance with the law, here's what the TSA actually did:

Following its standard operating procedure of rulemaking-by-press-release, the TSA announced changes to "Airport ID Requirements" on its website on June 5, 2008. These were stated as "requirements", which would imply either statutory requirements or regulations adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking pursuant to statutory authority. But neither the press release on the TSA website nor the subsequent TSA blog posts about these new purported "requirements" cited to any current or proposed regulations or statutory authority.

Hundreds of public comments were posted in the TSA blog in response to these blog posts, and many more comments were submitted to the TSA through its blog, but not published.

Since the only notice of the new ID "requirements" provided by the TSA was on its website and in its blog, and since the only opportunity provided for public comment was on that blog, the complete record of comments on this topic submitted to the TSA blog – including those


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that weren't published – is part of the administrative record of this rulemaking which should be made public and submitted to OMB for consideration.

Notwithstanding the absence of statutory authority, rulemaking, or rules, the TSA and its contractors began asking selected air travelers to complete the form later known as TSA Form 415, and collecting additional information verbally from them, on June 21, 2008.\footnote{See, "First Reports Of What It's Like Flying Without ID Arrive", June 24, 2008, \url{https://papersplease.org/wp/2008/06/24/first-reports-of-what-it%e2%80%99s-like-flying-without-id-arrive/}.}

On information and belief – based on published incident reports\footnote{See e.g. "First Reports Of What It's Like Flying Without ID Arrive", June 24, 2008, \url{https://papersplease.org/wp/2008/06/24/first-reports-of-what-it's-like-flying-without-id-arrive/}.}, unpublished reports provided to the Identity Project, and TSA reports disclosed to the Identity Project (and discussed further below), in most or all cases when a traveler is asked or required to complete Form 415 or its unnumbered predecessor form(s), the traveler is also asked a selection of questions from a standard list, the answers to which are compared with records from a commercial data broker.\footnote{See, "Accurint exposed as data broker behind TSA ‘ID verification’", November 9, 2015, \url{https://papersplease.org/wp/2015/11/09/accurint-exposed-as-data-broker-behind-tsa-id-verification/}. An identity thief familiar with the data broker's records pertaining to an individual would typically be better able to tell the TSA or TSA contractors what the data broker's file alleges than would the actual individual, who probably has never seen the data broker's records and has no idea what inaccurate allegations they contain.}

The day the TSA began using this form, June 21, 2008, the Identity Project requested "a copy of TSA's new identification requirement and all documents relating to it," pursuant to the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA), and requested expedited processing of that request.\footnote{FOIA request later assigned request number TSA08-0723, \url{https://papersplease.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/tsafoiareq62108_final.pdf}, discussed in and linked from blog post, "TSA Changes Airport ID Requirement; ID-Less Could Be Denied Right to Fly", June 23, 2008, \url{https://papersplease.org/wp/2008/06/23/tsa-changes-airport-id-requirement-id-less-could-be-denied-right-to-fly/}.}

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Comments on Certification of Identity Form (TSA Form 415)
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January 9, 2017
Despite the FOIA deadline and the request for expedited processing, the TSA did not produce any responsive documents until more than six months later. On January 12, 2009, the TSA provided us with five redacted pages of excerpts from the TSA "Screening Management SOP", Revision 3, May 28, 2008 (Implementation Date: June 30, 2008), "Appendix 2: Travel Document and ID Checks". Notably, the TSA's response to this FOIA request did not include any version, even in redacted form, of the form later known as TSA Form 415, even though the form was clearly responsive to our request for all "documents relating to" the ID requirement and could not plausibly be claimed to be exempt, in its entirety, from disclosure pursuant to FOIA. There was no mention in these records of any request for OMB approval for this form.

On January 31, 2011, we made another request, pursuant to FOIA, for "the most recent version of the document" later known as TSA Form 415 and "any records related to requests for approvals of this form by OMB, any OMB control number assigned to any version of this form, or the potential need for such approval." This time, the TSA delayed responding for even longer, more than two years. Finally, on May 9, 2013, the TSA disclosed a version of one side of "TSA Form 415, August 2008 [File: 400.7.2]", with no OMB control number or PRA notice, and 51 redacted pages of email messages, some of them discussing Form 415 as a two-sided form although no portion of any version of the back side of the form was disclosed.

17 Later designated as FOIA request TSA11-0344.

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One of the email messages included in that response to our FOIA request was from "OIMP Director" (sender and recipient email addresses redacted), dated February 10, 2011, and was apparently sent in response to our FOIA request. The "Subject:" header, unredacted, was "Re: 3600 - FOIA, Request TSA11-0344 (REPLY/NOTICE)".

This message stated:

Relative to **TSA Form 415, Certification of Identity**, indications were the form was to be completed by TSA officials via phone collection rather than issued to persons to complete. Consequently, it was understood that Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) was not applicable and OSO, as the requesting office, did not request PRA (OMB submission).

For questions re: PRA, pls contact OIT's [redacted], TSA PRA Officer.

It's obvious by inspection of the form that no competent person who had seen the form could have made this statement in good faith. Every version of the form has had a line for the signature of the individual traveler, and it is not credible that anyone believed that "TSA officials via phone collection" were expected to sign the form in the name of the traveler.

To summarize this history, the current notice of TSA intent to seek OMB approval for continued use of TSA Form 415 comes after many years of TSA withholding of the form itself and the policies (if any) related to its use, even when they were specifically requested; failure to provide public notice or opportunity for public comment on these "requirements"; and failure to submit any version of this form for OMB approval, even when that was considered and when multiple versions of the (unapproved) form had been in use for many years.

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VI. THE CURRENT USE OF FORM 415 AND THE ADDITIONAL ASSOCIATED INFORMATION COLLECTION VIOLATE THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT.

The Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 USC § 3507 (a)(1), provides that, “An agency shall not conduct or sponsor the collection of information unless in advance of the adoption or revision of the collection of information, (1) the agency has” carried out a series of steps, none of which have yet been taken with respect to TSA Form 415, “(2) the Director [of OMB] has approved the proposed collection of information … ; and (3) the agency has obtained from the Director a control number to be displayed upon the collection of information.”

The PRA further provides that, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information that is subject to this chapter if – (1) the collection of information does not display a valid control number assigned by the Director [of OMB] in accordance with this chapter; or (2) the agency fails to inform the person who is to respond to the collection of information that such person is not required to respond to the collection of information unless it displays a valid control number.” (44 USC § 3512)

The TSA is an agency subject to the PRA. Freedom of travel is a right, and denial or interference with air travel by common carrier is clearly a “penalty” within the meaning of this section of the PRA.

Each time since 2008 that TSA employees or contractors, or local law enforcement officers relying on (false) allegations by TSA staff or contractors that completion of Form 415 or responses to additional standardized verbal “ID verification questions” were “required” by Federal law or TSA regulation as a condition of passage, have delayed, detained, or prevented a
would-be traveler from passing through a TSA or contractor checkpoint or boarding a common carrier airline flight, they have acted in flagrant violation of the PRA (in addition to other Federal statutes and Constitutional and human rights treaty provisions).

How often has this happened, during the years that TSA Form 415 and the associated verbal information collection from travelers have been in use? We don’t know, although we have made diligent efforts to find out, and are entitled to know.

No portion of the administrative record that should have been considered by the agency decision-maker (and which it would be arbitrary and capricious not to have considered), made available to the public for comment, and reviewed by OMB and any eventual reviewing court, has been published by the TSA. As with TSA Form 415 itself, and the list of questions used for the associated verbal information collection, records of the actual experience of use of TSA Form 415 and the associated verbal information collection have been made available to the public only to the extent that they have been obtained and posted online by the Identity Project.

Meaningfully informed agency decision-making, public comment, or review of forms and practices that have been engaged in since 2008 cannot be conducted without access to the agency’s records of those many years of agency experience and its impact on the public. These records must be made available to the public by the TSA, and an opportunity provided for the public to comment on them and use them as the basis for informed comment on any proposed rules or information collection, before OMB can properly review or approve this request.

The TSA’s May 9, 2013 response to our FOIA request TSA-11-0344, included an example of a ”TSOC ID Verification Report”. On June 14, 2013, we requested all records pertaining to any such report ”or similar log, record, report, or e-mail message indicating the

20 See Note 10, supra.
numbers of ID checks, numbers of ID checks resulting in a 'not verified' outcome, or numbers of checks resulting in a 'denied' outcome, including but not limited to any aggregated reports for these quantities over any time periods, any guidelines or instructions for the preparation of such reports or the categorization of events or outcomes for reporting purposes, and any e-mail messages mentioning such reports or reporting protocols.\textsuperscript{21}

The TSA again dragged its feet, this time for almost two years, before beginning to respond. We received a first (redacted and badly munged) interim response on May 6, 2014. Three and a half years after we made our request, the TSA still has not completed its response.\textsuperscript{22}

This request stated, "With respect to any e-mail messages included in the responsive records, I specifically request access to and copies of the complete informational content of the underlying electronic records, in their full and complete form including all headers and attachments, fully expanded e-mail addresses, full addresses for address 'aliases', full lists for 'distribution list' aliases, and all related metadata." In extensive discussions with the TSA FOIA office during the years this request has been pending, we have repeatedly requested that access to


\textsuperscript{22} The TSA's "Check Status of [FOIA] Request" Web page, <https://www.dhs.gov/foia-status> has generally shown a date one month in the future, which is moved back each month by another month. It appears to be a robotic sham, not based on actual estimates. It's often completely broken. As of this writing, for example, it displays the following "status" information and expected date of completion of agency action for this request:

\texttt{The number you entered is 2013-TSFO-01016
Request Number: 2013-TSFO-01016
Received Date: 06/20/2013
Request Status: Documents Added
Estimated Delivery Date: 12/27/2016
Closed Date: Check performed on 01/05/2017 12:12:22 AM EST
Status information is current as of 01/04/2017"}

In other words, the "current" TSA estimate is that its response will be completed in negative one week's time. Estimates of the TSA's belief in its ability to travel backward in time are not useful to FOIA requesters.

Comments on Certification of Identity Form

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(TSA Form 415)

January 9, 2017
and copies of all responsive electronic records be provided in their native form, as bitwise copies of the records as found on digital devices or storage media.

The TSA has yet to provide any responsive email messages, in any format.

Instead of complying with the requirement of the FOIA statute to produce responsive records in any format in which they are requested and can readily be reproduced (it is obviously easier to reproduce electronic files as bitwise digital copies than in any other format), the TSA appears to have followed the following munging and substitution procedure: (1) Extract each attached file and separate it from the email message, (2) view the extracted file in an application (such as a word processing program, spreadsheet application, etc.) in "print view" mode, (3) capture a screenshot image of each "page" of the "print view" of the file, (4) create a new PDF file, (5) paste the screenshot images into the new PDF file, in random (or unexplained) order, and then (6) substitute the newly-created PDF image file for the underlying electronic records.

This procedure strips out all file metadata, and replaces text and tabular data with images. It obfuscates the structure and format of the underlying records, and greatly complicates the task of parsing, tabulation, or statistical analysis of the records. And it wastes agency time and effort, delaying the already overdue agency response to the FOIA request.

23 The TSA’s record of bad faith, delay, failure to produce records in the requested format, and substitution of newly-created (and less useful) records for responsive records should be assessed in the context of the TSA’s record of personal animus and actual malice, explicitly stated in writing in the TSA’s own records (obtained and published by the Identity Project) toward individuals associated with the Identity Project and these requests. See "How the TSA treats FOIA requesters it doesn’t like", September 5, 2013, and documents linked from that article including libelous email message to staff of the TSA FOIA office from TSA Privacy Officer Peter Pietra, December 17, 2009, <https://papersplease.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/pietra-17dec2009.png> and our appeal of the TSA’s “response” to FOIA request TSA10-0676, <https://ia601003.us.archive.org/0/items/TSA100676AppealAttach4SEP2013/TSA10-0676-appeal-attach-4SEP2013.pdf>.

Comments on Certification of Identity Form

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The Cyber Privacy Project

January 9, 2017
Whatever the causes for the TSA’s delay and failure to date to properly process and respond to this FOIA request, the comment period should be extended until at least 60 days after the completion of this response, including any administrative appeal and/or judicial review.

While the administrative record available to us for review and comment is incomplete, the redacted and munged fragments disclosed to date by the TSA provide significant clues as to the nature, scope, and inappropriateness of the ongoing verbal information collection ("administrative interrogation") of travelers by the TSA.

Although the TSA has never sought – and even now is not explicitly seeking – OMB approval for this verbal information collection, OMB approval was and still is required.

The PRA explicitly applies to all information collection, "regardless of form or format":

24 44 U.S. Code § 3502(3)(A).


It appears from the TSA records disclosed to date that identical questions have been posed to ten or more individuals by TSA staff and contractors, including without limitation:

1. Names of Other Residents at Address?
2. Neighbor’s Names?
3. Names of Associates
4. Phone Number?
5. Judicial District?
6. County of Residence?

7. Previous County of Residence?

8. Previous Address?

9. Other States of Residence?

10. Company Worked?

11. Name of Past Employer?

12. Employment History?

13. Sporting License?

14. Recreational License?

15. Mother’s Middle Name and DOB?

16. Mother’s Occupation?

17. Father’s Name and DOB?

18. Names of Relatives?

19. Relative’s Dates of Birth?

20. City of Relative’s Residence?

21. Vehicles Registered?

22. Mother’s Vehicles?

23. Relative’s Motor Vehicle Information?

24. Make and Model of Vehicle?

Being unable or unwilling to answer each of the questions above, or providing answers
that the TSA considered inconsistent with the (unverified, "garbage in, garbage out") data
provided by the commercial data broker Accurint, is cited in TSA ID Verification Call Center reports as having been the basis for denial of passage through TSA or contractor checkpoints.

It would be premature and impermissible for OMB to approve this ongoing unlawful verbal information collection unless and until it is properly submitted for approval. That request should include a complete list of the standard questions proposed to be asked. But on its face, the list above strongly suggests an entirely inappropriate and overbroad program of interrogation, with no relationship to or likely utility – much less necessity – for any lawful TSA function.

VII. THE TSA GREATLY UNDERESTIMATES, WITHOUT ADEQUATE FOUNDATION, THE BURDEN OF THE PROPOSED INFORMATION COLLECTION.

According to the notice:

TSA estimates that approximately 191,214 passengers will complete the TSA Form 415 annually. TSA estimates each form will take approximately three minutes to complete. This collection would result in an annual reporting burden of 9,561 hours.

The notice gives no indication whatsoever of the basis for these estimates, the manner in which they were calculated or derived, or the evidence (if any) supporting them.26

As noted above, the claim that this is a “new” information collection strongly suggests that the agency personnel preparing the notice were unaware that this information collection has been going on for more than eight years, or of the records of this extensive experience. Especially in the absence of any other disclosed basis for these estimates, they should be given little deference if they were prepared by personnel unfamiliar with the extensive existing records.

26 We find it especially odd that an estimate presented entirely without supporting evidence or a description of the estimating methodology is specified to a precision of six significant digits.
As discussed above, many of those records – which include more than eight years of reports to TSA headquarters records of the duration, to the minute, of each incident in which a traveler is required to complete TSA Form 415 – have been unlawfully withheld from us despite having been requested more than three years ago pursuant to FOIA.

However, the records that have been disclosed by the TSA to date in partial response to our FOIA request\(^27\) suggest that the TSA’s estimate of three minutes per incident is far too low. As discussed above, part of the process of “completing” Form 415 is responding to a series of questions posed by telephone by personnel at the TSA ID Verification Call Center.\(^28\) The TSA has provided no estimate of the average time to complete this verbal information collection. Based on review of the TSOC ID Verification Reports released by the TSA to date, we believe that the average time per incident required to complete the entire information collection, including the verbal information collection and the written TSA Form 415, is closer to thirty minutes than three minutes.

It is also clear from the TSOC ID Verification Reports released by the TSA to date that the TSA’s estimate of 191,214 is so much higher than the number of individuals currently being required to complete this form that it cannot have been based on these records or past experience.

Currently, the TSA requires any traveler who does not present ID credentials the TSA deems “acceptable” to complete TSA Form 415 and respond to verbal information collection.

How many travelers is that likely to be? The current number is much less than 191,214 per year. The only clue as to why that might change is the following statement in the notice:

\(^27\) This request and all interim responses to date are at <https://archive.org/details/TSOC-ID-Verification-Reports>.

\(^28\) Sometimes checkpoint staff hand the phone to the traveler and have the traveler speak directly with IVCC personnel. Sometimes checkpoint staff play a game of “telephone” and relay questions and answers back and forth between the IVCC and the traveler, creating a risk that errors in restatement will lead to denial of travel. Comments on Certification of Identity Form (TSA Form 415)

The Identity Project and The Cyber Privacy Project

January 9, 2017
TSA will begin implementing the REAL ID Act at airport security screening checkpoints on January 22, 2018. Starting on that day, TSA will not accept state-issued driver’s licenses and other state-issued identification cards from states that are not compliant with REAL ID Act requirements unless DHS has granted the state a temporary extension to achieve compliance.

If the TSA does not accept driver’s licenses or ID cards issued by states that are not compliant with REAL-ID Act requirements, all air travelers presenting driver’s licenses or ID cards issued by those states will be required to complete Form 415 and answer IVCC questions.

We can only guess that the TSA’s estimate is somehow derived from its political prediction of which states will eventually comply with the REAL-ID Act.

But current and historical numbers suggest that the TSA’s estimate of likely state noncompliance with the REAL-ID is far too low. That estimate probably reflects wishful agency thinking about a hoped-for, but unlikely, reversal of the public sentiment reflected in state policy.

More than a decade after the enactment of the REAL-ID Act, at most twelve of 55 U.S. jurisdictions (states, U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia) might be compliant.

One of the statutory elements of the REAL-ID Act is that each state that issues any compliant driver’s licenses or ID cards must, “Provide electronic access to all other States to information contained in the motor vehicle database of the State” including, “at a minimum — (A) all data fields printed on drivers’ licenses and identification cards issued by the State; and (B) motor vehicle drivers’ histories, including motor vehicle violations, suspensions, and points on licenses.”

The only system currently available, under development, or reasonably foreseeable as enabling compliance with this provision of the REAL-ID Act is the “State-to-State” (S2S) system operated by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA).


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includes the national “State Pointer Exchange System” (SPEXS). SPEXS is the centralized, privatized, outsourced national ID database which includes information about each and every driver’s license or ID issued by any compliant state.\(^{30}\)

According to AAMVA, the first state to participate in S2S was Wisconsin in 2015.\(^{31}\) Only a total of twelve states currently participate in S2S.\(^{32}\) Since no state not participating in S2S has any other way to comply with the database access requirement of the REAL-ID Act, at most those twelve states – not including any of the most populous states – are currently compliant.

Many of the remaining states are barred by state constitutional provisions and/or state statutes from uploading their state ID databases to SPEXS or otherwise complying with the REAL-ID Act. Public sentiment remains opposed to a national ID card or national ID database.

In light of the low compliance more than a decade after the enactment of the REAL-ID Act of 2005, we expect that the majority of jurisdictions are likely to remain nonparticipants in SPEXS, and thus noncompliant with the REAL-ID Act, a year from now on the TSA’s self-imposed “deadline” of January 22, 2018. Because those are likely to continue to include most of the most populous states, we expect that at least 75% of U.S. air travelers as of that date will continue to be residents of noncompliant states. And even if we assume that one-third of them will present a passport or some other Federally-issued ID, that would still mean that roughly half of all air travelers would be residents of noncompliant states with no “acceptable” ID. All of these travelers would be required to complete Form 415 and answer IVCC questions.

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Comments on Certification of Identity Form

The Identity Project and The Cyber Privacy Project

(TSA Form 415)

January 9, 2017
In 2015, the most recent year for which data has been released, the TSA “screened” 708 million travelers.\(^3\) If half of them have no acceptable ID and consequently are subjected to this information collection, that would be about 350 million people a year. And if answering the IVCC questions and filling out Form 415 takes about thirty minutes per person, the total annual burden of the proposed information collection would be about 175 million hours.

That’s obviously unrealistic. The real burden of this proposal is that it would create such long delays at TSA checkpoints as to effectively shut down the U.S. air transportation system. It should be assessed by OMB, and by the public, on that basis.

The TSA will undoubtedly say that this won’t happen because residents of noncompliant states who don’t present Federally-issued ID will simply be turned away from airports. But as discussed in Part III of these comments above, there is no statutory or regulatory basis for such TSA denial of access to travel by air.

VIII. THE CURRENT AND PROPOSED VERBAL AND WRITTEN INFORMATION COLLECTION FROM TRAVELERS VIOLATES THE PRIVACY ACT.

The Privacy Act, 5 U.S. Code § 552a (e)(7), provides that each agency shall, “maintain no record describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.”
As discussed above, records of how, when, and where we travel are, *per se*, records of how we exercise the right to assemble (however, whenever, and wherever we choose) guaranteed by the First Amendment. In addition, many of the questions listed above (which we only know about because records were maintained by the TSA of who was asked these questions, whether they answered, and whether their answers were deemed "acceptable") pertain to how individuals exercise rights of assembly, association, and other rights protected by the First Amendment. Questions asked of would-be travelers such as "Names of Associates?" clearly implicate the right to freedom of association, as do others of the questions mentioned in these records.

Questioning by TSA staff and contractors is an administrative interrogation, not a law enforcement function. Neither most TSA checkpoint staff nor TSA contractors are law enforcement officers. So this record-keeping cannot be justified under the second fork of the Privacy Act test as, "within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity," even if these questions were pertinent to such a purpose, which on their face they do not appear to be.

The maintenance of these records would thus be permissible under the Privacy Act only if it was "expressly authorized by statute". But whatever strained theory of *implicit* authorization the TSA may try to construct, this record-keeping is not *explicitly* authorized by any statute.

34 It's not clear what, if any, authority might exist for "administrative interrogation". Case law on administrative searches invariably assumes that those individuals subjected to administrative searches have the absolute right to stand mute. In the only cases of which we are aware that have upheld administrative interrogation at drunk-driving or immigration checkpoints, these have been upheld only on the basis that individuals were not required to respond to any such questions, and must be allowed to proceed after only a brief delay in the absence of evidence -- independent of their silence -- sufficient to support a law enforcement detention or arrest. We are aware of no case law upholding compelled responses to administrative interrogation by the TSA or its contractors, or the denial of passage by common carrier or imposition of other penalties for non-response. Statutory authority for "screening" is neither a general warrant for search nor a general subpoena for testimony. The obligation of travelers to submit to "screening" cannot validly be construed as an obligation to submit to any search or respond to any interrogatories declared by the TSA or checkpoint staff to constitute "screening". This proceeding is not a rulemaking, but these issues would need to be addressed in the rulemaking if the TSA were to propose rules that would require travelers to respond to administrative interrogatories.

Comments on Certification of Identity Form (TSA Form 415)

The Identity Project and The Cyber Privacy Project

January 9, 2017
There is nothing in Federal statutes authorizing the TSA to identify travelers, much less explicitly authorizing the keeping of records pertaining to travelers' identities.

Indeed, it has been the consistent and explicit (and correct) position of the TSA itself, whenever the issue has arisen in litigation, that no Federal statute or TSA regulation requires travelers to have or display and ID credentials in order to pass through TSA checkpoints.

This was the argument made by the TSA in *Gilmore v. Gonzales.* It was the TSA's own argument, and the evidence submitted by the TSA itself, *ex parte* and under seal, which persuaded the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals that Mr. Gilmore could have flown with no ID as a "selectee" if he submitted to more intrusive search. That factual finding that TSA policy and practice would have allowed Mr. Gilmore to fly without ID was critical to the Court's decision that Mr. Gilmore's Constitutional right to travel had not been violated.

This was also the testimony under oath of a TSA "Lead Checkpoint Security Officer" familiar with the TSA's ID procedures in the criminal trial of *State of New Mexico v. Phillip Mocek.* "You don’t have to show ID. You can fly without ID. We have a procedure for that."

To the extent that the TSA's notice in the *Federal Register* explains or attempts to offer any purported justification for the proposed new ID requirement, it is the following:

To ensure that the identity verification process described above does not become a means for travelers to circumvent implementation of the REAL ID Act, TSA is updating the process...

This is, at most, an argument that the REAL-ID Act somehow *implicitly* authorizes the TSA to impose an ID requirement to fly. It does not point to any *explicit* statutory authorization.

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35 See Notes 5-7, supra, and accompanying text.
36 435 F. 3d 1125 at 1133 (2007).
37 Criminal Case 2573709, Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court. No transcript of the trial was prepared. Audio recordings made by the Identity Project with the permission of the court are available at <https://papersplease.org/wp/2011/01/24/audio-state-of-new-mexico-v-phillip-mocel/>.
for such an ID requirement to fly, and thus fails to satisfy the requirements of the Privacy Act.

This statement in the notice also fundamentally misconstrues the REAL ID Act.38

The REAL-ID Act pertains solely to which ID credentials are considered acceptable for Federal purposes. The REAL-ID Act does not itself impose or change any requirements for when, where, or for what purposes ID is required. The REAL-ID Act contains no authorization for the TSA or any other agency to impose new ID requirements.

The REAL-ID Act is implicated only in circumstances in which other valid Federal statutes or regulations require acceptable ID. Neither when the REAL-ID Act of 2005 was enacted, nor today, does any statute or regulation purport to impose or purport to authorize the TSA to impose any such requirement for air travel.

Circumvention of the REAL-ID Act would consist of passing off some non-compliant ID as acceptable, or engaging in some activity that requires ID – like operating a motor vehicle, and unlike traveling as a passenger on a common carrier – without having ID. A traveler who has no ID, or who does not present any ID, is not representing some other ID as being compliant with the REAL-ID Act, or as acceptable for any Federal purpose. Such a traveler is doing nothing to circumvent the REAL-ID Act.

In the absence of any valid statute or regulation requiring ID to fly, the REAL-ID Act is simply not implicated by air travel by those who do not have, or do not chose to present, any ID.

Flying without ID is a lawful everyday activity. Flying without ID does not constitute circumvention of the REAL-ID Act any more than living, working, playing, moving from place to place, or engaging in any other activities of life without having been issued or being in

possession of ID credentials – where those activities are not subject to valid ID requirements as a condition of licensing or otherwise – constitutes circumvention of the REAL-ID Act.

IX. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The TSA should withdraw this application. If it does not do so, OMB should reject it. And the TSA should cease and desist from any attempt to require ID to travel by common carrier, or to claim that the REAL-ID Act of 2005 or any other Federal statute requires, or authorizes the TSA to require, that air travelers have or provide ID.
Respectfully submitted,

The Identity Project (IDP)
=http://www.PapersPlease.org>
A project of the First Amendment Project
1736 Franklin St., 9th Floor
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The Cyber Privacy Project
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/s/
Edward Hasbrouck,
Consultant to IDP on travel-related issues

January 9, 2017
Before
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Washington, DC 20229

Intent To Request Approval
From OMB of One New [sic]
Public Collection of
Information: Certification of
Identity Form (TSA Form
415); TSA-2013-0001-0075,
FR Doc. 2016-26958

COMMENTS OF THE
CYBER PRIVACY
PROJECT (CPP)

Cyber Privacy Project (CPP)
http://cyberprivacyproject.org/

The Constitutional Alliance
http://www.constitutionalalliance.org/

January 9, 2017
The Cyber Privacy Project (CPP) submits these comments in response to the notice and request for comments, “Intent To Request Approval From OMB of One New [sic] Public Collection of Information: Certification of Identity Form (TSA Form 415)”, docket number TSA-2013-0001-0075, FR Doc. 2016-26958, published at 81 Federal Register 78624-78625 (November 8, 2016).

I. INTRODUCTION

“Big Brother in the form of an increasingly powerful government and in an increasingly powerful private sector will pile the records high with reasons why privacy should give way to national security…”

- Justice William O. Douglas

Almost 50 years ago, Justice William O. Douglas, an associate just of the Supreme Court of the United States warned us of the potential for the federal government to impinge on our individual privacy rights. With any policy that impinges in civil liberties, we must balance the restriction of personal liberties with the benefit of increased personal safety. In this case, we believe this policy goes too far.

II. ABOUT THE CYBER PRIVACY PROJECT

A. Cyber Privacy Project

The Cyber Privacy Project ("CPP") is a non-partisan organization focusing on governmental intrusions against Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights of privacy, particularly in government databanks and national identification schemes for voting, travel and work, and on medical confidentiality and patient consent. CPP director Richard Sobel is a scholar of identity issues, has authored law review articles on the subject, and was an amicus with Privacy Activism in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, (2004), and with the Program in Psychiatry and Law at Harvard Medical School in Citizens for Health v. Leavitt, 428
B. The Constitutional Alliance

The Constitutional Alliance is an organization that was established to protect citizens against mandated biometric enrollment. The Constitutional Alliance recognizes that biometrics is the linchpin of a surveillance state which undermines the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The Constitutional Alliance is an organization comprised of state/national groups, state legislators, ministries and private citizens. Mark Lerner is the Co-Founder and Spokesperson for the Constitutional Alliance.

III. THE REAL ID ACT IS UNLIKELY TO ACHIEVE ITS STATED GOAL.

The TSA states: “Secure driver's licenses and identification documents are a vital component of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) national security strategy. In particular, preventing terrorists from obtaining state-issued identification documents is critical to securing the United States against terrorism.”

The stated goal of the TSA is to increase the nation's security through the implementation of the REAL ID Act. However, there is no logical connection between the use of the “REAL ID” for domestic travel and the prevention of terrorist activity.

Given the low probability of successfully preventing a security breach through Real IDs as opposed to more effective forms of intelligence gathering and law enforcement, the TSA is impinging upon a major right of travelers.
IV. THE REAL ID ACT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS AS WELL AS THE STATES THEMSELVES.

The Congressional Research Service Report of 2008 notes, there are many Constitutional issues that REAL ID raises: 10th amendment, federalism and anti-commandeering; freedom of travel, religious freedom against impose of digital photographs, and unfunded mandates on the states.

A. The REAL ID Act Violates Individuals' Rights.

Chief Justice Melville Fuller, in Williams v. Fears (1900):
"... Undoubtedly, the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any State is a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution. ..."

(U.S. Constitution, Amendment 1):
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble"

( Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13):
"Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."

(United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27):
"Liberty of movement is an indispensable condition for the free development of a person."

The mere assertion that the TSA seeks to provide additional security to passengers does not provide adequate justification for abridgement of constitutional rights of the individual.

B. The REAL ID Act Violates States’ Rights.

(U.S. Constitution, Amendment 10):
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

The states have police powers granted to them under the 10th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. This is not a federal power, and hence the TSA's imposition of Real ID requirements unconstitutionally violates constitutional principles of federalism and anti-commandeering.

Additionally, the imposition of this rule by the TSA would amount to an unfunded mandate which would violate the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act which was approved in 1995.

V. CONCLUSION

In short, based on the fact that the REAL ID Act is unlikely to achieve its stated goal, that is violates the constitutionally protected rights of individuals as well as the states themselves, and saddles the state governments with an unfunded mandate at a time when most state governments cannot afford it, this proposal should be denied in its entirety.

Respectfully submitted,

Cyber Privacy Project (CPP)

http://cyberprivacyproject.org/

The Constitutional Alliance

http://www.constitutionalalliance.org/

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Ian Sharping,

Consultant to CPP on travel-related issues

January 9, 2017
By notice published November 8, 2016 the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") requested public comments regarding the agency's intent to request approval from the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") to collect information for a certification of identity form individuals who do not have a REAL ID that the DHS has deemed a "compliant" form of identification. Pursuant to this notice, the Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC") recommends that the TSA not pursue the proposed information collection. Several states still rightly oppose REAL ID precisely because of the massive cost and the privacy concerns arising from the excessive collection of personal information by the federal government. The TSA's proposal fails to address the underlying privacy objections to the REAL ID.

EPIC is a public interest research center in Washington, D.C. EPIC was established in

1 Intent To Request Approval From OMB of One New Public Collection of Information: Certification of identity Form (TSA Form 415), 81 Fed. Reg. 78,623 (Nov. 8, 2016).
1994 to focus public attention on emerging privacy and human rights related issues, and to
protect privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional values. EPIC has considerable expertise
analyzing the privacy and security risks attendant to the design and implementation of REAL ID.

In 2007, EPIC filed comments on behalf of leading experts in privacy and technology in
response to the draft regulations for REAL ID. At the time, we stated, “REAL ID is
fundamentally flawed because it creates a national identification system. It cannot be fixed no
matter what the implementation regulations say. Therefore, the REAL ID Act must be
repealed.” EPIC also highlighted the privacy and security risks of REAL ID as part of the
"Spotlight on Surveillance” series. EPIC also testified before the Department of Homeland
Security’s (“DHS”) Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee and explained that the
REAL ID draft regulations impermissibly create a national identification system, prohibited by
the law that established the DHS, and threaten national security and individual privacy. In 2008,
EPIC published a report detailing the significant costs of implementing REAL ID. EPIC
explained that “[DHS] [] believes that it can sweep aside the fact that REAL ID is an unfunded
mandate by allocating $360 million to the States for REAL ID implementation...However, the

2 EPIC, Comments on DHS 2006-0030: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Minimum Standards for
Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes (May 8,
3 EPIC and 24 Experts in Privacy and Technology, Comments on DHS 2006-0030: Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking: Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal
Agencies for Official Purposes (May 8, 2007) [hereinafter “EPIC Expert Comments on Draft
Regulations”], http://www.epic.org/privacy/id_cards/epic_realid_comments.pdf.
4 See EPIC, Federal REAL ID Proposal Threatens Privacy and Security (March 2007),
http://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0307/. See also Anita Ramasastry, Why the New Department
of Homeland Security REAL ID Act Regulations are Unrealistic: Risks of Privacy and Security Violations
and Identity Theft Remain, and Burdens on the States Are Too Severe, Findlaw, Apr. 6, 2007,
5 Melissa Ngo, EPIC, Testimony and Statement for the Record at a Hearing Before the Data Privacy and
Integrity Advisory Comm., Dept of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 21, 2007),
6 See EPIC, REAL ID Implementation Review: Few Benefits, Staggering Costs (May 2008),

REAL ID Act Identity Verification Process
[FR Doc. 2016-26958]
number still pales next to the agency’s ‘reduced’ estimate of $9.9 billion.”

Our concerns about the problems with REAL ID are widely shared by many other organizations.

We have attached to these comments both the 2007 and the 2008 Comments on REAL ID and ask they be included in the administrative record.

EPIC remains concerned that the REAL ID Act creates a national identification system, in violation of the DHS Act, and poses significant privacy risks to millions of individuals. Furthermore, TSA’s proposed collection of information will unduly burden millions of people in several states that have rightly chosen not to comply with the REAL ID Act.

I. **History of Opposition to A National Identification System & REAL ID**

National identification cards have long been used to suppress minorities, track dissidents, and extend state authority.

   a. **Historical Opposition to the Implementation of National Identification System**

The United States has always opposed the creation of a national identification system. When the Social Security Number (“SSN”) was created in 1936, it was meant to be used only as an account number associated with the administration of the Social Security system. Though use of the SSN has expanded considerably, it is not a universal identifier and efforts to make it one have been consistently rejected. In 1971, the Social Security Administration task force on the Social Security Number declined to transform the number into an ID card.

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8 *Speak Out Against REAL ID, THE PRIVACY COALITION, https://www.privacycoalition.org/stoprealid/.*
9 See Appendix I and II.
10 See generally, EPIC, National ID Cards and the REAL ID Act, http://www.epic.org/privacy/id_cards/.
Education and Welfare Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems in 1973 again rejected the creation of a national identifier and advocated the establishment of significant safeguards to protect personal data. The committee said:

> We recommend against the adoption of any nationwide, standard, personal identification format, with or without the SSN, that would enhance the likelihood of arbitrary or uncontrolled linkage of records about people, particularly between government or government-supported automated personal data systems. What is needed is a halt to the drift toward [a standard universal identifier] and prompt action to establish safeguards providing legal sanctions against abuses of automated personal data systems.\(^{14}\)

The Federal Advisory Committee on False Identification also advised against the use of a national identifier in 1976.\(^{15}\) In 1977, the Privacy Protection Study Commission recommended against the adoption of a national ID system.\(^{16}\) In its report, *Personal Privacy in an Information Society*, the commission said that it:

> sees a clear danger that a government record system, such as that maintained by the Social Security Administration or the Internal Revenue Service, will become a de facto central population register unless prevented by conscious policy decisions. Therefore [...] the Federal government should act positively to halt the incremental drift toward creation of a standard universal label and central population register until laws and policies regarding the use of records about individuals are developed and shown to be effective.\(^{17}\)

In Congressional testimony in 1981, Attorney General William French Smith stated that the Reagan administration was “explicitly opposed to the creation of a national identity card.”\(^{18}\)

The Clinton administration advocated a “Health Security Card” in 1993 and assured the public


\(^{17}\) Id.

that the card, issued to every American, would have “full protection for privacy and confidentiality.” Still, the idea was rejected and the card never was created. In 1999, Congress repealed a controversial provision in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 that authorized the inclusion of SSNs on driver’s licenses.

b. State Opposition to the Implementation of REAL ID

The DHS has repeatedly stated that REAL ID is not mandatory, however, REAL ID is not a “voluntary” program. In 2007, EPIC noted that “States are under considerable pressure to implement REAL ID and citizens who fail to carry the new identity document will find it impossible to pursue many routine activities.” Furthermore, in issuing the final REAL ID rule DHS noted that it “believes that many States may find noncompliance an unattractive option” because the States would not be able to “maintain the conveniences enjoyed by their residents when using their State-issued driver’s licenses and non-driver identity cards for official purposes, particularly as it pertains to domestic air travel.” Additionally, shortly before the passage of the Act a DHS spokesman stated that “[noncompliance with REAL ID] will mean real consequences for their citizens... if their leadership chooses not to comply.”

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At this point in time, those concerns have become a reality for some states as they currently face two options (1) comply with the REAL ID Act or (2) not comply and have their citizens secure alternative forms of identification in order to get on a plane. These two choices only allow one to come to the conclusion that REAL ID is a mandatory program as those states who do not comply with the DHS mandate will suffer consequences that are effectively penalties.

Following the enactment of the REAL ID Act, at least 20 states enacted legislation opposing the REAL ID Act. While some of those states, under considerable pressure from the federal government, have modified earlier legislation, many still maintain opposition to REAL ID. Part of the resistance to REAL ID from the states is because the costs of implementing REAL ID were, and remain, unfunded by the federal government and place a large burden on the states. However, in addition to concerns as to how states are to pay for implementing the Act, states also have significant privacy concerns as does the general public.

II. Privacy Risks Inherent in the REAL ID Act

a. The Department of Homeland Security is not fulfilling their responsibility to protect privacy

The DHS stated ten years ago that it is constrained in its power to protect the privacy of individuals and their data under the REAL ID Act. The agency claimed in the draft regulations that, “The Act does not include statutory language authorizing DHS to prescribe privacy

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requirements for the state-controlled databases or data exchange necessary to implement the Act.  

REAL ID creates a national identification system that affects 245 million license and cardholders nationwide, yet today the DHS has still failed to institute strong privacy safeguards in the system itself.  The agency has the obligation to protect the privacy of individuals affected by this system and must do more than the feeble attempts set out in the Act.

The Privacy Act of 1974 applies to the entire national identification system under guidelines set out by OMB and DHS.  The OMB guidelines explain that the Privacy Act "stipulates that systems of records operated under contract or, in some instances, State or local governments operating under Federal mandate 'by or on behalf of the agency . . . to accomplish an agency function' are subject to . . . the Act." The guidelines also explain that "systems 'maintained' by an agency are not limited to those operated by agency personnel on agency premises but include certain systems operated pursuant to the terms of a contract to which the agency is a party." The REAL ID system is operated under a Federal mandate to accomplish several agency functions, including immigration control.

Because the DHS has created this system, the agency must fully apply Privacy Act requirements of notice, access, correction, and judicially enforceable redress to the entire REAL ID national identification system. The REAL ID Act states that individuals should attempt to exercise their rights to notice, access, correction and redress through State DMVs, the Social

30 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations, 6-12.
32 Id.
Security Administration, the Department of State, and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (a part of the Department of Homeland Security).  

In enacting REAL ID, DHS has punted the issue of privacy to the States, but the agency needs to lead. Various questions remain, including important ones concerning redress. The right of redress must be judicially enforceable. The Privacy Act protections must be mandated in the REAL ID regulations in order for DHS to fulfill its obligations.

b. Privacy Risks of REAL ID

There are significant threats to individual privacy and security that would be created by unfettered access to REAL ID national identification system data. Some of these problems are based on the design of the card, the information required to be stored on the cards, and the safeguards for the underlying databases.

Under REAL ID, a substantial amount of personal information must be included on the card. This includes a full legal name, digital photograph, and signature that can be read by common machine readable technology and the information included on the card is not required to be encrypted. Prior to enactment, the DHS Privacy Office supported encryption “because 2D bar code readers are extremely common, the data could be captured from the driver's licenses and identification cards and accessed by unauthorized third parties by simply reading the 2D bar code on the credential” if the data is left unencrypted. There are many examples of unauthorized users being able to download data from unencrypted machine-readable technology. To protect privacy and improve security, this machine-readable technology must

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33 REAL Final Rule at 5284-5284, supra note 20.
34 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 17-28, supra note 26.
36 EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 21-23.
either include encryption or access must be limited in some other form. Without required encryption, REAL ID leaves 245 million individuals at risk for individual tracking.\(^{37}\)

DHS rejected encryption in the final rule because of "the complexities and costs of implementing an encryption infrastructure."\(^{38}\) DHS is required to include security protections on the REAL ID card. Under the REAL ID Act, the card must include "Physical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for any fraudulent purpose."\(^{39}\) The agency has this obligation and it should not abdicate this responsibility. If DHS does not seek to limit access to the data on the REAL ID card, then it is signaling that it is acceptable for third parties to download, access and store data for purposes beyond the three official purposes.

Rejecting encryption for the 2D barcode helps to push the REAL ID system into "widespread" use in everyday life, a goal that former DHS Secretary Chertoff and the DHS final rule itself expect and support. Such an expansion would harm both individual privacy and security and quickly turn the United States into a country where the REAL ID national identification card is involuntarily carried by everyone.

Furthermore, the amount of information contained on the REAL ID cards increases risks if the card is compromised. There are a number of "insider" and "outsider" threats to the massive identification database connecting 56 States and territories. Creating a national identification database containing personal data of 245 million State license and ID cardholders nationwide, one that would be accessible from a massive number of DMVs across the country, is an invitation for all criminals — whether identity thieves or terrorists — to break into just one of these entrance points to gather such data for misuse.

\(^{37}\) EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 17-18.
\(^{38}\) REAL Final Rule at 5292.
\(^{39}\) REAL ID Act at §202(b)(8).
Such a system would also be at risk of abuse from authorized users, such as DMV employees, who are bribed or threatened into changing the system data or issuing “authentic” national identification cards. It is appropriate to note here that, on the day that DHS released the final regulations for REAL ID, “A Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration employee [...] and four others were indicted [...] on charges that they made and sold fake State driver’s licenses and identification cards in exchange for money.”

Identity theft continues to be one of the leading concerns for consumers. The FTC found that in 2015, the last year for which information is currently available, the number of identity theft claims they received increased by more than 47% than identity theft incidents reported in 2014. Furthermore, identity theft has been one of the top consumer issues for the past fifteen years.

Large-scale data breaches have occurred in State DMVs across the country; if the databases are linked under REAL ID, these breaches will only grow in scale. The Oregon DMV lost half a million records in 2005. Also that year, in Georgia, a dishonest insider exposed 465,000 records. In 2011 a North Carolina DMV worker was charged with five counts of identity theft after she used DMV computers to obtain information to take out payday loans in other people’s names. In 2014, the California DMV suffered a data breach where credit card

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40 Five indicted in identity theft scheme, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 11, 2008.
42 Id.
43 Id.
45 Id.
information was compromised via their online payment system.\textsuperscript{47} In 2015, an Oregon man was able to download a list that contained a DMV list of identification numbers as well as federal income tax forms and was charged with 26 counts of aggravated identity theft.\textsuperscript{48} The list goes on, and the personal information of individuals will be endangered under the REAL ID national identification system.

Domestic violence survivors are particularly vulnerable to compromised data. Domestic violence survivors who flee their abusers, crossing into different States, would be exposed if their abuser breaches the security of any one of these 56 interconnected databases. “An abuser with an associate inside a State DMV, law enforcement, or other agency with access to the State records would be able to track a victim as the victim moves across the country.”\textsuperscript{49}

The danger of negligent and accidental disclosures is increased by REAL ID, as substantially more government employees will have access to all motor vehicle records nationwide. This sort of inadvertence will happen much more frequently in a post-REAL ID world as the access to driver’s license information is spread throughout the national identification system.

\textsuperscript{47} Sources: Credit Card breach at California DMV, KREBS ON SECURITY, Mar. 22, 2014, https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/03/sources-credit-card-breach-at-california-dmv/.


\textsuperscript{49} EPIC Expert Comments on Draft Regulations at 50, supra note 26.
c. Increased Risks Associated with Hacking

In light of recent events there is even more reason to be concerned about the likelihood and effects of a data breach occurring of state DMV records. The federal government has been subject to a number of hacks in recent years which have been incredibly concerning to those affected by those hacks and the public at large. The lack of security features remain and show the risk of those states that chose to adopt the REAL ID requirements.

Recently, government data breaches have been numerous and severe and have raised concerns surrounding the safety of data in the United States. In the past three years, data breaches have affected the Office of Personnel Management, Internal Revenue Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the DHS. Overall, the number of government data breaches has exploded in the last decade, rising from 5,503 in 2006 to 67,168 in 2014.

These reports of hacking and data breaches are likely to be of further concern to state officials who are implementing, or are skeptical of, REAL ID in light of recent revelations of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The intelligence community currently has information showing that a foreign government was responsible for hacks of the Democratic National Committee as well as the hacking of John Podesta’s email. While the full nature and reasons behind the 2016...

US Presidential Election hacks are still being investigated and debated, the event should give pause to any state official that is considering fully complying with the REAL ID Act. It is clear that large databases of personal information are attractive targets for the purposes of identity theft, blackmail, or in some cases simply for the challenge of hacking into a government database.

III. Undue Burden on States Who Continue to Oppose REAL ID

The REAL ID Act is an unfunded mandate that burdens states with numerous unnecessarily requirements. Several states continue to fight the implementation of REAL ID. As such, the TSA has stated that individuals with drivers licenses and identification cards from states the DHS deems “non-compliant” will need alternative forms of identification in order to board airplanes. Consequently, individuals in states that oppose REAL ID are far more likely to be inconvenienced at the airport under the proposed new form of information collection.

In addition to the eight states that opposed REAL ID, there are several other whose citizens may also be subjected to the agency’s data collection requirements. For example,

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Montana has a law that prevents them from fully implementing the Act. Additionally, states like New York and Oregon have been granted extensions and may or may not be fully “compliant,” according to the DHS, by 2018 which potentially puts them at risk as well of having to go through information collection practices when they go to the airport.

The proposed system creates a large problem for states that the DHS deems “non-compliant.” The TSA seeks to implement information collection practices that will burden millions of traveling individuals who hail from states that do not adhere to REAL ID requirements. Many of these individuals will likely be entirely unaware that their identification is not satisfactory and that they will be subject to TSA information collection until they arrive at the airport. These individuals will be burdened not because they do not have identification, but because they have identification that the TSA refuses to accept. Furthermore, the proposed information collection system penalizes these people for the choices of their state legislators and other state officials who have expressed several valid concerns surrounding REAL ID. Individuals should not be punished when their state representatives have strong concerns about how REAL ID will impact their citizens to whom they are all accountable.

Given the stresses that a number of people face when traveling it is entirely misguided to have travelers who do have driver’s licenses or identification cards which, for years, have been acceptable documents to show to be able to board a plane. This is not an instance where individuals arrive at the airport with no proof of who they are, it is an instance of the DHS,

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through TSA, attempting to force states to comply with their wishes and has nothing to do with airport security.

IV. Conclusion

The REAL ID Act still poses several concerns and challenges for states. It remains an unfunded federal mandate that exposes millions of individuals to threats of identity theft as well as having their information compromised and potentially exposed. Several states have chosen not to comply with the Act for reasons spanning from lack of federal funding, to opposition to a national identification system, and privacy concerns. The proposed information gathering of individuals at airports essentially punishes citizens for actions that their state governments have taken to protect their privacy.

EPIC urges the TSA to abandon the proposed information collection for individuals who do not possess a state driver’s license that fails to comply with the DHS’s view of “compliance”: the United State has long opposed national identification system, the privacy risks of REAL ID are substantial, and the States were correct to opposed a federal identity system not in the best interests of their citizens.

Respectfully Submitted,

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APPENDIX I

Comments of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Experts in Privacy and Technology

Department of Homeland Security
Docket No. DHS 2006-0300
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Minimum Standards for Drivers Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes

May 2007
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
DOCKET NO. DHS 2006-0030

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes

COMMENTS OF:

ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER (EPIC)

AND

[EXPERTS IN PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY]

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I. INTRODUCTION

By notice published on March 9, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") announced it seeks to establish “minimum standards for State-issued driver’s licenses and identification cards that Federal agencies would accept for official purposes after May 11, 2008, in accordance with the REAL ID Act of 2005.” Pursuant to this notice, the aforementioned group ("Coalition") submits these comments to request the Department of Homeland Security recommend to Congress that REAL ID is unworkable and must be repealed. The REAL ID Act creates an illegal de facto national identification system filled with threats to privacy, security and civil liberties that cannot be solved, no matter what the implementation plan set out by the regulations. And if REAL ID implementation does go forward, the protections of the Privacy Act of 1974 must be fully enforced for all uses of the data current and feature. Agencies should not be permitted to assert any exemptions and individuals must granted all rights, including the judicially enforceable right to access and correct their records and to ensure compliance with all of the requirements of the Privacy Act.

The problematic adoption of the law now under consideration is now well known. The REAL ID Act was appended to a bill providing tsunami relief and military appropriations, and passed with little debate and no hearings. It was passed in this manner


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even though Republican and Democratic lawmakers in the Senate urged Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist to allow hearings on the bill and to permit a separate vote on the measure. The senators said they believe REAL ID "places an unrealistic and unfunded burden on state governments and erodes Americans' civil liberties and privacy rights." The people could not speak during this rushed process. They are speaking now.

II. REAL ID CREATES A NATIONAL ID SYSTEM

Throughout the history of the United States, its people have rejected the idea of a national identification system as abhorrent to freedom and democracy. The REAL ID Act and the draft regulations to implement it create a de facto national identification system, and the Act must be repealed.

A. Americans Have Consistently Rejected a National ID System

When the Social Security Number (SSN) was created in 1936, it was meant to be used only as an account number associated with the administration of the Social Security system. Though use of the SSN has expanded considerably, it is not a universal identifier and efforts to make it one have been consistently rejected. In 1973, the Health, Education and Welfare Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems rejected the creation of a national identifier and advocated the establishment of significant safeguards to protect personal information. The committee said:

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4 Id.
We recommend against the adoption of any nationwide, standard, personal identification format, with or without the SSN, that would enhance the likelihood of arbitrary or uncontrolled linkage of records about people, particularly between government or government-supported automated personal data systems. What is needed is a halt to the drift toward [a standard universal identifier] and prompt action to establish safeguards providing legal sanctions against abuses of automated personal data systems.

In 1977, the Carter Administration reiterated that the SSN was not to become an identifier. In Congressional testimony in 1981, Attorney General William French Smith stated that the Reagan Administration was “explicitly opposed to the creation of a national identity card.” When it created the Department of Homeland Security, Congress made clear in the enabling legislation that the agency could not create a national ID system. In September 2004, then-Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge reiterated, “[t]he legislation that created the Department of Homeland Security was very specific on the question of a national ID card. They said there will be no national ID card.” The citizens of the United States have consistently rejected the idea of a national identification system.

B. REAL ID Is Not Voluntary

Supporters of REAL ID point to the legislation, which says that State implementation is “voluntary.” However, States are under considerable pressure to implement REAL ID and citizens who fail to carry the new identity document will find it impossible to pursue many routine activities. The administration has also pursued a

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heavy-handed assault on those who have raised legitimate questions about the efficacy, cost, and impact of the $23B program. Critics of REAL ID have been labeled anti-security. In Congressional testimony, a high-ranking DHS official said, "Any State or territory that does not comply increases the risk for the rest of the Nation." It is not anti-security to reject a national identification system that does not add to our security protections, but in fact makes us weaker as a nation. This system is also an unfunded mandate that imposes an enormous burden upon the states and the citizenry. The federal government has estimated that REAL ID will cost $23.1 billion, but it has allocated only $40 million for implementation and has told the states that they may divert homeland security grant funding already allocated to other security programs for REAL ID.\(^\text{12}\)

Design standardization means that anyone with a different license or ID card would be instantly recognized, and immediately suspected. The Department of Homeland Security already contemplates expanding the REAL ID card into “everyday transactions.”\(^\text{13}\) It will be easy for insurance firms, credit card companies, even video stores, to demand a REAL ID driver’s license or ID card in order to receive services. Significant delay, complication and possibly harassment or discrimination would fall upon those without a REAL ID card. In actuality, the “voluntary” card is the centerpiece of a mandatory national identification system that the federal government seeks to impose on the states and the citizens of the United States.


\(^{12}\) REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.845, supra note 1.

\(^{13}\) See Data Collection Expansion discussion, infra Section IX (DHS plans to expand uses of REAL ID).
C. Regulations Create a De Facto National ID System

The Department of Homeland Security draft regulations would (1) impose more difficult standards for acceptable identification documents that could limit the ability of individuals to get a state drivers license; (2) compel data verification procedures that the Federal government itself is not capable of following; (3) mandate minimum data elements required on the face of and in the machine readable zone of the card; (4) require changes to the design of licenses and identification cards; (5) expand schedules and procedures for retention and distribution of identification documents and other personal data; and (6) dictate security standards for the card, state motor vehicle facilities, and the personal data and documents collected in state motor vehicle databases. These regulations create a de facto national identification system.

State licenses and identification cards must meet standards set out in the regulations to be accepted for Federal use. REAL ID cards will be necessary for:

"accessing Federal facilities, boarding commercial aircraft, and entering nuclear power plants."14 The Supreme Court has long recognized that citizens enjoy a constitutional right to travel. In Saenz v. Roe, the Court noted that the "'constitutional right to travel from one State to another' is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence."15 For that reason, any government initiative that conditions the ability to travel upon the surrender of privacy rights requires particular scrutiny. This is particularly relevant under the REAL ID regulations, as they affect 245 million license and cardholders nationwide. REAL ID could preclude citizens from entering Federal courthouses to exercise their right to due

14 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,823, supra note 1.
process, or from entering Federal agency buildings in order to receive their Social Security or veterans’ benefits.

DHS may compel card design standardization, “whether a uniform design/color should be implemented nationwide for non-REAL ID driver’s licenses and identification cards,” so that non-REAL ID cards will be easy to spot. 16 This universal card design will lead to a national identification system, combined with the mandate under the proposed regulations imposing new requirements on state motor vehicle agencies so that the Federal government can link together their databases to distribute license and cardholders’ personal data, create a national identification system. 17 DHS also has considered expanding the official uses for the REAL ID system, going so far as to estimate that one of the ancillary benefits of REAL ID implementation would be to reduce identity theft – a reduction DHS bases on “the extent that the rulemaking leads to incidental and required use of REAL ID documents in everyday transactions.” 18 There are other ways in which DHS has contemplated expanding the uses of the REAL ID system so that the card becomes a national identifier – one card for each person throughout the country. 19

III. DHS HAS THE OBLIGATION TO PROTECT PRIVACY OF CITIZENS

The Department of Homeland Security states that it is constrained in its power to protect the privacy of individuals and their data under the REAL ID Act. The agency claims in the notice of proposed regulations that “The Act does not include statutory

16 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.841. supra note 1.
17 Id. at 10.825.
19 See Data Collection Expansion discussion, infra Section IX (DHS plans to expand uses of REAL ID).
language authorizing DHS to prescribe privacy requirements for the state-controlled databases or data exchange necessary to implement the Act.”20 We agree with Sen. Joseph Lieberman, who stated, “The concept that federal agencies need explicit Congressional authorization to protect Americans’ privacy is just plain wrong. In fact, our government is obligated to ensure that programs and regulations do not unduly jeopardize an individual’s right to privacy.”21

The draft regulations include little in terms of privacy safeguards:

In summary, DHS has proposed the following privacy protections in its implementing regulations for the REAL ID Act: (1) The State-to-State data exchanges and the State data query of Federal reference databases will be State operated and governed; (2) as part of the State certification process, States will be required to submit a comprehensive security plan, including information as to how the State implements fair information principles; and (3) while acknowledging the benefits of employing encryption of the personal information stored on the identification cards, we invite comment on its feasibility and costs and benefits to ensure that its costs do not outweigh the benefits to privacy.22

DHS’s statement that it is constrained in its ability to set privacy protections for the REAL ID system is a product of the agency’s mistaken belief that security and privacy are separate. Security and privacy are intertwined; one cannot have a secure system if privacy safeguards are not created, as well. DHS stated that it “believes that this language [in the REAL ID Act] provides authority for it to define basic security program requirements to ensure the integrity of the licenses and identification cards.”23 Because DHS has the authority to define basic security requirements, it also has the authority to set basic privacy safeguards for the REAL ID system.

20 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,825, supra note 1.
21 Joseph Lieberman, U.S. Senator, Statement at a Hearing on Understanding the Realities of REAL ID: A Review of Efforts to Secure Drivers’ Licenses and Identification Cards Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Management, the Federal Workforce & the District of Columbia, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. (Mar. 26, 2007).
22 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,826, supra note 1.
23 Id.

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The draft regulations create a national identification system that affects 245 million license and cardholders nationwide, yet DHS is hesitant to ensure strong privacy safeguards in the system itself. DHS has the obligation to protect the privacy of citizens affected by this system and must do more than the feeble attempts set out in the draft regulations.

A. Privacy Act Applies Under OMB Guidelines

The Department of Homeland Security states that the Privacy Act of 1974\textsuperscript{24} applies to only one part of the REAL ID system – the Problem Driver Pointer System.\textsuperscript{25} However, the Privacy Act of 1974 applies to the entire national identification system, under guidelines set out by the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") and the Department of Homeland Security itself.

The OMB guidelines explain that the Privacy Act "stipulates that systems of records operated under contract or, in some instances, State or local governments operating under Federal mandate 'by or on behalf of the agency . . . to accomplish an agency function' are subject to . . . the Act."\textsuperscript{26} The guidelines also explain that the Privacy Act "make[s] it clear that the systems 'maintained' by an agency are not limited to those operated by agency personnel on agency premises but include certain systems operated pursuant to the terms of a contract to which the agency is a party."\textsuperscript{27} The REAL ID system is operated under a Federal mandate to accomplish several agency functions, including immigration control.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{24} 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.826. \textit{supra} note 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} Id.
\end{itemize}
The REAL ID system is covered by the Privacy Act under the Department of Homeland Security's own policies. In a policy guidance memorandum from the agency's Privacy Office, defines "DHS Information Systems" as "an Information System operated, controlled, or directed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This definition shall include information systems that other entities, including private sector organizations, operate on behalf of or for the benefit of the Department of Homeland Security." The national system of interconnected State databases is "operate[d] on behalf of or for the benefit" of DHS. The Privacy Office also states:

As a matter of DHS policy, any personally identifiable information (PII) that is collected, used, maintained, and/or disseminated in connection with a mixed system by DHS shall be treated as a System of Records subject to the Privacy Act regardless of whether the information pertains to a U.S. citizen, Legal Permanent Resident, visitor, or alien.

It is clear that, under both DHS and OMG guidelines, the REAL ID national identification system is a system of records subject to the requirements and protections of the Privacy Act of 1974.

B. Requirements of Notice, Access, Correction and Judicially Enforceable Redress Must Be Mandated

If the Department of Homeland Security creates this system, the agency must fully apply Privacy Act requirements of notice, access, correction, and judicially enforceable redress to the entire REAL ID national identification system. Though the States are asked to include provisions for notice, access, correction and redress, this is not enough. The Privacy Act protections must be mandated in the REAL ID implementation regulations.

29 Id. at 1.
When it enacted the Privacy Act in 1974, Congress sought to restrict the amount of personal data that Federal agencies could collect and required agencies to be transparent in their information practices. In 2004, the Supreme Court underscored the importance of the Privacy Act's restrictions upon agency use of personal data to protect privacy interests, noting that:

"[I]n order to protect the privacy of individuals identified in information systems maintained by Federal agencies, it is necessary . . . to regulate the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information by such agencies." Privacy Act of 1974, §2(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1896. The Act gives agencies detailed instructions for managing their records and provides for various sorts of civil relief to individuals aggrieved by failures on the Government's part to comply with the requirements.

The Privacy Act is intended "to promote accountability, responsibility, legislative oversight, and open government with respect to the use of computer technology in the personal information systems and data banks of the Federal Government[]." It is also intended to guard the privacy interests of citizens and lawful permanent residents against government intrusion. Congress found that "the privacy of an individual is directly affected by the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal information by Federal agencies," and recognized that "the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United States." It thus sought to "provide certain protections for an individual against an invasion of personal privacy" by establishing a set of procedural and substantive rights.

We support the Department of Homeland Security's requirement that the States must include in their "comprehensive security plan" an outline of "how the State will
protect the privacy of personal information collected, disseminated or stored in connection with the issuance of REAL ID licenses from unauthorized access, misuse, fraud, and identity theft” and that the State has followed the Fair Information Practices (these are practices, not principles, as listed in the draft regulations), which “call for openness, individual participation (access, correction, and redress), purpose specification, data minimization, use and disclosure limitation, data quality and integrity, security safeguards, and accountability and auditing.”35 However, this is not enough. The agency must mandate minimum security and privacy safeguards, which the states should build upon, to protect individuals and their personal information. Also, there must be standards for the issue of redress. How will redress be adjudicated if one State includes erroneous information in an individual’s file and passes that information on to another State? Will the individual have to petition both States separately for redress? Will neither State process the redress, because each believes it to be the responsibility of the other? The right of redress must be judicially enforceable.

The right of redress is internationally recognized. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data recognize that “the right of individuals to access and challenge personal data is generally regarded as perhaps the most important privacy protection safeguard.”36 The rights of access and correction are central to what Congress sought to achieve through the Privacy Act:

35 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.826. supra note 1.
36 The OECD Privacy Guidelines of 1980 apply to “personal data, whether in the public or private sectors, which, because of the manner in which they are processed, or because of their nature or the context in which they are used, pose a danger to privacy and individual liberties.” Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-Border Flow of Personal Data, OECD Doc. 58 final at Art. 3(a) (Sept. 23, 1980), reprinted in M. ROTENBERG ED., THE PRIVACY LAW.
The committee believes that this provision is essential to achieve an important objective of the legislation: Ensuring that individuals know what Federal records are maintained about them and have the opportunity to correct those records. The provision should also encourage fulfillment of another important objective: maintaining government records about individuals with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to individuals in making determinations about them.37

The Privacy Act requirements that an individual be permitted access to personal information, that an individual be permitted to correct and amend personal information, and that an agency assure the reliability of personal information for its intended use must be applied to the entire REAL ID national identification system. Full application of the Privacy Act requirements to government record systems is the only way to ensure that data is accurate and complete, which is especially important in this context, where mistakes and misidentifications are costly.

IV. REAL ID CARDS MUST NOT DENOTE CITIZENSHIP STATUS

DHS is considering using the REAL ID card in the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative border security program. For the REAL ID card to be compliant under the program, it would need to include long-range RFID technology, discussed below, and “the State would have to ensure that the State-issued REAL ID driver’s license or identification card denoted citizenship.”38 It cannot be stressed strongly enough: REAL ID cards must not include citizenship status. If REAL ID cards were to signify citizenship, there would be intense scrutiny of and discrimination against individuals who chose not to carry the national identification card and those who “look foreign.”

SOURCEBOOK 2004 395 (EPIC 2005. The OECD Privacy Guidelines require, among other things, that there should be limitations on the collection of information; collection should be relevant to the purpose for which it is collected; there should be a policy of openness about the information’s existence, nature, collection, maintenance and use; and individuals should have rights to access, amend, complete, or erase information as appropriate. Id.

38 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,842, supra note 1.
V. Standards for ID Documents Would Burden Many Individuals

Under the REAL ID Act, States are required to obtain and verify documents from applicants that establish "(1) The applicant's identity, through a photo identity document, or a non-photo identity document that includes full legal name and date of birth if a photo identity document is not available; (2) Date of birth; (3) Proof of SSN or ineligibility for an SSN; (4) The applicant's address of principal residence; and (5) Lawful status in the United States."\(^3^9\) Under the regulations, the only documents that could be accepted by the states to issue these new identity cards would be: (1) valid unexpired U.S. passport or the proposed passport card under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative; (2) certified copy of a birth certificate; (3) consular report of birth abroad; unexpired permanent resident card; unexpired employment authorization document; (4) unexpired foreign passport with valid U.S. visa affixed; (5) U.S. certificate of citizenship; U.S. certificate of naturalization; or (6) REAL ID driver's license or identification card (issued in compliance with the final regulations).\(^4^0\)

The difficult standards for acceptable identification documents would limit the ability of some individuals to get a state driver's license. There are questions as to whether some citizens could produce these documents, among them Native Americans, victims of natural disasters, domestic violence victims, the homeless, military personnel, or elderly individuals.\(^4^1\) We applaud the Department of Homeland Security for attempting to resolve this problem by allowing the States to voluntarily create an exceptions process for extraordinary circumstances. However, though DHS set minimum standards for data

\(^{3^9}\) Id. at 10,827.
\(^{4^0}\) Id. at 10,827-28.
\(^{4^1}\) See Domestic Violence discussion, infra Section XI (how domestic violence victims will be harmed by the standards); see Data Verification discussion, infra Section VI (general problems with the standards).
collection, retention and documentation of the transaction, the agency did not set minimum standards for eligibility, length of process, or cost of process.\textsuperscript{42} DHS states that persons born before 1935 might not have been issued birth certificates, so they might be eligible for the exceptions process.\textsuperscript{43} Otherwise, there is nothing that explains to either States or individuals how they could prove eligibility, how long the process would take (days, weeks, months or even years), or if they could even afford the cost of the exceptions process.

VI. DATA VERIFICATION PROCEDURES ARE BASED ON FAULTY PREMISES

The data verification procedures mandated by the draft regulations are based on faulty premises: DHS relies on non-existing, unavailable or incomplete databases and the mistaken belief that DMV workers can or should be turned into Federal immigration officers. Each assumption creates more problems in the Department of Homeland Security’s attempt to create a fundamentally flawed national identification system.

A. DHS Relies on Verification Databases That Are Not Available

Under REAL ID, the states must verify applicant documents and data with the issuing agency. DHS states that, “If for individual States to verify information and documentation provided by applicants, each State must have electronic access to multiple databases and systems . . . . Secure and timely access to trusted data sources is a prerequisite for effective verification of applicant data.”\textsuperscript{44} Yet, beyond the national identification system created by the State-to-State data exchange, two of four verification systems required are not available on a nationwide basis and third does not even exist.

\textsuperscript{42} REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,834, \textit{supra} note 1.  
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Id.} at 10,822.  
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Id.} at 10,833.
The database systems the States are required to verify applicant information against are: (1) Electronic Verification of Vital Events ("EVE"), for birth certificate verification; (2) Social Security On-Line Verification ("SSOLV"), for Social Security Number verification; (3) Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements ("SAVE"), for immigrant status verification; and (4) a Department of State system to verify data from "U.S. Passports, Consular Reports of Birth, and Certifications of Report of Birth."\(^4^5\)

The only system that is available for nationwide deployment is SSOLV, and a survey of States by the National Governors Association found that even this database would need substantial improvements to be able to handle the workload that would be needed under REAL ID.\(^4^6\) EVVE is currently in pilot phase and only five states are participating.\(^4^7\) Yet DHS bases its requirements on the assumption that EVVE will be ready for nationwide expansion by the implementation deadline May 2008.\(^4^8\) The executive director of the organization overseeing the database has announced that EVVE will not be ready by May 2008 and the system may not be ready by the extended implementation deadline of December 2009.\(^4^9\)

DHS admits that only 20 states are using SAVE, and that the planned connection between SAVE and another database for foreign student status verification (Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, "SEVIS") may not be completed by the

\(^{45}\) Id., at 10,830-35; Electronic Verification of Vital Events ("EVE") is also called Electronic Verification of Vital Event Records ("EVEVER") in some federal documents.


\(^{48}\) REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,831. \textit{supra} note 1.

\(^{49}\) Eleanor Stables, \textit{Multi-Billion Dollar Real ID Program May Be Stymied Due to $3 Million Shortfall}, CQ, Mar. 15, 2007.
implementation deadline of May 2008. The State Department system to verify passports and some reports of births has not even been created, but DHS bases its mandates on the assumption that the system “is eventually developed.”

B. DMV Workers Cannot and Should Not Become Immigration Officials

Under the regulations, State DMV employees would need to authenticate license and identification card applicants’ source documents, which means the employees would be required to physically inspect the documents and “verify[] that the source document presented under these regulations is genuine and has not been altered.” These source documents are: (1) valid unexpired U.S. passport or the proposed passport card under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative; (2) certified copy of a birth certificate; (3) consular report of birth abroad; unexpired permanent resident card; unexpired employment authorization document; (4) unexpired foreign passport with valid U.S. visa affixed; (5) U.S. certificate of citizenship; U.S. certificate of naturalization; or (6) REAL ID driver’s license or identification card (issued in compliance with the final regulations).

State DMV employees would be required to verify these documents, including Federal immigration documents, though they have no training to do so. DHS contemplates this problem and seeks to solve it by requiring that DMV employees handling source documents undergo 12 hours of “fraudulent document recognition” training. A review of the Social Security Administration found that staff had difficulty recognizing counterfeit documents, though it is their primary job to verify these

50 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,833. supra note 1.
51 Id. at 10,832.
52 Id. at 10,850.
53 Id. at 10,827-28.
54 Regulatory Evaluation at 122, supra note 18.
documents before issuing SSN. For example, the Government Accountability Office review reported difficulty with detection of fraudulent birth certificates. In one case, a fake in-state birth certificate was detected, but "SSA staff acknowledged that if a counterfeit out-of-state birth certificate had been used, SSA would likely have issued the SSN because of staff unfamiliarity with the specific features of numerous state birth certificates."\(^\text{55}\) It is questionable how well State DMV employees would be able to spot fraudulent documents, especially documents as rarely seen as consular reports of birth abroad, with merely 12 hours of training when it is difficult for counterfeit documents to be spotted by federal employees whose primary job is verification of source documents. Also, if a State DMV employee determines that an applicant's source documents are fraudulent, where could the applicant turn? No redress procedure has been created.\(^\text{56}\)

VII. **Minimum Data Elements on MRT Must Remain Minimum**

Under REAL ID, the following amount of information, at a minimum, must be on the REAL ID card: (1) full legal name; (2) date of birth; (3) gender; (4) driver's license or identification card number; (5) digital photograph of the person; (6) address of principal residence; (7) signature; (8) physical security features; (9) a common machine readable technology, with defined minimum data elements; and, (10) card issue and expiration date.\(^\text{57}\) The REAL ID card will include a 2D barcode as its machine readable technology. To protect privacy and improve security, this machine readable technology must either include encryption, which is recommended by the DHS Privacy Office, or access must be limited in some other form. Leaving the machine readable zone open would allow

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\(^\text{56}\) See Privacy Act discussion, supra Section III.

\(^\text{57}\) REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.8435, supra note 1.
unfettered third-party access to the data and leave 245 million license and cardholders nationwide at risk for individual tracking.

A. Access to Data Must Be Limited

Under the required changes to the design of State licenses and identification cards, DHS states the card must include “[p]hysical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for fraudulent purpose” and “common [machine-readable technology], with defined minimum data elements.”\(^5\) The Federal agency will require the use of a two-dimensional bar code, but will not require the use of encryption. Though Homeland Security lays out the privacy and security problems associated with creating an unencrypted machine readable zone on the license, it does not require encryption because there are concerns about “operational complexity.”\(^6\)

The Department of Homeland Security’s own Privacy Office has urged the use of encryption in REAL ID cards. In its Privacy Impact Assessment of the draft regulations, the Privacy Office supported encryption “because 2D bar code readers are extremely common, the data could be captured from the driver’s licenses and identification cards and accessed by unauthorized third parties by simply reading the 2D bar code on the credential” if the data is left unencrypted.\(^6\) DHS says that, “while cognizant of this problem, DHS believes that it would be outside its authority to address this issue within

\(^5\) Id. at 10,835.
\(^6\) Id. at 10,826.
As we have previously stated, DHS has the obligation to protect the privacy of individuals from whom they collect data, and the agency should not abdicate this responsibility. Imposing a requirement for the States to use unencrypted machine readable technology renders the cardholder unable to control who receives her data.

If, however, the agency determines that it will not use encryption because of concerns about the complexity of public key regulation, there is another approach that would better protect the privacy of individuals than unfettered access to the machine readable zone. We suggest that no personal data be placed on the machine readable zone. Instead, place a new identifier that is unused elsewhere (i.e., not the driver’s license number or Social Security Number). This unique identifier will “point” to the records in the national database. Access to the database can be controlled by password and encryption security, because it is easier to regulate public keys in this scenario. Also, the State should ensure that a new unique identifier is created each time the machine readable zone is renewed or reissued, in order to make the identifier less useful as an everyday ID number – people would not be forever linked to this identifier. This approach would improve data security and privacy.

It is possible to use a “pointer” system in the machine readable zone, because the REAL ID Act did not set out what minimum document requirements on the machine readable zone need to be. The Act reads, “(9) a common machine-readable technology, with defined minimum data elements.”

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61 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,837, supra note 1.
62 See Privacy Act discussion, supra Section III (federal agencies have the obligation to protect the privacy rights of individuals from whom they collect information).
machine readable zone of the driver's license or identification card should be reduced or expanded." We recommend against putting any personal data on the machine readable zone and only placing this unique identifier. In this way, access to the data can be more tightly controlled.

DHS is required to include security protections on the REAL ID card. Under the REAL ID Act, the card must include "(8) Physical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for any fraudulent purpose." If DHS does not seek to limit access to the data on the REAL ID card, then it is signaling that it is acceptable for third parties to download, access and store the data for purposes beyond the three official purposes set out in the draft regulations: "accessing Federal facilities, boarding commercial aircraft, and entering nuclear power plants." Though DHS has contemplated expanding the uses for the REAL ID card, such an expansion would harm both individual privacy and security and quickly turn the United States into a country where the national identification card is involuntarily carried by everyone.

B. Unfettered Data Access Threatens Individual Privacy

If personal data is placed on the machine readable zone of the REAL ID card, then access to this data must be limited or individual privacy will be threatened. Unlimited access to this data will allow unauthorized third parties to download, access and store the personal data of any REAL ID cardholder.

The REAL ID Act mandates that the REAL ID card include "(8) Physical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the document for..."

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References:
64 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,842, supra note 1.
66 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,823, supra note 1.
any fraudulent purpose."\(^{67}\) Allowing universal access to personal data contained on the REAL ID card would facilitate identity theft and security breaches. In the privacy impact assessment of the draft regulations, the Department of Homeland Security Privacy Office urges encryption for the REAL ID machine readable zone. It explains that unsecured digital data raises the risk of "skimming," where one "expos[es] the information stored on the credential to unauthorized collection."\(^{68}\) This risk is not theoretical, the Privacy Office says, because "[r]eaders for the 2D bar code are readily available for purchase on the Internet and at a very low cost, which permits unauthorized third parties to skim the information for their own business needs or to sell to other third parties."\(^{69}\) Such skimming is often done without the individual's knowledge or consent.

A recent case illustrates the security threat posed by open access to personal data on a machine readable technology. Last month, New York prosecutors charged thirteen people in a counterfeiting ring where restaurant servers on the East Coast (from Connecticut to Florida) skimmed data from customers' credit cards.\(^{70}\) "They used small hand-held devices, about the size of a cigarette package that could be kept in a pocket, to record information encoded in the magnetic strips of credit cards."\(^{71}\) For a year and a half, the illegally gathered data was used to create fake credit cards and buy merchandise that the criminals resold.\(^{72}\) The financial data was easily accessed, downloaded and misused by the criminals because anyone with a skimmer device was able to read the unprotected machine readable zones.

\(^{68}\) Privacy Impact Assessment of Draft Regulations at 14.
\(^{69}\) Privacy Impact Assessment of Draft Regulations at 14.
\(^{70}\) Anemona Hartocollis, \$3 Million Lost to Fraud Ring, Authorities Say, N.Y. Times, April 21, 2007.
\(^{71}\) Id.
\(^{72}\) Id.
Some States are already facing problems with unauthorized parties accessing license and ID card data. California, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Texas have laws restricting the skimming of such data. In November, the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission sent letters to bar, restaurant and retail organizations explaining that they must stop scanning and downloading their patrons' license data. Such actions violate the state Digital Driver License Act, as well as the state and federal Drivers Privacy Protection Acts, according to the commission. Yet at least one establishment expressed reluctance to stop downloading and storing their customers' personal data, even in the face of legal action from the State. Today, different States have different ID cards with a variety of data and security features. Imagine what would happen if 245 million cards nationwide had personal data in the exact same open access format.

When a person hands over her license or ID card today, the data is not routinely downloaded and stored. A grocery store clerk or club bouncer usually merely looks at the card, verifies age or address, and then hands the card back to the individual. No transaction is recorded. However, universal access to the machine readable zone of the REAL ID card would allow the data to be downloaded, stored and transferred without the knowledge or permission of the individual cardholder. A digital transaction would be recorded and a digital trail could be created.

For example, let's follow Douglas Osborne for one weekend in the near future, if the national identification system is created and the machine readable zone left open for universal access. On Friday night, Doug went to Eighteenth Street Lounge at 8 p.m. with...
four friends, where their REAL ID cards were scanned and their personal data accessed and stored. At 9:35 p.m., he went to Club Five with the same four friends, where their REAL ID cards were scanned and their personal data accessed and stored. On Saturday afternoon, Doug bought two six-packs of Harpoon beer at 12:27 p.m. at a Safeway in Capitol Hill, where Doug’s REAL ID data was scanned and stored. On Saturday night, Doug and two friends took the 5:10 flight to Atlantic, where their cards were scanned and their information stored. At 11:37 p.m., Doug and his two friends checked into a hotel, where their ID cards were scanned and their data downloaded. On Sunday morning, one of Doug’s friends buys cigarettes at a casino, and his REAL ID is scanned and his data stored at 11:04 a.m. The digital trail could continue indefinitely. Individuals could easily be tracked from location to location as they went about their daily lives. Add to the REAL ID trail the information that could be gleaned from individuals’ credit card transactions, and you have complete consumer profiles for which many companies would pay dearly.

DHS must include in restrictions against the addition of data beyond that defined in the REAL ID Act. To allow additional data on the machine readable zone is to increase the likelihood of the REAL ID card becoming the default identification documents for everyday transactions; this would increase the incentive for third parties to gather and store individuals’ data, and substantially increase the card’s value to marketers and criminals. Expansion of the data collected, uses allowed, and users authorized would greatly increase both threats to the security and privacy of personal data.

77 "Because REAL IDs use a common MRT, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) considered requiring the use of machine readers on REAL IDs at airports. At this time TSA has rejected [the plan]" (emphasis added). Regulatory Evaluation at 58, supra note 18.
C. Use of RFID Technology Increases Vulnerability of Data

DHS contemplates using the REAL ID system as part of its Federal border security program and requested comments on how States could incorporate long-range radio frequency identification ("RFID") technology into the REAL ID card so that it could be used as part of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. Many groups have urged against the use of RFID technology in identification documents. There are significant privacy and security risks associated with the use of RFID-enabled identification cards, particularly if individuals are not able to control the disclosure of identifying information. The Department of State recognized these security and privacy threats and changed its E-Passport proposal because of them; the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") has just abandoned a plan to include RFID chips in border identification documents because the pilot test was a failure; and both the Department of Homeland Security's Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee and the Government Accountability Office recently cautioned against the use of RFID technology in identification documents.

Privacy and security risks associated with RFID-enabled identification cards include "skimming" and "eavesdropping." Skimming occurs when an individual with unauthorized RFID reader gathers information from an RFID chip without the cardholder’s knowledge. Eavesdropping occurs when an unauthorized individual intercepts data as it is read by an authorized RFID reader. In the absence of effective security techniques, RFID tags are remotely and secretly readable. Although the creation

of a small, easily portable RFID reader may be complex and expensive now, it will be easier as time passes. For example, the distance necessary to read RFID tags was initially thought to be a few inches. In the now-abandoned pilot test, the Department of Homeland Security said, “reliable reads can be received from a few inches to as much as 30 feet away from the reader.” Other tests also have shown that RFID tags can be read from 70 feet or more, posing a significant risk of unauthorized access.

Some attacks already have succeeded against so-called “strengthened” identification documents. In one case, a computer expert was able to clone the United Kingdom’s electronic passport by using a commercially available RFID reader (which cost less than $350) and software that took him less than a couple of days to write. In assessing the new RFID-enabled U.S. passports, one expert cloned the RFID tag and another used characteristics of the radio transmissions to identify individual chips, and those researchers spent only a few weeks attacking the RFID-enabled passports.

Another security risk of RFID-enabled identification cards is that of clandestine tracking. An unauthorized RFID reader could be constructed to mimic the authorized signal and then be used to secretly read the RFID tag embedded in the identification card. The Government Accountability Office has highlighted this security problem unique to wireless technology:

The widespread adoption of the technology can contribute to the increased occurrence of these privacy issues. As previously mentioned, tags can be read by any compatible reader. If readers and tags become ubiquitous, tagged items

carried by an individual can be scanned unbeknownst to that individual. Further, the increased presence of readers can provide more opportunities for data to be collected and aggregated.\textsuperscript{83}

So long as the RFID tag or chip can be read by unauthorized individuals, the person carrying that tag can be distinguished from any other person carrying a different tag. Individuals, unlike commercial products with RFID tags, should have the right to control the disclosure of their identifying information.

The federal government should be fully aware by now of the problems raised by an insecure RFID scheme. In April 2005, EPIC, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and other groups submitted comments urging the State Department to abandon its E-Passport proposal, because it would have made personal data contained in hi-tech passports vulnerable to unauthorized access.\textsuperscript{84} After the Department of State received more than 2,400 comments on its notice for proposed rulemaking on RFID-enabled passports, many of which criticized its serious disregard of security and privacy safeguards, the agency said it would implement Basic Access Control in an attempt to prevent skimming and eavesdropping.\textsuperscript{85} The use of RFID-enabled identification documents, without including Basic Access Control and other safeguards, contravenes the Department of State’s incorporation of basic security features into new U.S. passports.\textsuperscript{86}

In 2005, DHS began testing RFID-enabled I-94 forms in its United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology ("US-VISIT") program to track the entry and

\textsuperscript{86} See Kim Zetter, Feds Redesigning RFID Passport, Wired, Apr. 26, 2005; Eric Lipton, Bowing to Critics, U.S. to Alter Design of Electronic Passports, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 2005.
exit of visitors. The RFID-enabled forms stored a unique identification number, which is linked to data files containing foreign visitors’ personal data. EPIC warned that this flawed proposal would endanger personal privacy and security, citing the plan’s lack of basic privacy and security safeguards. The Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General echoed EPIC’s warnings in a July 2006 report. The Inspector General found “security vulnerabilities that could be exploited to gain unauthorized or undetected access to sensitive data” associated with people who carried the RFID-enabled I-94 forms. A report released by the Government Accountability Office in late January identified numerous performance and reliability issues in the 15-month test. The many problems with the RFID-enabled identification system led Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff to admit in Congressional testimony on February 9th that the pilot program had failed, stating “yes, we’re abandoning it. That’s not going to be a solution” for border security.

88 The data includes biographic information, such as name, date of birth, country of citizenship, passport number and country of issuance, complete U.S. destination address, and digital fingerprints. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Notice of Availability of Privacy Impact Assessment, 70 Fed. Reg. 39300, 39305 (July 7, 2005), available at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jun20051800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2005/05-13371.htm.
In Congressional testimony in March, a GAO official cautioned against the use of RFID technology to track individuals. "Once a particular individual is identified through an RFID tag, personally identifiable information can be retrieved from any number of sources and then aggregated to develop a profile of the individual. Both tracking and profiling can compromise an individual's privacy," the GAO said. The GAO reiterated the many problems with the failed US-VISIT RFID project and expressed concern that, despite this failure, DHS endorsed the use of RFID in the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative PASS Card.

In December, the Department of Homeland Security Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee adopted a report, "The Use of RFID for Identity Verification," which included recommendations concerning the use of RFID in identification documents. The committee outlined security and privacy threats associated with RFID similar to the ones discussed below, and it urged against RFID use unless the technology is the "least intrusive means to achieving departmental objectives." It is clear that the RFID technology outweigh its benefits and should not be used in identification documents.

VIII. UNIFORM LICENSE DESIGN WOULD CAUSE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NON-REAL ID CARDHOLDERS

95 Id. at 2.
The Department of Homeland Security contemplates a universal design for compliant and non-compliant REAL ID cards. A universal design, especially for a card including citizenship status, would cause irreparable harm, as it would foster suspicion of those who do not wish to carry the REAL ID card. Uniform design for a national identification card would also create an enormous security risk.

A. Universal Design Would Foster Suspicion of Innocent Individuals

The agency is considering a uniform REAL ID card design, asking for comments on "whether DHS should standardize the unique design or color required for non-REAL ID under the REAL ID Act for ease of nationwide recognition, and whether DHS should also implement a standardized design or color for REAL ID licenses." Mandating distinct designs or colors for both REAL ID and regular licenses and identification cards and requiring non-REAL ID driver’s licenses or ID cards to have explicit “invalid for federal purposes” designations turns this “voluntary” card into a mandatory national ID card. It would divide the country into two – people with the REAL ID card and those without – and anyone with a different license or ID card would be instantly suspicious. Significant delay, complication and possibly harassment or discrimination would fall upon those who choose not to carry a REAL ID card.

B. Official and Unofficial Purposes of REAL ID Must Not Be Increased

According to DHS, State driver’s licenses and identification cards must meet standards set out in the regulations to be accepted for Federal use under REAL ID. Such Federal purposes include entering Federal facilities, boarding commercial aircraft, entering nuclear power plants, and “any other purposes that the Secretary shall

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96 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,841-42, supra note 1.
97 Id. at 10,842.
determine,” but the limitation on use to the three enumerated purposes are “for the time
being.” The Department of Homeland Security, via the draft regulations and Homeland
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, contemplates expanding the use of the national
identification system.

In the draft regulations, the agency seeks comments on “how DHS could expand
the card’s official purposes] to other federal activities.” In a February speech, Secretary
Chertoff said he envisioned the REAL ID licenses “do[ing] double-duty or triple-duty.”
These national identification cards would “be used for a whole host of other purposes
where you now have to carry different identification.” The agency also may use the
REAL ID card in the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative program – if citizenship is
denoted on the card and long-range RFID technology added.

In the agency’s economic analysis of REAL ID implementation, reducing lD theft
is listed as one of the potential ancillary benefits of the national identification system.
However, the agency says that the potential benefit would depend on a vast expansion of
REAL ID uses from the three official purposes required in the draft regulations; DHS
suggests what is needed is “incidental and required use of REAL ID documents in
everyday transactions.” DHS envisions that employers, social service agencies

98 Regulatory Evaluation at 30, supra note 18.
99 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,823, supra note 1.
100 Michael Chertoff, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Remarks by Secretary Michael Chertoff at the
National Emergency Management Association Mid-Year Conference (Feb. 12, 2007), available at
101 Id.
102 See RFID Technology discussion, supra Section VII(c) (security and privacy risks inherent in RFID
use), and Citizenship Designation discussion, supra Section IV (citizenship designation breeds
discrimination).
103 Regulatory Evaluation at 130, supra note 18; see Identity Theft discussion, infra at Section X(c) (why
REAL ID will not reduce identity theft).
(including Medicare, Medicaid and student financial aid), firearm sellers and licensors, and election workers will all use this national identification system.\footnote{104}

The official and unofficial uses of REAL ID must not be broadened. Such expansion would harm national security. As explained below, using a single card for many identification purposes would be the same as using one key for every lock.

**IX. Expanded Data Collection and Retention Increases Security Risks**

Under REAL ID, the government would have easy access to an incredible amount of personal data stored in one national database (or, according to the DHS description, 56 State and Territory databases, each of which can access all of the others).\footnote{105} DHS claims that it is not expanding data collection and retention, but it is enlarging schedules and procedures for retention and distribution of identification documents and other personal data. This broad expansion of data collection and retention in a national database creates significant threats to privacy and security.

The agency makes two claims about the expanded data retention under REAL ID that we dispute: (1) “Most States already include this [extensive, personal] information in a machine readable technology,” and (2) “neither the Real ID Act nor these proposed regulations gives the Federal Government any greater access to information than it had before.”\footnote{106} Each claim is false: DHS is mandating the increase of both the type of documents that need to be retained and the length of data retention, and the agency will give both State and Federal governments greater access to the personal data.

\footnote{104}{See National Committee for Voting Integrity, http://votingintegrity.org/ and EPIC, Spotlight on Surveillance, With Some Electronic Voting Systems, Not All Votes Count (Sept. 2006), http://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0307 (why requiring any voter identification card is a poll tax).}

\footnote{105}{Section 202(d)(12); (d)(13).}

\footnote{106}{REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,824, supra note 1.}
With the REAL ID national identification system, DHS imposes new requirements on State motor vehicle agencies. Each of the 56 interconnected databases must contain all data fields printed on driver's licenses and ID cards, and driver's histories, including motor vehicle violations, suspensions, and points on licenses. The States are compelled to begin maintaining paper copies or digital images of important identity documents, such as birth certificates or naturalized citizenship papers, for seven to 10 years. This is a significant expansion of the personal data previously reviewed or stored by State motor vehicle agencies.

Currently these identification documents are kept in a variety of places – the Social Security system, the immigration system, local courthouses – and it takes considerable effort to gather them all together. Under REAL ID, all of these identification documents – concerning, among other things, births, marriages, deaths, immigration, social services – are consolidated into one national database, accessible to at least tens of thousands of government employees nationwide, which would give the Federal and State governments greater access than before.

Security expert Bruce Schneier, EPIC and others have explained that it decreases security to have one ID card for many purposes, as there will be a substantial amount of harm when the card is compromised. There is also the threat that REAL ID is ostensibly trying to protect against: forged identification cards. Investing so much trust into one card means that criminals will only have to forge one identification card. “No

107 Section 202(d)(12); (d)(13).
108 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.855, supra note 1.
matter how unforgeable we make it, it will be forged. We can raise the price of forgery, but we can’t make it impossible. Real IDs will be forged,” Schneier said. A national database full of identification documents, images and data would entice many kinds of criminals, including terrorists who seek to steal the identity of a “trusted” individual.

A national identification system would divide the United States into two groups: (1) “trusted good guys” who have the national ID card, and (2) “untrusted bad guys” who do not. But, Schneier has pointed out that there is a third category that appears – bad guys who fit the good guy profile. Upon the release of the draft regulations, Schneier said, “The REAL ID regulations do not solve problems of the national ID card, which will fail when used by someone intent on subverting that system. Evildoers will be able steal the identity – and profile – of an honest person, doing an end-run around the REAL ID system.” This national identification system inherently contains significant threats to individual privacy and national security.

X. NATIONAL ID DATABASE WOULD INCREASE SECURITY VULNERABILITIES

In the best-case scenario, the creation of the REAL ID national identification system does nothing to improve our security protections. In the worst-case scenario, the REAL ID system will exponentially increase threats to our national security. DHS’s cryptic economic analysis is based upon incredible assumptions about possible future terrorist attacks that REAL ID would supposedly prevent. The economic analysis also ignores indirect costs. The REAL ID system would harm national security by increasing

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112 See National Database discussion, supra Section X (how universal identification systems increase security threats).
risks of identity theft and fraud, and by diverting funds away from other security programs that have been proven effective.

A. Regulations Would Not Improve Our Security Protections

Quantitative risk assessments are characteristically limited by false or unverifiable assumptions, faulty modeling, and above all short-sighted local optimization that tends to ignore long-term implications and slippery-slope changes in the validity of the assumptions.\textsuperscript{113} The economic analysis in the Department of Homeland Security’s Regulatory Evaluation conducts such a quantitative risk assessment, and falls victims to these faulty assumptions. The Regulatory Evaluation states:

The primary benefit of REAL ID is to incrementally increase U.S. national security by reducing the vulnerability to criminal or terrorist activity of federal buildings, nuclear facilities, and aircraft. The chances of a terrorist attack on such targets being successful would generally increase if identity documents that grant access to them are in the possession of the attackers. This is demonstrated by the fact that several of the 9/11 hijackers had false driver’s licenses or fraudulently obtained driver’s licenses in their possession at the time of that attack.\textsuperscript{114}

The analysis goes on to say, “REAL ID is highly unlikely to impact the consequences of a successful attack, but it may impact, on the margin, the chance of a terrorist attack being attempted and succeeding.”\textsuperscript{115} So, DHS is attempting to determine the marginal chance that REAL ID will lessen the chance of success or discourage the attempt of a terrorist attack. Setting aside the assumption that a lack of REAL ID cards would make it more difficult to succeed in a terrorist attack upon the United States, we turn to the mathematical formula that DHS uses to calculate the REAL ID system’s presumed “primary benefit.”

\textsuperscript{114} Regulatory Evaluation at 126, \textit{supra} note 18.
\textsuperscript{115} Id. at 127.
The annual risk that the U.S. faces with regard to a potential terrorist attack can be represented as the chance that an attack will successfully take place, multiplied by the consequences of that attack. This can be mathematically represented as $\Pi \times K$, where $\Pi$ is the annual chance of a successful attack and $K$ is the consequences of an attack in monetary terms. Homeland security measures such as REAL ID impact either the chance or consequences of a successful attack, or both. REAL ID is highly unlikely to impact the consequences of a successful attack, but it may impact, on the margin, the chance of a terrorist attack being attempted and succeeding. Let $\Pi B$ be this chance prior to the introduction of REAL ID, and $\Pi A$ be the chance after REAL ID comes into effect. Then the security impact of REAL ID in the course of one year can be measured in dollar terms as $(\Pi B - \Pi A) \times K$.

So, DHS takes the probability of a successful terrorist attack without the REAL ID national identification system in place ($\Pi B$) and subtracts the probability of a successful attack with REAL ID ($\Pi A$); then they take the resulting number and multiply it by the cost to the United States of a successful terrorist attack. Understandably, DHS goes onto explain that such an evaluation is very difficult and full of uncertainty.

Let the cost of the REAL ID regulation, which has been estimated, be $C$. Then for REAL ID to be fully justified on national security grounds alone, it must be the case that its benefit is at least as great as its costs. The annual risk-reduction benefit of Real ID is $(\Pi B - \Pi A) \times K$, and the sum of this benefit over ten years must equal Real ID’s cost, $C$. If we can determine a dollar value for $K$, then we can measure the marginal impact that REAL ID must bring about on the probability of a successful terrorist attack on a federal target for it to be fully justified by its security benefit.

DHS is attempting to determine if $(\Pi B - \Pi A) \times K$, which is the annual risk-reduction benefit of REAL ID, over 10 years, is at least equal to $C$, which is the cost of REAL ID, which DHS has set at – a discounted rate of – $17.2B. DHS goes on to explain that this formula is based on the assumption that another attack would affect us, in economic terms, the same as September 11, 2001. DHS estimates another attack would cost the United States either $63.9 billion (an estimate of the immediate impact incurred) or

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116 Id. at 127.
117 Id.
$374.7B (an estimate of the immediate and longer run impact). Other assumptions:

We assume that terrorist groups are seeking to inflict another attack with consequences on the order of magnitude of 9/11. We also assume that they are engaged in a campaign such that in every year during the 10-year period over which the costs and benefits of REAL ID are being evaluated, there is a positive and identical probability of being successfully attacked. Under this assumption, the expected present value of the consequences of the terrorist campaign against the U.S. homeland equals the sum of the expected values of consequences in each particular year over the 10-year period 2007-16:

$$\sum_{2007}^{2016} (1-\delta)^n K_n + (1-\delta)^2 D_2 K_2 + (1-\delta)^3 D_3 K_3 + \ldots + (1-\delta)^9 D_9 K_9,$$

where $\delta$ is the discount rate and $K$ is the monetary value of consequences in real 2006 dollars. Because we assume that $\delta$ and $\delta$ do not change from year to year, this can be re-written as:

$$\sum_{2007}^{2016} (1-\delta)^n K + (1-\delta)^2 D_2 K + \ldots + (1-\delta)^9 D_9 K,$$

or

$$D \times \sum_{2007}^{2016} (1-\delta)^n K,$$

where $D$ equals \{1 + (1-\delta) + (1-\delta)^2 + \ldots + (1-\delta)^9\}.

This expression is the sum of the expected discounted annual consequences of a terrorist campaign against the U.S. homeland over a ten-year period. As noted earlier, Real ID is anticipated to bring about a reduction in the annual probability of a successful attack from $\Pi_B - \Pi_A$, and the security benefit of Real ID over the ten-year period is therefore $D \times (\Pi_B - \Pi_A) \times K$.\(^{119}\)

The variable $D$ represents the annual consequences of a terrorist campaign against the U.S. over a ten-year period. DHS multiplies $D$ by $[(\Pi_B - \Pi_A) \times K]$, which is the annual risk-reduction benefit of REAL ID. DHS then sets this equation equal to the direct cost of the REAL ID national ID system. By solving this equation, DHS hopes to find the marginal impact on security that the REAL ID system must have in order to break even. For "Real ID to break even with respect to cost and expected security

\(^{116}\) Id. at 127.

\(^{119}\) Regulatory Evaluation at 128-29, supra note 18.
benefits, it must be the case that $D^*(\Pi B - \Pi A)^*K = C$, or $\Pi B - \Pi A = C/(D^*K)$. So, to break even, we need $[D^*(\Pi B - \Pi A)^*K]$ to be equal to $C$, meaning that how much REAL ID will save us in economic terms must be equal to the cost of the REAL ID system. Or, stated another way, it must be that $\Pi B - \Pi A$, probability of a successful terrorist attack without the REAL ID national identification system in place ($\Box B$) minus the probability of a successful attack with REAL ID ($\Pi A$), is equal to $C$, cost of REAL ID system, divided by $D$, annual consequences of a terrorist campaign against the U.S. over a ten-year period, multiplied by $K$, cost to the United States of a successful terrorist attack.

Here is where it gets tricky. Assuming the cost of REAL ID to be $17.2B and the cost of a successful 9/11-type terrorist attack to be $374.7 billion long-term, the value of $C/D^*K$, in 2006 dollars, is 0.61%. Therefore, for "REAL ID to be fully justified by its primary security benefit, it must bring about a marginal reduction in the annual chance of a successful 9/11-type attack of 0.61%." If DHS only estimates the immediate impact, and assumes the cost of REAL ID to be $17.2 billion and the cost of the attack to be $63.9 billion, then the value of $C/(D^*K)$ is 3.60%. "For REAL ID to be fully justified by its primary security benefit in immediate impacts alone, it must bring about a marginal reduction in the annual chance of a successful 9/11-type attack of 3.60%." After all of these head-scratching mathematical assumptions, there is no conclusion, because, as DHS explains, "[w]ithout further information on the absolute level of $\Box B$ [the probability of a successful terrorist attack without the REAL ID national identification system in place], it is difficult to say whether 0.61% or 3.60% is a very large reduction in..."
the chance of successful attack, or a more moderate reduction.\footnote{Id.} Therefore, it is unknown, even with all of these assumptions, whether REAL ID would even marginally reduce the possibility of a successful terrorist attack.

DHS acknowledges that certain assumptions are used in this analysis, such as assumptions for the variable K, the impact or the cost to the U.S. economy of a terrorist attack, which DHS assumes would be of the same magnitude as September 11, 2001. However, there is little discussion about the variable C, the cost of the REAL ID system. There are two ways in which the figures used by DHS are faulty: 1) they underestimate the direct costs and 2) they ignore the indirect costs. Such indirect costs include the impact upon civil liberties, increased risk of identity theft and fraud, and the diversion of funds from other, effective security programs.\footnote{See Identity Theft discussion, infra at Section X(c) (REAL ID increases risks for identity theft).} Both faulty assumptions make the variable C smaller, while DHS has assumed a very large number for K, so the cost of the REAL ID system would seem dwarfed in comparison to the cost of another terrorist attack, making REAL ID seem cost-effective even if it only has a marginal effect on the probability of another attack – an effect REAL ID would not have.

REAL ID does not add to our security protections, but in fact increases our security threats by diverting needed funds from other national security projects. The estimated cost of REAL ID implementation has spiraled. Before the Act’s passage in 2005, the Congressional Budget Office estimated its cost to be around $100 million.\footnote{Cong. Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 418: REAL ID Act of 2005 (Feb. 9, 2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6072&sequence=0&from=6.} In September, the National Conference of State Legislatures released a report estimating the

\footnote{Id.}

cost to be $11 billion over the first five years.\textsuperscript{126} Now, the Department of Homeland Security has admitted that REAL ID will cost states and individuals from $17.2 billion to $23.1 billion over ten years.\textsuperscript{127} Congress has appropriated only $40 million for REAL ID implementation. The Department of Homeland Security now says that a state can use up to 20 percent of its Homeland Security Grant Program funding for REAL ID implementation, which total about $100 million for 2007.\textsuperscript{128} Implementation costs for the state of California alone would be about $500 million.\textsuperscript{129}

Diverting Homeland Security Grant Program money to REAL ID means that funding originally budgeted by the states for other homeland security projects, including training and equipment for rescue and first responder personnel. Even if the states received $100 million per year for 10 years, that would still amount to only $1.04 billion in Federal funds, a fraction of the $17.2 billion to $23.1 billion price tag. The rest of the cost would be borne by states and their residents.

\textbf{B. Regulations Would Increase National Security Threats}

In a recent analysis of the REAL ID Act, EPIC Executive Director Marc Rotenberg explained that "[s]ystems of identification remain central to many forms of security. But designing secure systems that do not introduce new risks is proving more difficult than many policymakers had imagined."\textsuperscript{130} The theory that the REAL ID Act

\textsuperscript{126} Governors' Analysis, supra note 46.
\textsuperscript{127} REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,845. supra note 1.
will prevent terrorism is predicated on the belief that only “outsiders” have an intent to harm the United States. This theory is fundamentally flawed.

Security expert Bruce Schneier has explained the theory of identification-based security. “In theory, if we know who you are, and if we have enough information about you, we can somehow predict whether you’re likely to be an evildoer,” Schneier said. This is impossible, because you cannot predict intent based on identification, he said. There are threats from both sides. Terrorist acts have been committed by U.S. citizens, “insiders.” Oklahoma City bombers Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were U.S. citizens. As was Unabomber Ted Kaczynski.

A recent case illustrates Schneier’s point. According to court documents, last month, two men entered restricted areas at an airport in Florida, bypassed security screeners and carried a duffel bag containing 14 guns and drugs onto a commercial plane. They avoided detection, because they are airline baggage handlers who used their uniforms and legally issued identification cards. Both men had passed Federal background checks before they were hired, according to a spokesman for Comair, the airline that employed the men. This questions the assumption that more and broader background checks, such as those suggested in the draft regulations, would prevent insider attacks. There are other problems with the background checks, which will be discussed below.

131 Schneier Essay, supra note 110.
132 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See Domestic Violence discussion, infra Section XI.
The baggage handlers were only investigated and caught after police received an anonymous tip. If the airport had identification-neutral security systems, such as requiring all fliers go through metal detectors, then the men could not have walked past them. But the identification-based security system failed because it allowed some fliers to skip screening because they are presumed to have no evil intent, and the men transported weapons and contraband aboard a commercial flight. Creating a national identification system would have just as devastating consequences, but on a larger scale, because many more people would be presumed “trusted” or “untrusted” based upon their decision to carry or not carry the REAL ID card.

C. Even If Assumptions Granted, REAL ID Would Not Substantially Affect Identity Theft Crimes

The draft regulations list reducing identity theft as one of the benefits of the REAL ID national identification system. However, the agency’s own economic analysis under its Regulatory Evaluation shows that, even if one grants DHS the economic assumptions it makes, overall identity theft crimes would only be reduced by 2.8 percent, at best.

First, it is important to note that the DHS Regulatory Evaluation does not list “Reduce Identity Theft” under any of the three categories of benefits — “monetized,” “annualized quantified, but unmonetized,” or “unquantifiable benefits” in the accounting statement for the draft regulations. Actually, the only benefit listed is under “unquantifiable benefits,” and that is the claim that REAL ID would “incrementally increase U.S. national security.”

137 Jim Ellis, Feds: Bag Of Guns Smuggled Onto Plane.
138 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,837, 10,846, supra note 1.
139 Regulatory Evaluation at 5, supra note 18.
140 Id. at 7.
Second, the Regulatory Evaluation later lists “reducing identity theft” as a potential ancillary benefit. The economic analysis explains that:

REAL ID will only have the ability to impact those types of identity theft that require a drivers license for successful implementation, and only to the extent that the rulemaking leads to incidental and required use of REAL ID documents in everyday transactions, which is an impact that also depends critically on decisions made by State and local governments and the private sector.

The potential ancillary benefit depends on a vast expansion of REAL ID uses from the three official purposes required in the draft regulations. The economic analysis assumes that REAL ID would be used in “everyday transactions,” which would have a devastating affect on identity theft protections. Setting aside that flawed assumption and focusing upon the economic analysis, there is little benefit to be found. If all of the agency’s assumptions are agreed to, including the belief that REAL ID cards would be used in everyday transactions, the Department of Homeland Security still finds that REAL ID would reduce by 10 percent only the 28 percent of ID theft crimes that “are likely to require the presentation of an identity document like a drivers license.” Therefore, the REAL ID national identification system will reduce only 2.8 percent of all identity theft crimes, a savings of approximately $1.6 billion total for the 2007-2016 period. The Department of Homeland Security has estimated that REAL ID would cost $23.1 billion for that period. Basic economic analysis finds that one ought not spend $23.1 billion to create a national identification system that might reduce the cost of identity theft crimes by $1.6 billion.

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141 Id. at 126, 129-30.
142 Id. at 130.
143 See Identity Theft discussion, infra at Section X(c) (REAL ID increases risks of identity theft).
144 Regulatory Evaluation at 130, supra note 18.
145 Id.
D. Centralized Identification System Increases Risk of Identity Theft

The draft regulations create a national identification system with a national database, and this creates an enormous security risk. EPIC and others have explained that it decreases security to have a centralized system of identification, one ID card for many purposes, as there will be a substantial amount of harm when the card is compromised. 146

The REAL ID Act mandates that States provide every other state with electronic access to information contained in their motor vehicle databases and each State database must contain all data fields printed on driver’s licenses and ID cards, and driver’s histories, including motor vehicle violations, suspensions, and points on licenses. 147 Yet, DHS claims that a national database will not be created because the regulations “leave[] the decision of how to conduct the exchanges in the hands of the States.” 148 This mandatory “State-to-State data exchange” creates one huge national database containing the personal information of 245 million license and ID cardholders – a database that can be accessed at DMVs across the country.

Using a national ID card would be as if you used one key to open your house, your car, your safe deposit box, your office, and more. 149 “The problem is that security doesn’t come through identification; security comes through measures – airport screening, walls and door locks – that work without relying on identification”; therefore,

147 Section 202(d)(12); (d)(13).
148 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.825. supra note 1.

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a centralized system of identification would not increase national security, security expert Bruce Schneier has said.\textsuperscript{150}

A large data breach affects the confidence and trust of the public. People will recoil from systems that create privacy and security risks for their personal data. We have seen countless data breaches that have left the personal data of tens of millions of Americans vulnerable to misuse. Recently, almost 46 million credit and debit card numbers were stolen by hackers who accessed the computer systems at the TJX Companies over a period of several years, making it the biggest breach of personal data ever reported.\textsuperscript{151} The computer system breaches began in July 2005 but weren't discovered until December 2006 – the financial data of millions were exposed for 17 months.\textsuperscript{152} Last May, an information security breach by a Department of Veterans Affairs employee resulted in the theft from his Maryland home of unencrypted data affecting 26.5 million veterans, active-duty personnel, and their family members.\textsuperscript{153} The laptop and an external hard drive contained unencrypted information that included millions of Social Security numbers, disability ratings and other personal information.\textsuperscript{154} In February 2005, databroker Choicepoint sold the records of at least 145,000 Americans to a criminal ring engaged in identity theft.\textsuperscript{155} Also that year, Bank of America misplaced back-up tapes


\textsuperscript{151} TJX Cos., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8-10 (Mar. 28, 2007), available at \url{http://ir.10kwizard.com/download.php?format=PDF&ipage=4772887&source=487}.

\textsuperscript{152} Id. at 7.

\textsuperscript{153} See EPIC's Page on the Veterans Affairs Data Theft, \url{http://www.epic.org/privacy/vatheft/}.

\textsuperscript{154} Statement, Dep't of Veterans Affairs, A Statement from the Department of Veterans Affairs (May 22, 2006).

\textsuperscript{155} Robert O'Harrow Jr., \textit{ID Theft Scam Hits D.C. Area Residents}, Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 2005, at A01; see EPIC's Page on ChoicePoint, \url{http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/}.
containing detailed financial information on 1.2 million employees in the Federal
government, including many members of Congress.\textsuperscript{156}

A centralized identification system would be a tempting target for identity thieves. If a criminal breaks the system's security, then the criminal would have access to the personal information of every single person in that database. If this one, centralized system is used across the nation, this would put hundreds of millions of people at risk for identity theft.

There is another significant security risk, besides that of attacks by unauthorized users, and that is of authorized users abusing their power.\textsuperscript{157} A 2005 scandal in Florida highlights risks associated with large database systems. A woman wrote to a newspaper criticizing a Florida sheriff as being too fat for police work and condemning his agency's use of stun guns.\textsuperscript{158} Orange County Sheriff Kevin Beary ordered staffers to use state driver's license records to find the home address of his critic.\textsuperscript{159} The sheriff sent her a letter at her home address, and she reported being surprised that he was able to track her down so easily.\textsuperscript{160} In a case in Maryland just last year, three people – including a Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration official – were indicted on charges of "conspiring to sell unlawfully produced MVA-issued Maryland identification cards."\textsuperscript{161}

The consumer harm that results from the wrongful disclosure of personal information is very clear. For the seventh year in a row, identity theft is the No. 1 concern

\textsuperscript{156} Robert Lemos, Bank of America loses a million customer records, CNet News.com, Feb. 25, 2005.

\textsuperscript{157} See Domestic Violence discussion, infra Section XI (abusers use their authorized access to stalk victims).

\textsuperscript{158} Called fat, sheriff tracks down reader, Associated Press, Apr. 6, 2005.

\textsuperscript{159} Id.

\textsuperscript{160} Id.

\textsuperscript{161} Fake ID Cards, Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 2006, at B02.
of U.S. consumers, according to the Federal Trade Commission's annual report. Over 104 million data records of U.S. residents have been exposed due to security breaches since January 2005, according to a report from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. A centralized system of identification creates a "one-stop shop" for identity thieves. Centralizing authority over personal identity into one database and one card increases both the risk of identity theft as well as the scope of harm when it occurs. The confidence and trust of consumers will fall when such a breach occurs; people will withdraw because of privacy and security questions.

XI. REAL ID HARMS VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT

The REAL ID national identification system creates difficulties for many groups, and it has significant consequences for domestic violence and sexual assault victims. The residential address requirements endanger the ability of victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and other crimes to hide from their abusers. The background check provisions set out in the draft regulations do not fully protect these victims from their abusers. In fact, the REAL ID system would help abusers find and track their victims across the nation.

A. REAL ID Endangers Address Confidentiality

Currently, many States allow domestic violence victims and others to protect the confidentiality of their residential addresses. States have created formal Address Confidentiality Programs and states have also provided general measures of residential

address privacy. The proposed regulations override these substantial protections, and the overrides must be removed from the final regulations. The government must not make it easier for abusers to find their victims.

State Address Confidentiality Programs are an important tool for protecting the safety of domestic violence and sexual assault victims. Currently 20 states have address confidentiality programs. Generally, under such programs, domestic violence or sexual assault victims register with the secretary of State or their attorney general. The victim is provided an address with that State office, which forwards the mail received there to the enrollee’s residential address. This State office address is used in official correspondence with the State, though businesses are not usually required to use it.

The REAL ID Act requires that driver’s licenses include a person’s “address of principal residence.” This requirement effectively destroys state address confidentiality programs. The recent Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act (“VAWA”) included a requirement for DHS to “consider and address” the needs of certain groups when the agency is “developing regulations or guidance with regard to identification documents, including driver’s licenses.” These groups include domestic violence and sexual assault victims who are entitled to be enrolled in State address confidentiality programs; whose addresses are entitled to be suppressed via court order or State or Federal law; or whose information is protected

165 See, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures. States With Address Confidentiality Programs for Domestic Violence Survivors, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/dvsurviive.htm (listing 19 states, not including Maryland but including Illinois which is unfunded); See also, Maryland Safe At Home Address Confidentiality Program, http://www.sos.state.md.us/ACP/Information.htm.
from disclosure according to Section 384 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 1996.\textsuperscript{168}

In the draft regulations, DHS has not followed the VAWA requirement; instead, the agency has significantly reduced the protections afforded by these programs. The proposed regulations require that addresses of principal residence be placed on the face of the REAL ID card and include some exemptions from this requirement, such as one for those enrolled in Federal Witness Security Programs.\textsuperscript{169} The regulations also exempt those who are enrolled in State address confidentiality programs.\textsuperscript{170} This is not the same as creating an exemption for those who are “entitled to be enrolled in the programs, as stated under the Violence Against Women Act.” In its discussion of the proposed rule, DHS does propose to include an exemption for those who are “entitled to be enrolled” in state address confidentiality programs.\textsuperscript{171} DHS must include this exemption in the final regulations. It cannot be that, as currently stated under the draft regulations, only those actually enrolled in State Address Confidentiality Programs would be exempted from the requirement to display their residential addresses on the face of the REAL ID card. Many domestic violence and sexual assault victims who are entitled to enroll in State Address Confidentiality Programs are not actually enrolled, for a variety of personal, safety and logistical reasons. They should not be punished for not actually enrolling in the program.

In order to adequately “consider and address” the needs of those who are “entitled to be enrolled” in a State confidentiality program, DHS must permit States to allow those who are entitled to be, but are not in address confidentiality programs to be exempted

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{169} REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10854, \textit{supra} note 1.
\textsuperscript{170} Id. at 10854.
\textsuperscript{171} Id. at 10836.
\end{footnotes}
from the address of principal residence requirement. DHS should allow individuals to affirm that they fear victimization and would benefit from address confidentiality. It would be problematic to burden State motor vehicle agencies with the determination of who is entitled to be enrolled in an address confidentiality program. States could rely on the affirmation, rather than making a determination of the merits of an individual’s need for confidentiality. This would close the gap between those domestic violence and sexual assault victims who are “entitled to be enrolled” and those who are actually enrolled in State Address Confidentiality Programs.

Also, though the proposed rule exempts from the residential address requirement those whose addresses are “entitled to be suppressed under State or Federal law or suppressed by a court order,” this statement should be clarified to include States that generally allow individuals to display on licenses and ID cards an address other than their principal place of residence.172 Several States generally allow non-residential addresses to be on driver’s licenses. Currently, at least seven States permit an address other than a residential address to be listed on licenses or ID cards (California,173 Florida,174 Montana,175 New Mexico,176 Oklahoma,177 Wyoming,178 and Virginia179). For example, under Virginia’s law, an applicant may choose to list a post office box, business or residential address.180 The applicant is still required to provide their residential address

172 REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10854, supra note 1.
180 Id.
for motor vehicle department records, but this residential address is not displayed on the license or ID card.\textsuperscript{181}

Domestic violence survivors, other crime victims, or those generally interested in protecting their privacy avail themselves of these State laws to keep their addresses confidential. These laws are the only way that survivors can protect themselves in States that do not have formal address confidentiality programs – four of those listed do not (Montana, New Mexico, Virginia and Wyoming). These general address privacy laws are also the only way that those who fear victimization, but who do not formally qualify for State Address Confidentiality programs, can protect themselves.

Without this exemption allowing States to permit any individual to protect her privacy by listing a non-residential address, the victims of domestic violence and sexual abuse will also face the embarrassment of disclosing that they are victims anytime that their identification is shown. There are few exceptions from the residential address requirement, and anyone holding a REAL ID card without the residential address listed would immediately be placed into one of these few categories.

\textbf{B. National Database Threatens Security of Victims of Abuse Crimes}

The draft regulations require that States provide electronic access to their motor vehicle database information to all other States.\textsuperscript{182} Survivors who flee their abusers, crossing into different states, will be exposed if their abuser breaches the security of any one of these interconnected databases. An abuser with an associate inside a State DMV, law enforcement, or other agency with access to the State records would be able to track a victim as the victim moves across the country.

\textsuperscript{181} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{182} REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,856, \textit{supra} note 1.
The danger of negligent and accidental disclosures is increased by REAL ID, as substantially more government employees will have access to all motor vehicle records nationwide. One example of accidental disclosure occurred in Wisconsin earlier this year -- a police officer disclosed a victim's address, found in a DMV record to a stalker; the officer did not know that the victim had a restraining order against this.\textsuperscript{183} This sort of inadvertence would happen much more frequently in a post-REAL ID world, as access to personal information is spread throughout the national identification system. Intentional breaches by outsiders or authorized insiders abusing their power would also have a wider scope. Past abuses exemplify what can be expected in a nationwide scale. For example, in Arizona, a police officer admitted to accessing motor vehicle records to find personal information on women he was romantically interested in, as well as co-workers.\textsuperscript{184} If REAL ID is implemented, abusers and insiders would have access to records throughout the country and would be able to track their victims no matter where they flee.

C. Proposed Background Check Procedures Do Not Fully Protect Victims of Abuse Crimes

DHS proposes that certain government employees be subject to criminal history background checks, with certain offenses disqualifying employees from specific jobs related to the REAL ID national identification system.\textsuperscript{185} Covered employees would be limited to those who could affect the recording of information, the manufacture of REAL ID cards, or the information displayed on a card.\textsuperscript{186} Employees who can access the record information without the ability to edit it are not subject to the background check.

\textsuperscript{183} Kevin Murphy, Officer's Actions will Cost 25,000. \textsc{GazetteXtra}, Feb. 15, 2007, available at http://www.gazetteextra.com/mezera021507.asp.
\textsuperscript{184} Michael Kiefer, Officer Admits to Tampering; Databases Used to Check on Women, \textsc{Arizona Republic}, April 6, 2006, at B3.
\textsuperscript{185} REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10,855. \textit{supra} note 1.
\textsuperscript{186} Id. at 10,856.
requirement. This massive loophole greatly increases the security and privacy risks of domestic violence and sexual abuse victims, as significant damage can be done by unauthorized data disclosure. In order to safeguard against these threats, the broad category of those who have access to records should be shrunk, rather than increasing the category of those who are covered by the background check requirement.

The suitability criteria of the background check do not match the threat of stalkers and abusers. DHS proposes to use the permanent and interim disqualifying criteria in the Transportation Security Administration’s background checks for maritime and land transportation security at 49 C.F.R. 1572.103. The offenses include espionage, sedition, treason, making bomb threats, and crimes involving transportation security incidents. Some of the offenses, such as fraud and misrepresentation -- including identity fraud -- are relevant to the risks of improper disclosure and access to the records. However, crimes such as stalking, surveillance, harassment and domestic abuse are not in this list. These crimes must be added to the list of disqualifying offenses, so that the REAL ID system does not create a loophole permitting abusers access to a national database that would allow them to track their victims no matter where the victims moved.

D. REAL ID Increases the Power Abusers Have Over Their Victims

REAL ID’s stringent document requirements will place more power in the hands of abusers. Fleeing domestic violence or sexual abuse can be a sudden and dramatic step. Victims’ advocates often counsel their clients to prepare “safety plans,” which include

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187 Id. at 10,856.
188 49 C.F.R. 1572.103(a).
189 Id. at 1572.103(b)(2)(iii).

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gathering key documents such as passports, visas, and birth certificates. The proposed regulations limit the types of documents that can be used to prove identity, which create problems for many groups, including abuse victims. The draft regulations permit exceptions for those who do not have the required documents “for reasons beyond their control.” The exception requires that the records “visibly indicate” that alternative documentation was accepted and that a “full explanation” of the reason be included in the record. Thus victims will face the embarrassment of having intimate details of the abuse they have suffered included in a national database accessible to thousands of government employees across the nation. The “for reasons beyond their control” exception must specifically include abuse victims, so that they may not be punished for leaving their abusers. The visible indication and “full explanation” included in the records should be limited to the statement that alternative documents were accepted “for reasons of personal safety,” so that victims need not expose the history of their abuse to anyone who could view their DMV records.

Another problem is that this “for reasons beyond their control” exception does not apply to those who must demonstrate lawful immigration status. Under the draft regulations, the demonstration of lawful status would require documents that an abuser would likely have control over. Abusers of immigrants who are able to control their victims immigration documents will be able to control the victim’s ability to obtain a

\[^{190}\] E.g., Oakland County Coordinating Council Against Domestic Violence, Domestic Violence Handbook – Personalized Safety Plan, at http://www.domesticviolence.org/plan.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2007) (“Items to take, if possible... Birth Certificates ... Social security cards ... Passports, green cards, work permits”).
\[^{191}\] REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.852, supra note 1; see Data Verification discussion, supra Section VI (general problems with the standards).
\[^{192}\] REAL ID Draft Regulations at 10.852, supra note 1.
\[^{193}\] Id.
\[^{194}\] Id.
REAL ID card or license. The “for reasons beyond their control” exception must be extended to those victims who must prove lawful immigration status, so that the abusers cannot use these documents to trap their victims into staying in abusive situations. The exception permitting those who do not have access to documents to use alternative documentation should be extended to the proof of lawful immigration status. Here, also, the visible indication and “full explanation” included in the victims’ DMV records should be limited to the statement that alternative documents were accepted “for reasons of personal safety,” so that victims need not expose the history of their abuse to anyone and everyone who could view their DMV records.

XII. METASYSTEM OF IDENTIFICATION IS BETTER CHOICE

Once personal data has fallen into the hands of an identity thief, the potential for its misuse is proportionate to the extent that the information can be used for illegitimate authentication. We have already explained why a universal identifier will not improve security. Rather than promoting the use of universal identifiers, EPIC advocates the distribution of identity or an identity metasystem in which authentication is confined to specific contexts in order to limit the scope for potential misuse. The danger of a single identifier is that the harm will be magnified when it is compromised.

A system of distributed identification reduces the risks associated with security breaches and the misuse of personal information. For example, a banking PIN number, in conjunction with a bank card, provides a better authentication system because it is not coupled with a single, immutable consumer identity. If a bank card and PIN combination is compromised, a new bank card and PIN number can be issued and the old combination cancelled, limiting the damage done by the compromised data. Drawbacks of such